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English Summary 
i 
 
  
Anxiety disorders are not just characterized by intense fear responding; fear also becomes 
widespread and can be ‘called out’ by a litany of innocuous events. This overgeneralization substantially 
contributes to the debilitating nature of anxiety. Our objective was to better understand the learning 
mechanisms underlying this clinical phenomenon. In particular, we sought to explain complex cases in 
which seemingly abstract events evoke psychological distress. For instance, an individual who survives a 
traumatic car accident might later experience fear when confronted with symbols of driving (e.g. the 
sound of keys) or even avoid other modes of transport (e.g. trains or boats). This is known as category-
level fear generalization. 
 Derived relational responding is one learning mechanism likely to be involved in category-level 
fear generalization. This is the ability to spontaneously respond to one stimulus in terms of another, which 
is physically dissimilar and not immediately present. Using laboratory procedures from the field of 
learning psychology (e.g. the matching-to-sample task), we can establish artificial stimulus categories 
wherein participants derive conceptual relations between stimuli, e.g. stimulus equivalence categories. 
Next, we can examine the impact of derived stimulus relations on fear generalization through the use of 
standard fear conditioning protocols. 
 Section 1 investigated the impact of a fundamental concept of similarity on fear generalization. 
First, we conducted an experimental study that illustrated how perceptual and conceptual similarities 
concurrently facilitate the generalization of fear (Chapter 2). Second, we considered whether category-
level generalization is involved in other anxiety-related health complaints. In an experimental study, a 
previously neutral arm-movement evoked heightened fear-of-pain by virtue of its derived similarity to an 
aversively conditioned stimulus (Chapter 3). This finding might highlight a novel pathway for the 
emergence of pain-related fear in chronic pain disorders. 
 Section 2 expanded the scope of inquiry. The impact of more complex types of derived stimulus 
relations on fear generalization were specifically investigated. We replicated and extended upon the 
findings of previous experimental research and demonstrated that conceptual opposition can hamper fear 
generalization (Chapters 4 & 5). Attempts were also made to isolate environmental and individual traits 
that promote category-level fear generalization. As a final aim, we also attempted to determine whether 
stimuli in derived opposition with an aversively conditioned stimulus could act as safety signals that 
inhibit the expression of fear (Chapter 6). 
 In Section 3, we explored whether the category-level fear generalization could be attenuated. 
Two experimental studies demonstrated that the generalization of fear-relevant behaviors between 
members of a stimulus equivalence category could be disrupted. This occurred by presenting category 
exemplars in novel contexts (Chapter 7). The potential connection between this experimental design and 
the clinical technique known as ‘cognitive defusion’ was also considered. 
 Six experimental chapters are couched between a general introduction and a general discussion. 
In the general introduction, the background for this dissertation is outlined and the reader is introduced to 
key themes, definitions, objectives and goals. The final discussion then provides an overview of the 
principle findings, general conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
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Angststoornissen worden niet enkel gekenmerkt door intense vrees en vermijding; deze responsen kunnen 
ook wijdverspreid raken/ uitbreiden en opgeroepen worden door gebeurtenissen en stimuli die daarvoor neutraal 
waren. Deze overgeneralisatie van vrees draagt substantieel bij aan de slopende aard van angst. Daarom was ons 
doel om de leermechanismen die onderliggend zijn aan dit klinisch fenomeen beter te begrijpen. Meer bepaald 
probeerden we complexe gevallen te verklaren waarin ogenschijnlijk arbitraire gebeurtenissen vrees en vermijding 
uitlokken. Bijvoorbeeld, een persoon die een traumatisch auto-ongeluk overleeft, kan later vrees ervaren wanneer 
hij/zij geconfronteerd wordt met symbolen die verwijzen naar autorijden (bijvoorbeeld het geluid van sleutels) en 
uiteindelijk andere transportmiddelen vermijden (bijvoorbeeld treinen of boten). Dit wordt categoriegebaseerde 
angstgeneralisatie genoemd . 
 We veronderstellen dat onder andere afgeleide relationele responsen betrokken zijn bij categoriegebaseerde 
generalisatie. Afgeleide relationeel responderen verwijst naar de mogelijkheid om spontaan te reageren op een 
stimulus in overeenstemming met een andere stimulus die fysisch verschillend is en niet rechtstreeks aanwezig. Aan 
de hand van laboratorium procedures uit het domein van de leerpsychologie (bijvoorbeeld de matching-to-sample 
task), zijn we in staat om artificiële stimulus categorieën te installeren waaruit deelnemers complexe conceptuele 
relaties tussen stimuli kunnen afleiden, bijvoorbeeld ‘stimulus gelijkwaardigheid categorieën’. Gebruik makend van 
standaard conditioneringsprotocollen kunnen we dan de invloed van de afgeleide stimulus relaties op 
vreesgeneralisatie onderzoeken. 
 Deel 1 onderzocht de invloed van essentiële concepten van gelijkheid op vreesgeneralisatie. Ten eerste 
deden we een experimentele studie die toelicht hoe perceptuele en conceptuele gelijkenissen gezamenlijk 
vreesgeneralisatie bevorderen (Hoofdstuk 2). Ten tweede, namen we de mogelijkheid in overweging dat 
categoriegebaseerde generalisatie kan betrokken zijn bij andere angst gerelateerde gezondheidsklachten. In een 
experimentele studie lokten voorheen neutrale armbewegingen verhoogde vrees uit op basis van hun conceptuele 
gelijkenis met andere aversieve geconditioneerde stimuli (Hoofdstuk 3). Deze bevinding kan een nieuw pad 
markeren voor het ontstaan van pijn gerelateerde vrees in chronische pijnstoornissen. 
 Deel 2 breidde het onderzoeksgebied uit en onderzocht de invloed van complexe, afgeleide stimulusrelaties 
op vreesgeneralisatie. We repliceerden en verruimden de bevindingen van eerder experimenteel onderzoek en 
toonden aan dat conceptuele tegenstelling eigenlijk vreesgeneralisatie kan belemmeren (Hoofdstukken 4 en 5). Als 
een laatste doel probeerden we ook vast te stellen of stimuli die een afgeleide tegengestelde relatie hebben  met een 
aversieve geconditioneerde stimulus kunnen dienen als veiligheidssignalen die actief angst inhiberen (Hoofdstuk 6). 
Als laatste doel exploreerden we in Deel 3 of de categoriegebaseerde generalisatie van aangeleerde vrees 
kan afgezwakt worden. We toonden in twee experimentele studies aan dat de generalisatie van vrees gerelateerd 
gedrag verstoord kan worden door de presentatie van nieuwe contexten (Hoofdstuk 7). De mogelijke koppeling 
tussen dit experimenteel protocol en de klinische techniek gekend als ‘cognitive defusie’ wordt ook in overweging 
genomen. 
Zes experimentele hoofdstukken worden voorafgegaan door een algemene inleiding en gevolgd door een 
algemene discussie. In de algemene inleiding wordt de achtergrond van dit doctoraat geschetst en worden de 
kerndefinities, thema’s en doelen uitgelegd. De algemene discussie biedt een coherent overzicht van de belangrijkste 
bevindingen, enkele algemene conclusies en suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek. 
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General introduction 
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 2 
 Individuals with anxiety live restrictive life-styles, characterized by desperate attempts to 
evade distressing objects and situations. Impairments in psychosocial functioning are common, 
e.g. social withdrawal, physical under-activity, substance dependency, work absenteeism and 
academic underachievement (APA, 2013; Mendlowicz, & Stein, 2014; Rapaport, Clary, Fayyad, 
& Endicott, 2005). This, of course, is to the detriment of quality-of-life and sense of self. 
Anxiety also bears a mammoth social cost, which was estimated to be $42-47 billion dollars per 
annum in the 1990’s (Greenberg et al., 1999). This expense mostly owes to lost work 
productivity and increased health service demands. Personal and societal consequences such as 
these give impetus to experimental psychopathological research that, firstly, identifies 
psychological mechanisms underlying anxiety and, secondly, arranges these mechanisms into 
precise theoretical models. The ultimate goal here is to enhance psychotherapy and facilitate 
meaningful reductions in anxious suffering (Craske, Hermans, & Vanstenweegen, 2006; Kasdin, 
2007; Vervliet & Raes, 2013).  
Excessive fear is quintessential of anxiety disorders (APA, 2013). This emotion emerges 
in response to anticipated or present threat, which is real or imagined. Fear is often deconstructed 
into three measurable components. These are (i) enhanced physiological arousal (e.g. sweating 
and palpitations), (ii) cognitive disruptions (e.g. attentional bias to threat) and (iii) behavioral 
coping strategies (e.g. safety behaviors) (Lang, 1979). To understand the course of anxiety, it 
may be useful to first understand the conditions that allow neutral stimuli evoke these fear 
responses. Learning psychology is pivotal in that regard (e.g. Barlow, 1988). This branch of 
psychological science explicates mechanisms through which experiences change responding, 
emotional or otherwise (Bouton, 2007). Indeed, psychologists have long appealed to mechanisms 
like Pavlovian conditioning, operant conditioning and stimulus generalization to explain how 
neutral stimuli can evoke preparatory fear and avoidance. Recent developments in learning 
psychology continue to afford insight (Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 2013). 
Derived stimulus relations could, for example, explain situations in which a catalog of physically 
dissimilar events elicits fear despite never featuring in a threatening episode. 
Learning and fear 
 Certain primary and salient events automatically evoke fear, e.g. the pain of a sudden dog 
bite evokes fear. These are known as unconditioned stimuli (US). Neutral events can also control 
fear if they were previously present during a threatening episode. These are known as 
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 3 
conditioned stimuli (CS). For instance, seeing the park where the dog attack ensued might trigger 
intense fear responding. Neutral stimuli can essentially act like warning signals that flag the 
possibility of threat; this represents an incident of Pavlovian conditioning. Second, behavioral 
strategies may emerge that limit proximity to the US, at least temporarily. These coping 
responses become more probable in future due to the transient relief they afford (Dinsmoor, 
2001). This represents an incident of operant reinforcement. An individual might walk 
alternative routes, for example, that avoid parks and dogs. Such an analysis captures the 
development of specific phobia but it could also extend to other anxious complaints. Panic 
disorder, for example, is thought to involve the exact same learning mechanisms (Bouton, 
Mineka and Barlow, 2001). The averseness of an unexpected panic attack can readily motivate 
fear. That is, an unexpected surge in autonomic arousal (US) elicits a sense of doom and 
defensive behavioral responses. Neutral stimuli (CS) can be associated with this panic and 
subsequently trigger anticipatory fear responding. These stimuli might be external, e.g. crowds 
and tight spaces, or internal in nature, e.g. a racing heart and breathlessness. Operant 
conditioning soon follows as individuals engage in desperate avoidance strategies, which are 
then strengthened by the (coincidental) absence of the US, e.g. only going outside with a loved 
one. Lastly, the fear-avoidance model of chronic pain also highlights the contribution of learning 
mechanism to anxious suffering. This approach appeals to Pavlovian and operant conditioning to 
describe how fear of pain leads to the functional disabilities experienced in chronic pain 
disorders (Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000, 2012). Pain is thought of as a US that motivates emotional 
learning due to its sensory. Neutral bodily movements that have been paired with pain signal the 
possibility of more pain or (re)-injury (CS) and evoke pain-related fear. Safety behaviors might 
then develop in a desperate attempt to reduce pain and avoid (re)-injury, e.g. adopting rigid gait 
(Volders, Meulders, De Peuter, Vervliet, & Vlaeyen, 2012). Any short-lived relief is likely to be 
attributed to these coping strategies and increase the likelihood that they will be employed again. 
However, safety behaviors are pervasive and quickly interfere with valued activities. This in turn 
has a deleterious impact on mood and sense of self.  
 The acquisition of fear can apparently be understood in terms of conditioning episodes, 
which are replicable in experimental paradigms. Watson and Raynor (1920) were among the first 
to investigate the conditions under which neutral stimuli control, or call out, fear. This was 
termed conditioned emotional responding. Their seminal study recruited an 11-month year old 
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infant, Albert. He was seated in a nursery where the experimenters suddenly hammered a steal 
bar from behind. The loud noise (US) evoked fear responding, which manifested in the form of 
crying, falling forwards and quivering lips. Later, a white rat (CS) was presented in front of 
Albert and the loud noise was produced. After seven CS-US pairings, the previously neutral rat 
prompted fear even in the absence of noise. Also, the conditioned emotional response proved to 
be flexible. Fear spread to stimuli that never featured in the earlier conditioning episodes. For 
instance, other furry objects like cotton wool, rabbits and a Santa Claus mask spontaneously 
evoked fear. In a contemporary lab, numerous tools assay different elements of conditioned fear. 
The ‘gut feelings’ of fear are characterized by somatic changes like sweating. This is measured 
using electro-dermal skin conductance responses (SCR) (Boucsein, 2012). Fear is associated 
with a readiness for action and this is reflected in the magnitude of the eye-blink startle reflex 
(fear-potentiated startle) (Davis & Astrachan, 1978; Grillon & Baas, 2006). The anticipation of 
danger can be indexed using US expectancy ratings- a verbal report of the extent to which a US 
is expected (Boddez, Baeyens, Luyten, Vansteenwegen, Hermans, & Beckers, 2012). The object 
of fear also evokes the unpleasantness that is inherent to the US (Baeyens, Eelen, van den Bergh, 
& Crombez, 1989). This evaluative shift is measured using self-reported stimulus valence ratings. 
Lastly, protocols exist to investigate fear related avoidance behaviors. Avoidance is usually 
operationalized in the form of a spacebar or response-box press that results in the omission of a 
pending US (e.g. Lovibond, Saunders, Weidemann, & Mitchell, 2008). 
 The question remains, how do we explain (or understand) learning mechanisms like 
Pavlovian conditioning, operant conditioning and stimulus generalization? In truth, there is no 
straightforward answer. Different theories of learning exist that originate from distinct 
philosophical homelands. Three accounts specifically feature in this dissertation.  
 During the early twentieth century, (fear) learning was couched in behaviorist 
philosophies. John B. Watson (1913) asserted that the goal of psychological science was the 
prediction and control of behavior; this was achievable through measuring of observable 
relationships between environmental stimuli (S) and organismic responses (R) (S-R learning; 
Waston, 1913). B.F. Skinner’s (1945) radical behaviorism later drew a distinction between 
responses that are a function of antecedent environmental events (S-R learning; classical 
conditioning) and behaviors whose future probability changed as a function of environmental 
consequence (R-S learning; operant conditioning). Indeed, operant conditioning speaks to novel 
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behaviors that are not immediately present in an individual’s repertoire but are instead shaped 
across experience. Over the next decades, an industry of research isolated the environmental 
conditions under which behavior was occasioned, shaped, strengthened and weakened. Many 
learning principles were elucidated over the course of this experimental analysis of behavior, e.g. 
schedules of reinforcement. A précis, this is a functional approach and it assumes that (fear) 
learning mechanisms are explained by the historical relationship between stimuli and responses 
(see Dymond & Roche, 2009). Pavlovian fear responses are therefore an immediate function of 
antecedent environmental events, which were previously paired with aversive outcomes. Operant 
avoidance responses, on the other hand, are a function of the consequential relief and diminished 
arousal affiliated with an omitted US. 
 One dominant perspective holds that the acquisition and activation of associative 
connections play a causal role in (fear) learning (see Bouton, 2007; Bouton et al, 2000; Hall, 
1996). According to this associative account, representations of stimuli are acquired through 
experience and individually stored in memory. A representation is then activated during an 
encounter with the respective stimulus. For instance, a US (or CS) presentation will excite the 
memory of that US (or CS). The concurrent activation of two representations is also thought to 
facilitate the formation of an associative connection; this provides an additional pathway to 
activate the memory of a US. For example, pairing a CS and US during Pavlovian fear 
conditioning fosters an associative link between their two corresponding representations. 
Afterwards, presenting the CS alone can indirectly excite the memory of the US and this 
mediates the expression of fear responding. This is known as S-S learning. Operant responses 
(like avoidance) are also rooted in these same associative processes. Responses are represented 
in memory and can become associated with particular outcomes; this is known as R-S learning 
(see Dickinson, 1980; Lovibond, Chen, Mitchell, & Weidemann, 2013). During an operant 
avoidance task, for example, an association is made between the emission of an avoidance 
response and the absence of the otherwise expected US. There are, of course, theories that more 
finely detail the factors governing associative activity (see Pearce & Bouton, 2001). For instance, 
the Rescorla-Wagner model (1972) argues that learning is driven by the effectiveness (or 
unexpectedness) of the US. Such theories, however, are beyond the scope of this introduction. A 
standard model of associative learning is instead presented (Hall, 1996). Overall, this is a 
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representational approach and it assumes (fear) learning mechanisms are a function of underlying 
associative activity. 
 A recent cognitive account alternatively argues that (fear) learning is mediated by 
semantic-like propositional representations that have a truth-value (De Houwer, 2009). These 
propositional beliefs encode for the specific relation between environmental stimuli. They are 
therefore composed of different elements (e.g. ‘dog’ & ‘pain’; ‘breathlessness’ & ‘panic’; ‘spasm’ 
& ‘spinal injury’) that are connected by a relational link (i.e. ‘dogs cause pain’; ‘breathlessness 
predicts panic’; ‘spasms indicate spinal injury’) (Boddez, DeHouwer, & Beckers, 2015). 
Propositions could otherwise be described as structured mental representations that have 
combinatorial syntax and semantics. They can also be acquired through different pathways such 
as direct experience, instruction, observation and even effortful inferential reasoning processes. 
In the latter, propositional representations form input premises, e.g. if P!Q, and not Q, from 
which new output premises are derived, i.e. then not P (Mitchel, DeHouwer, & Lovibond, 2009). 
Overall, this is a relatively recent cognitive account and assumes (fear) learning mechanisms are 
a function of propositions structures that encode for the qualitative relation between 
environmental events. 
 In summary, the acquisition of new fears and the development of behavioral coping 
strategies can be understood in terms of Pavlovian and operant conditioning episodes. This 
represents fear learning as an effect, or outcome. I then elaborated on the experimental tools that 
are used to replicate these experiences in the laboratory. This represents fear learning as a 
procedure. Finally, different philosophical and theoretical approaches to (fear) learning were 
reviewed. These include (i) a behavioral approach, which is concerned with observable 
correlations between a stimulus and response, (iii) an associative approach, which is rooted in 
underlying associative representations, and (iii) a propositional approach, which is grounded in 
propositional structures. These represent distinct process-level definitions of (fear) learning.  
Generalization and fear 
 Human anxiety is not just characterized by excessively intense fear responses. Fear is 
also widespread and emerges in response to a litany of innocuous stimuli, which never even 
featured in threatening episodes (Boddez et al., 2012; Hermans, Baeyens, & Vervliet, 2013). 
This overgeneralization contributes to the debilitating nature of anxiety. The architecture of an 
individual’s world is so replete with feared events that the ability to engage in meaningful 
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activities is seriously undermined e.g. parenting, relationships, academic success, and 
occupational performance. The core objective of this dissertation is to explore some of the 
learning mechanisms that involved in overgeneralization. A coherent understanding of these 
mechanisms might eventually help researchers and therapists to predict when, and influence 
whether, fear and avoidance responding will spread to other stimuli. 
 Aspects of the surrounding environment can elicit heightened fear when they physically 
resemble features of the original traumatic episode. After a life threatening road traffic accident, 
for example, a sense of fear might emerge in the presence of other motorways, cars and traffic 
lights. In addition, war veterans can be overcome by panic upon hearing loud noises that sound 
similar to gunfire. Such cases can be understood with respect to stimulus generalization. Novel 
stimuli that are perceptually similar to a conditioned stimulus can partially evoke a conditioned 
response (e.g. McLaren & Mackintosh, 2002; Rescorla, 1976). This is often modeled in simple 
conditioning paradigms. First, a particular stimulus, (e.g. a black ring) is aversively conditioned 
through repeated pairing with a US, e.g. a slight electric shock. Next, and in the absence of the 
US, a number of stimuli that resemble the CS+ are presented (i.e. black rings of different sizes). 
These physical variants (or generalization stimuli; GSs) evoke heightened fear and, moreover, a 
gradient in the expression of fear can be observed across them. Variants that closely resemble the 
CS+ evoke more fear than variants that have less in common with the CS+. This can be 
graphically represented as a curvilinear generalization gradient (e.g. Haddad, Xu, Raeder, & Lau, 
2013; Lenaert, Boddez, Griffith, Vervliet, Schreurs, & Hermans, 2014; Lommen, Engelhart, & 
van den Hout, 2010). 
 Interest in perceptually based fear generalization has surged in recent years; it is presently 
explored with remarkable scope and depth (see Hermans & Meuret, 2015). First, cross-sectional 
research studies indicate differential stimulus generalization effects between clinical samples and 
healthy controls. For instance, individuals with high trait neuroticism are more likely to avoid 
generalization stimuli than individuals with low neuroticism. Lissek and colleagues also 
highlighted elevated generalization in individuals with panic disorder (Lissek et al., 2010), 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Kaczkurkin & Lissek, 2013) and generalized anxiety disorder 
(Lissek, Kaczkurkin, Rabin, Geraci, Pine, & Grillon, 2015). Second, prospective research studies 
suggest that individual differences in generalization might actually contribute to the development 
of anxiety (Lenaert et al., 2014). Lenaert and colleagues, for example, found that the degree of 
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fear generalization could predict anxiety symptoms after six months. Finally, other research has 
focused on the neurological underpinnings of perceptually based fear generalization. 
Overgeneralization in adolescent anxiety, for example, might relate to the underdevelopment of 
important category learning regions such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Haddad, Xu, 
Reader, & Lau, 2015). This neurocognitive disposition may hamper the precision with which 
safety signals (i.e. stimuli that are negatively correlated with a US) can be separated from 
warning signals (i.e. stimuli that are positively correlated with a US). These safety signals would 
otherwise circumscribe, or inhibit, the expression fear by establishing clear situations where 
threat is unlikely. 
Categories and fear 
 The perceptual generalization of fear is predominantly and enthusiastically studied (see 
Dymond, Dunsmoor, Vervliet, Roche & Hermans et al., 2015). This intense focus could however 
distract from the fact that physical similarities between feared objects are not always obvious or 
existent. In truth, overgeneralization needs not be perceptually based. Innocuous objects that lack 
any physical resemblance to a conditioned stimulus can also produce fear and avoidance. Using 
an acquired equivalence paradigm, Vervoort (2015) first trained participants that a pair of 
physically dissimilar stimuli predicted one outcome (e.g. a low pitched tone) while a second pair 
predicted another outcome (e.g. a high pitched tone). A member of the former pair was then 
associated with an aversive US. Freezing-like behavior was resultantly observed in the presence 
of this conditioned stimulus. While playing a short computer game, the rate of key pressing 
reduced in the presence of the conditioned stimulus relative to the control; this is known as 
conditioned suppression (e.g. Estes & Skinner, 1941; Meulders, Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, 
Hermans, & Baeyens, 2011). A final probe phase then presented other members of the stimulus 
pairs. Suppression was exclusively observed in response to stimuli that participated in same pair 
as the conditioned stimulus. As such, learned fear transferred through ‘functional categories’ 
wherein stimuli are indirectly associated via a common outcome (also, see Greville, Dymond, 
Newton, & Roche, 2014). This mechanism might reflect the ever-expanding catalog of fear-
relevant triggers in obsessive-compulsive disorder. These triggers are often dissimilar from one 
another and never featured in conditioning episodes but are distressing with respect to their 
common function. For example, an individual might initially have an unpleasant experience with 
a household-cleaning agent (e.g. read a story of a child who died from ingesting bleach). An 
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entire range of other household objects (e.g. washing powder, bug-spray, ammonia, cleaning gels, 
aerosols) could soon become fear-relevant by virtue of their common function (i.e. corrosive 
agents) (McGinn & Sanderson, 1999). 
 Evidence also suggests that abstract, conceptual relations between stimuli can activate 
fear generalization (Dunsmoor & Murphy, 2014). For instance, Dunsmoor, Martin and LaBar 
(2012) demonstrated the generalization of fear to neutral objects that were conceptually similar 
to conditioned stimuli. First, the delivery of a slight electric shock coincided with the termination 
of members from one familiar category (e.g. animals; CS+) but not another (e.g. tools; CS-). 
Twenty-four hours later, previously unseen members from both categories were presented in 
extinction. Members of the aversively conditioned category specifically evoked heightened skin 
conductance responding and US expectancy ratings. As such, fear transferred to previously 
neutral category exemplars by virtue of their conceptual similarity to other exemplars. In 
addition, Boyle, Roche, Dymond and Hermans (2015) demonstrated the generalization of fear 
between verbally interchangeable stimuli. Using a semantic generalization procedure certain 
words, e.g. soup, were paired with a brief electric shock (US). During a critical test phase, 
synonyms of the conditioned words (e.g. broth) spontaneously evoked heightened fear and 
avoidance (also, see Feather, 1965). These findings arguably reflect real-world cases wherein 
arbitrary events (bizarrely) evoke intense fear and debilitating avoidance. For example, a person 
with a fear of blood-injections might also struggle with categorically related events, e.g. nurses 
with white coats or the scent of a hospital (Dunsmoor et al., 2012). As another example, an 
individual who survives a traumatic car accident might experience fear when confronted with 
symbolic of driving, like the sound of keys or sight of a road signs. And this could worsen to the 
degree that ‘modes of transport’, in general, become the source of intense psychological distress 
(e.g. Yule, Bolton, Udwin, Boyle, O’Ryan, & Nurrish, 2000). These instances of 
overgeneralization are relatively understudied; they have certainly not received as much attention 
relative to cases of perceptual generalization. To address this lacuna, we conducted a timely 
experimental analysis of such complex cases of fear generalization. 
 The current dissertation specifically discusses instances in which fear extends to neutral 
stimuli by virtue of their conceptual relation with an aversively conditioned stimulus. This 
phenomenon goes by different names. Category-level generalization is one popular term (e.g. 
Dunsmoor & Murphy, 2014; Vervoort, Vervliet, Bennett, & Baeyens 2014). Others are symbolic 
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generalization and transfer of stimulus function (Dougher, 1998; Dymond, Schlund, Roche, 
Whelan, Richards, & Davis, 2011). These terms are affiliated with certain procedural techniques. 
Those referring to ‘category-level generalization’ often, but not always, condition pre-existing 
categories that participants already comprehend (e.g. types of tools or types of animals) 
(Dunsmoor et al., 2012; cf. Vervoort et al., 2014) On the other hand, those referring to ‘symbolic 
generalization’ or ‘transfer of stimulus function’ typically establish artificial stimulus categories 
with which participant have no prior experience (e.g. Auguston & Dougher, 1997; Dymond et al.,  
2011). These terms might also signify particular theoretical explanations. Those referring to 
‘symbolic generalization’ or ‘transfer of stimulus function’ assert that the capacity derive (or 
infer) relations between dissimilar stimuli is fundamental to verbal category learning (e.g. Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Dymond, 2014). Those referring to ‘category-level 
generalization’, in contrast, are generally silent on this issue. Given such trends in the literature, 
it could seem as though these labels are unique and should be treated separately. However, it 
could be argued that they are functionally identical. They describe the exact same psychological 
effect- instances in which the threat-value of a stimulus changes by virtue of an abstract, 
conceptual relation to a conditioned stimulus. For the sake of accessibility, I will consolidate this 
broad and somewhat confusing nomenclature. In this dissertation, I will primarily refer to 
category-level generalization1. 
 One learning mechanism that could be involved in category-level generalization is 
relational responding (or technically speaking, arbitrarily applicable relational responding) 
(Hayes et al., 2001; Dymond & Roche, 2009, 2013). This described the ability to respond to one 
stimulus in terms of its relation to another stimulus that is physically dissimilar and not 
immediately present. For instance, an individual with a blood phobia could read the words “Give 
Blood” or hear the sound “needle” or see a lab coat, only to experience the nausea associated 
with actual blood. On a procedural level, relational responding can be studied using a (one-to-
many) matching-to-sample (MTS) task (Sidman, 1971). This is a two-part laboratory protocol 
(see Appendix). A number of conditional discriminations are initially reinforced using physically 
dissimilar stimuli, e.g. non-words, abstract shapes and novel tones. A sample stimulus is first 
                                                
1 At the time of writing, category-level generalization seemed to be the most accessible label. 
However, certain chapters relied on a specific literature. Chapter 7, for example, borrows heavily 
from a Behavior Analysis tradition. It therefore felt appropriate to adopt the phrases symbolic 
generalization” and “transfer of stimulus function” during these pages. 
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presented on the top of a computer screen, e.g. A1 (or A2). A set of comparison stimuli then 
appear on the bottom of the screen, e.g. [B1, B2, B3] (or [C1,C2,C3]). Participants are then 
instructed to select one comparison stimulus based on the sample. Selecting B1 (and C1) in the 
presence of A1, for example, is reinforced using corrective feedback, e.g. the words “correct” or 
“wrong”. A network of untrained, derived stimulus relations are likely to then emerge in which 
participants respond to one stimulus in terms of its relation with another. Derived stimulus 
relations might, first, involve a reversal of the previously trained conditional discriminations. If 
[B1] (or [C1]) are presented as a sample stimulus, then participants are likely to spontaneously 
select [A1]. This is known as mutual entailment. Derived stimulus relations might, secondly, 
involve a combination of the previously trained conditional discriminations. If [B1] (or [C1]) is 
presented as a sample stimulus, then participants are likely to spontaneously select [C1] (or [B1]). 
This is known as combinatorial entailment. In essence, a collection of physically dissimilar 
stimulus emerge that are functionally interchangeable with one another, i.e. A1=B1=C1. This is 
known as a frame of equivalence (Hayes et al., 2001) or a stimulus equivalence category (Galizio, 
Stewart, & Pilgrim, 2001; Vervoort et al., 2013). Once mutual and combinatorial entailment are 
observed, these stimuli are thought to resemble a real-world verbal category wherein physically 
dissimilar stimuli can stand for, or take the place, of one another (Hayes et al., 2001; Fields, 
Reeve, Adams, & Verhave, 1991; Galizio et al., 2001). 
 Derived stimulus relations have an additional, critical characteristic; they can affect 
behavioral and emotional responding. That is, the control a stimulus exerts over responding can 
change with respect to its derived relation to another stimulus. This is referred to as the transfer 
(or transformation) of stimulus function. For instance, Auguston and Dougher (1997) first used a 
MTS task to establish two four-member stimulus equivalence categories with physically 
dissimilar shapes, i.e. A1=B1=C1=D1 & A2=B2=C2=D2. Second, members of these categories 
were differentially associated with a brief electric shock (US); the US onset coincided with the 
termination of B1 (CS+) but not B2 (CS-). Participants were then informed that pressing 
telegraph key could cancel the US before it occurred. Pressing the key over 20 times in the 
presence of CS+ was reinforced through the contingent omission of the electric shock. During a 
final probe phase, other members of both stimulus equivalence categories were presented. This 
included C1 and D1 (which were in derived equivalence with the CS+) as well as C2 and D2 
(which were in derived equivalence with the CS-). The results indicated that stimuli in derived 
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equivalence to the CS+ prompted significantly more avoidance responses than stimuli in derived 
equivalence with the CS-. This was indeed a particular interesting finding; equivalent stimuli 
evoked heightened fear-relevant behavior despite (i) never featuring in a conditioning episode 
and (ii) the lack of any physical similarity to the CS+. In essence, the equivalent stimuli were 
responded to as if they were the originally conditioned stimulus (also, Dougher, Augustson, 
Markham, Greenway, & Wulfert, 1994) 
Aims and objectives 
 A number of experimental studies have replicated the work of Augustson and Dougher 
(1997). Findings reliably indicate that a neutral stimulus elicits heightened fear when in derived 
equivalence with an aversively conditioned stimulus (Dymond, Dunsmoor, Vervliet, Roche, & 
Hermans, 2015). Still, some questions remain unanswered. Many of these relate to the clinical 
relevance of derived relational responding and category-level generalization. Are derived 
stimulus relations pertinent to overgeneralization? Is category-level generalization a trans-
diagnostic effect that features in, not just anxiety, but also other disorders involving fear 
learning? These questions will be considered in the opening section. Other questions are more 
theoretically and experimentally interesting. What is the impact of complex relations, like 
derived opposition, on category-level generalization? Could stimuli that are conceptually 
opposed to fear-relevant stimuli signal safety? These questions will be tackled in the middle 
section of the current dissertation. Finally, there is relatively little discussion as to how category-
level generalization could be manipulated. What are the limits of this effect? Can the emotional 
impact of derived stimulus relations be diminished? The third and final section addresses such 
issues. 
 The findings from seven experimental studies are described across 3 sections. The 
general objective of Section 1 is to examine whether a conceptual similarity between arbitrary 
stimuli facilitates fear generalization. This section also attempts to elaborate on the clinical 
potential of this research. The specific aim of Chapter 2 is to bridge the gap between conceptual 
and perceptual fear generalization; these forms of generalization are rarely considered in unison. 
An experimental study was therefore conducted to examine the whether perceptual and 
conceptual similarities concurrently facilitate fear generalization. Here, two stimulus equivalence 
categories were established using a MTS task such that non-words and animal-like objects were 
in derived equivalence. Non-words from one equivalence category were associated with threat 
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while the non-words from the other equivalence category were associated with safety. Results 
indicated that fear spread to animal-like objects that were (i) conceptually similar to the non-
word and (ii) perceptual variants of these objects. Next, Chapter 3 explores category-level 
generalization in the context of chronic pain disorders. Patients with chronic pain are often 
fearful of movements that never featured in painful episodes. An experimental study tested 
whether a movement’s conceptual relation with pain relevant events could precipitate pain-
related fear. A MTS task established two equivalence categories wherein non-words and joystick 
arm movements were in derived equivalence. The non-words from one category were then 
associated with a painful US. Results indicated that joystick arm movements from within the 
same category spontaneously elicited pain-related fear. This highlights a potential pathway for 
the emergence of pain-related fear in the absence of a discrete pain episode.  
 The objective of Section 2 is to examine whether conceptual relations play a dynamic 
role in fear generalization. Chapter 4 described the findings of an experimental study that 
compared conceptual similarity and opposition in fear generalization. The specific aim of this 
study was to replicate and extend upon a previous study by Dymond and colleagues (2008). A 
variant of the MTS task was used to establish arbitrary ‘opposite relations’ and ‘similar relations’ 
between stimuli (see Dymond & Whelan, 2010). Participants derived one stimulus as relationally 
similar to a conditioned stimulus and a second as relationally opposite to the conditioned 
stimulus. Results showed that derived similarity facilitated generalization while a derived 
opposition did not. This clearly indicates that the qualitative nature of conceptual relations can 
moderate generalization. Chapter 5 further elaborates on this fundamental research. A second 
experiment was conducted, which aimed to isolate factors that promote category-level 
generalization. Some participants were given an opportunity to explicitly designate the derived 
stimulus relations prior to conditioning and generalization, while others were not. It was 
postulated that articulating the conceptual relations would enhance category-level generalization. 
Findings again indicated that a conceptual similarity, but not a conceptual opposition, facilitated 
fear generalization. Interestingly however, the between-groups factors had no effect. Chapter 6 
shifts the scope of inquiry and explores the contribution of conceptual opposition to safety 
learning. The findings of an experimental study are discussed; it was examined whether stimuli 
in derived opposition with a fear-relevant stimulus can act as safety cues that actively signal the 
absence of threat. A brief MTS task was completed such that one stimulus was conceptually 
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opposed to an aversively conditioned stimulus. A critical test phase examined the generalization 
of learned fear to stimuli that varied in similarity between these stimuli. If the opposite stimulus 
signaled safety, then the generalization of fear should be inhibited relative to the control. 
Unfortunately, certain procedural caveats limited the conclusions that could be drawn from this 
study.  
 The principle objective of Section 3 is to assess whether category-level fear 
generalization can be manipulated. A theoretical rationale suggested by Blackledge and 
colleagues (2007, 2009, 2013, 2015) was specifically tested; it is postulated that presenting 
equivalent stimuli in unfamiliar contexts could temporarily disrupt the transfer of stimulus 
function (or category-level generalization). Two experimental studies were conducted to provide 
a proof-of-principle demonstration of this assertion. The findings are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Stimulus equivalence categories were established using a MTS task. A member from one 
category was then directly associated with an aversive outcome while a member of the other 
category was associated with an appetitive outcome. Acquisition took place in a specific context. 
In a final probe phase, stimuli that were in derived equivalence to these conditioned stimuli were 
presented in either the acquisition context or a novel context. Results clearly indicate that fear-
related behaviors selectively transferred to equivalent stimuli in the acquisition context and not 
the novel context. Therefore, the control that conceptual relations exert over behavior was 
blocked and the category-level generalization of fear was reduced. A secondary aim of these 
experiments was to explain why novel contexts could disrupt the transfer of fear. However, the 
results are not so straightforward. Lastly, this section considers the protocols used to reduce 
category-level generalization might mirror the mechanisms of change in cognitive defusion. This 
is a popular but poorly understood therapeutic exercise that putatively disrupts emotional impact 
of problematic conceptual relations.  
 A summary of the principle findings and some final thoughts on the future of this 
research are offered in Chapter 7.  
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Abstract 
Learned fear can generalize to neutral events due their perceptual and conceptual similarity with 
threat relevant stimuli. This study simultaneously examined these forms of generalization to 
model the expansion of fear in anxiety disorders. First, artificial categories involving sounds, 
nonsense words and animal-like objects were established. Next, the words from one category 
were paired with threatening information while the words from the other category were paired 
with safety information. Lastly, we examined if fear generalized to (i) the conceptually related 
animal-like objects and (ii) other animal like-objects that were perceptually similar. This was 
measured using behavioral avoidance, US expectancy ratings and self-reported stimulus valence. 
Animal-like objects conceptually connected to the aversive words evoked heightened fear. 
Perceptual variants of these animal-like objects also elicit fear. Investigating the role of both 
perceptual and conceptual fear generalization is important to better understand the etiology of 
anxiety disorders symptoms.  
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 A longstanding challenge in anxiety disorder research and therapy has been to explain the 
elaborate collection of events that evoke unwarranted fear (Coelho & Purkis, 2009; Rachman, 
1977). It has been theorized that the overgeneralization of fear is critically involved (see 
Dymond, Dunsmoor, Roche, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2015; Lissek et al., 2005). This describes the 
spontaneous elicitation of fear to innocuous stimuli that did not feature in an aversive encounter 
but are similar to a stimulus that was present. The term ‘similar’ typically refers to either an 
apparent physical resemblance or an abstract conceptual sameness. However, little is known 
about how perceptual and conceptual information might be concurrently involved in fear 
generalization. This is surprising given that (threat relevant) stimuli can be connected both 
perceptually and conceptually to a whole series of other events (e.g. Fields, Reeve, Adams, & 
Verhave, 1991; Storms, 2003). For instance, if one was to fall victim of a traumatic car accident 
then other cars or roads could later evoke fear and avoidance, as might symbols of driving like 
traffic signs or keys. We argue that investigating the interconnections between perceptual and 
conceptual similarity is a necessary step in the development of a precise theoretical account of 
the expansion of fear in anxiety disorders.  
 Associative learning theorists often appeal to the composite features of a stimulus to 
explain perceptually based fear generalization (e.g. McLaren & Mackintosh, 2002; Rescorla, 
1976). It is assumed that each individual stimulus is composed of multiple elements and 
generalization between stimuli is the result of associative connections that originate from their 
common elements (Kalish, 1969). That is, a once neutral stimulus can excite the memory of an 
aversive outcome when it shares common elements with another stimulus that is already 
associated with that outcome. Following a frightening experience with an aggressive dog, for 
example, other animals sharing perceptual features with that dog may elicit fear. The perceptual 
generalization of fear is typically studied in laboratory studies by pairing a neutral, conditioned 
stimulus (CS+) with an unpleasant unconditioned stimulus (US), e.g. a brief electric shock. Next, 
and in the absence of the US, a number of stimuli that perceptually resemble the CS+ are 
presented. These physical variants are found to evoke heightened fear and, moreover, a gradient 
in the expression of fear can be observed across them. Variants that closely resemble the CS+ 
evoke more fear than variants that have less in common with the CS+ (e.g. Haddad, Xu, Raeder, 
& Lau, 2013; Lenaert, Boddez, Grifith, Vervliet, Schreurs, & Hermans, 2014; Lissek et al., 2010; 
Lommen, Engelhard, & van den Hout, 2010). 
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 Learned fear can also spread to neutral stimuli that are perceptually dissimilar from a 
threat relevant stimulus but are still alike in a conceptual sense (e.g. Dunsmoor, Martin, & LaBar, 
2012). For instance, individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder fear a diversity of triggers 
(e.g. dogs, gasoline and knifes) that are related in terms of their conceptual relevance (i.e. 
potentially life threatening; Hermans, Baeyens, & Vervliet, 2013; McGinn & Sanderson, 1999). 
In order to study conceptually based fear generalization, some researchers have taken to 
experimental studies wherein an artificial category is established with physically distinct stimuli 
like nonsense words- a stimulus equivalence category. This research makes use of an operant 
conditioning procedure known as a matching-to-sample (MTS) task. Here, a single item (sample 
stimulus) is first presented on the top of a computer screen for a few seconds and this is followed 
by a set of items on the bottom of the screen. Participants are instructed to select one item from 
the set based on the sample stimulus that had appeared. Several sets can be presented but, in each, 
there is one correct item (the comparison stimulus) and corrective feedback follows each choice. 
Therefore, a number of conditional relationships are initially trained such that different 
comparison stimuli are mutually related to same sample stimulus. In a later test phase, the 
emergence of coherent untrained relations is examined. Using the same format, albeit without 
corrective feedback, participants may select the sample stimulus when presented with a 
comparison stimulus (known as symmetry relations) and also select a comparison stimulus when 
presented with another of the comparison stimuli (known as equivalence relations). In essence, 
physically distinct stimuli become substitutable with one another and this is reasoned to resemble 
a conceptual sameness within a verbal category (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Fields 
et al., 1991; Galizio, Stewart, & Pilgrim, 2001). In order to examine the generalization of fear 
through these artificial categories, one member (CS+) is repeatedly paired with an aversive US. 
Afterwards, other category members are typically found to elicit fear in the absence of the US 
(Dymond, Schlund, Roche, Whelan, Richards, & Davies, 2011; Vervoort, Vervliet, Bennett, & 
Baeyens, 2014). 
 This research clearly indicates that fear generalization can be facilitated by either a 
physical or conceptual similarity between stimuli. But beyond the laboratory, the physical and 
conceptual features of events are not easily disentangled from one another and might 
simultaneously exacerbate generalization. By examining both forms of similarity together, we 
may better describe the ever-increasing array of events that can evoke fear. For that reason, the 
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current study combined the above approaches and made use of both artificial stimulus 
equivalence categories and perceptual variants of category members. Specifically, we 
investigated whether a stimulus could evoke generalized fear because of its category membership 
and whether another stimulus could evoke generalized fear because of its perceptually similarity 
to category members.  
 Importantly, this study elected to use an instructed fear conditioning paradigm over a 
traditional Pavlovian fear conditioning. Rachman (1977) proposed that, next to direct experience 
with a US, hearing or reading about the threat value of a stimulus can also lead to fear and this is 
supported by extensive research (Dymond, Schlund, Roche, DeHouwer, & Freegard, 2012; 
Muris & Field, 2011; Ollson & Phelps, 2007; Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, Brass, & Kalisch, 
2014). But despite the established importance of instructed fear conditioning in the acquisition of 
real-life fear, there are no studies (to the very best of our knowledge) that examine the potential 
for this this pathway to catalyze perceptual or conceptual generalization. We consider this to be 
an important topic for study.  
 In the current experiment, participants first selected a combination of unpleasant images 
and sounds although these would not appear during the experimental study (a sham-US). This 
was done to suggest that an aversive outcome was possible in the experimental context and 
motivate fear. Next, two stimulus equivalence categories were shaped using a MTS task. 
Nonsense words and animal-like objects acted as comparison stimuli that were mutually related 
to common sample sounds. The nonsense word from one category was paired with threatening 
information and the nonsense word from the other category was paired with safety information. 
A final testing phase examined generalization to (i) other category members (animal-like objects) 
and (ii) perceptual variants of these members. Behavioral avoidance, retrospective US 
expectancy ratings and self-reported stimulus valence were recorded as our main dependent 
variables.  
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty undergraduate students (23 females) from the University of Leuven were recruited 
(Mage = 21 years, SD = 1.41 years) through an online experimental management system. None 
had previously taken part in research of this type and the sample size was based on previous 
research conducted in our lab. The faculty of psychology’s ethical committee approved the study. 
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All participants signed informed consent and were compensated with course credits (1 
credit/hour) or money (€8/hour).  
Apparatus 
 The experiment was programmed using Affect4 and ran on a Dell desktop PC with a 17” 
monitor with a white background inside a sound attenuated cubicle. Two 2 s sounds (A1, & A2) 
were the sample stimuli- a low-pitch constant tone (80db) and a high-pitch pulsing tone (90db). 
Three nonsense words (B1, B2, & B3) were shown in black Ariel font, size 32- “Veg”, “Lur” 
and “Mau”. Three sets of animal-like objects, with 2 objects in each set (150 x 150 pixels), were 
selected from an online catalogue (C1, & pC1; C2, & pC2; C3, & pC3; Barry, Griffith, De Rossi, 
& Hermans, 2014). Objects were perceptually similar within but not between sets (see Figure 1).  
Nonsense words and animal-like objects acted as comparison stimuli. These stimuli formed the 
members of two stimulus equivalence categories- CAT+ (A1-B1-C1) and CAT- (A2-B2-C2). 
The assignment of tones, nonsense words and animal-like objects into these categories was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
 The sham-US was a compound of an unpleasant image and noise. Three images 
(1024x768 pixels) were selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
 
Figure 1. The nonsense animal-like objects, which were used as 'C' stimuli. There were 3 sets 
and the objects were similar within these but not between. 
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Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001) based on the arousal ratings of young adults (Grühn & Scheibe, 
2008). Images were presented for 3 s and included a mutilated hand (M arousal = 7.4; high 
aversion), a tribal mutilation (M arousal = 5.9; moderate aversion) and cockroaches on food  (M 
arousal = 5.1; low aversion) (see Lenaert et al., 2014). There were two unpleasant noises. One 
was a 2 s, 80-db female scream, which was selected based on unpleasantness ratings of young 
adults (M = 1.21; high aversion) (Van Diest, Bradley, Guerra, Van den Bergh, & Lang, 2009). 
The other was a 0.2 s, 80 db of white noise, of low aversion (no normative information available). 
Images and noises were sorted into 4 levels. Level-1 consisted of low aversive images and a low 
aversive noise. Level-2 consisted of moderate aversive image and a low aversive noise. Level-3 
consisted of moderate aversive image and high aversive noise. Level-4 consisted of the high 
aversive image and high aversive noise. Sham-US unpleasantness ratings were recorded via 
paper and pencil on an 11-point Likert scale where 0 = neutral, 5 = mildly unpleasant and 10 = 
very unpleasant. US expectancy was measured using an 11-point Likert scale where 0 = 
definitely unlikely, 5 = uncertain and 10 = definitely likely. This scale appeared horizontally on 
the bottom of the screen and responses were made via a mouse click on the scale. Stimulus 
valence was measured using a 21-point Likert scale where -10 = highly unpleasant, 0 = neutral 
and +10 = highly pleasant. This scale appeared vertically on the side of the screen and responses 
were given via a mouse click.  
Procedure 
 Sham-US Selection 
 Participants were instructed to select an unpleasant, but tolerable, combination of images 
and noises. The experimenter presented sham-USs from level 1 to level 4. After each 
presentation, the participants rated the unpleasantness of the sham-US and the next level was 
then presented. This continued until all 4 levels were completed or until participants selected a 
level that was most unpleasant. Once a level was selected participants were told that any future 
images and sounds would be from that level. However, the sham-US would not be presented 
again.  
 MTS Task 
 Initially, a picture of a quaver (150x150 pixels) appeared on the top of the screen. 
Clicking the quaver removed it and played a sample stimulus- [A1] or [A2]. This was followed 3 
s later by the comparison stimuli- [B1, B2, B3] or [C1, C2, C3]. These stimuli appeared in a line 
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on the bottom of the screen and order was randomized on all trials.  Participants were instructed 
to select a comparison stimulus by pressing 1, 2 or 3 on a numeric keyboard where 1 = left 
stimulus, 2 = middle stimulus and 3 = right stimulus. There were 4 types of training trials- 
[A1]! [B1, B2, B3], [A2]! [B1, B2, B3], [A1]! [C1, C2, C3] and [A2]! [C1, C2, C3], with 
the correct choice in italics (see Figure 2). Making a selection removed all stimuli from the 
screen and presented corrective feedback. Correct selections were followed by the feedback 
“correct” for 3 s and incorrect selections were followed by the feedback “wrong” for 3 s. This 
was followed by a 3 s inter-trial interval (ITI). Trials continued until 16 consecutively correct 
responses were made. Subsequent trials examined the interchangeability between comparisons 
stimuli, i.e. equivalence relations. Here, one comparison stimulus, e.g. [B1] appeared on the top 
of the screen for 5 s followed by the presentation of 3 other comparison stimuli at the bottom of 
the screen [i.e. C1, C2, C3]. There were 4 testing trial types- [B1]→ [C1, C2, C3], [B2]→ [C1, 
 
 
Figure 2. A schematic overview of the experimental procedure. The A1, B1 and C1 stimulus 
equivalence category is referred to as CAT+. The A2, B2 and C2 stimulus equivalence category 
is referred to as CAT-. The digit within the parentheses indicates the number of presentations of 
the stimulus. + indicates that the stimulus was paired with threatening information (i.e. a 
conditioned exciter). – indicates that the stimulus was paired with safety information (i.e. a 
conditioned inhibitor). * indicates that an avoidance response was available. 
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C2, C3], [C1]→ [B1, B2, B3] and [C2]→ [B1, B2, B3], with the correct selection in italics. 
Again, selections were made with a numeric keypad but no corrective feedback was given. Trials 
appeared quasi randomly 4 times each in a block of 16 trials.  
 Instructed Fear Conditioning 
 Participants were told that extra information would be given about the nonsense words. 
During these trials, a nonsense word stimulus (B1 or B2) appeared in the top-center of the screen. 
This was followed 1 s later by the word “is” in the center of the screen. Evaluative information 
then appeared 1 s later in the bottom-center of the screen. B1 was paired with threatening 
information- injury, terrible, danger, pain and hurt. B2 was followed by safety information- safe, 
secure, gentle, trust and peace. B1 and B2 trials appeared 5 times each, quasi-randomly with no 
more than two consecutive presentations of the same type. Information remained on-screen for 4 
s and was followed by a 5-9 s ITI. Therefore, the nonsense word from CAT+ was aversively 
instructed and the nonsense word from CAT- was appetitively instructed (see Figure 2). 
 Generalized Avoidance Test 
 Participants were informed that items would appear and that unpleasant images and 
sounds might follow. It was also stated that these could be avoided by pressing the space bar and 
a cue that read “space bar available” would indicate when this was possible. However, the sham-
US was never presented. Four animal-like objects were presented; C1, C2, pC1 and pC2. This 
examined the generalization of avoidance to other members of CAT+ and CAT- (category 
stimuli; C1, & C2) and (ii) the perceptual generalization of avoidance to stimuli physically 
similar to the members of CAT+ and CAT- (perceptual stimuli; pC1, & pC2). Each object was 
presented 4 times each in a block of 16 trials. An object appeared center-screen followed 1 s later 
by a cue “space bar available”. If an avoidance response was made whilst a stimulus was on-
screen the cue was removed. Overall, each stimulus remained on-screen for 5 s followed by a 3-9 
s ITI (see Figure 2). 
Outcome Measures 
 Behavioral Avoidance 
 During the generalized avoidance test, avoidance responses to C1 and C2 (category 
stimuli), and pC1 and pC2 (perceptually similar stimuli) were recorded. Participants had 4 
opportunities to avoid each of these stimuli. 
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 US Expectancy  
 Participants completed a series of questions after the generalized avoidance test. To 
ensure that the conditioning phase installed threat expectancy, US expectancy ratings were 
reported for the verbally conditioned stimuli from CAT+ and CAT- (i.e. B1, & B2).  Also, US 
expectancy ratings were made in response to the category stimuli (i.e. C1, & C2) and 
perceptually similar stimuli (i.e. pC1, & pC2). US expectancy was first reported for stimuli when 
the avoidance response was assumed to be present. Stimuli were shown center screen with the 
question- “Imagine that you do press the space bar. How likely was it that images and sounds 
would follow this? ”. US expectancy was then reported when the avoidance response was 
assumed to be absent. The question now read, “Imagine that you do not press the space bar. How 
likely was it that images and sounds would follow this? ”.  
 Stimulus Valence  
 In order to ensure that conditioning phase changed the evaluative nature of stimuli, 
valence ratings were also reported for the conditioned stimuli (i.e. B1, & B2).  In addition, 
stimulus valence ratings were recorded for the category stimuli (i.e. C1, & C2) and the 
perceptual stimuli (i.e. pC1, & pC2). This took place before the conditioning phase and again 
after generalized avoidance test.  
Data Analysis 
 The mean unpleasantness for each sham-US level was calculated. The number of MTS 
training trials for each participant was calculated and the accuracy was calculated by expressing 
the total number of correct trials as a percentage of the overall number of training trials. The 
number of correct equivalence testing trials in the MTS task was also calculated for each 
participant and an accuracy score was calculated by expressing this as a percentage of the overall 
number of testing trials. An accuracy of 87.50% during the equivalence test (14/16 correct trials) 
was assumed to indicate the establishment of stimulus equivalence categories. All participants 
met this requirement. The percentage of generalized avoidance responses emitted in the presence 
of stimuli for each stimulus was calculated for each participant. A repeated measure ANOVA 
was conducted to assess the effect of stimulus (B1, B2, C1, C2, pC1, & pC2) on avoidance. The 
mean retrospective US expectancy for each stimulus (B1, B2, C1, C2, pC1, & pC2) was also 
calculated while (i) the avoidance response was assumed to be absent and (ii) the avoidance 
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response was assumed to be present. Two repeated measures ANOVA were conducted to assess 
the effect of stimulus on these US expectancy ratings. 
 Self-reported stimulus valence ratings were reported for each stimulus (B1, B2, C1, C2, 
pC1, & pC2) pre-instructed fear conditioning (X) and post-generalized avoidance test (Y). A 
mean difference score was then calculated (d = Y - X) for each stimulus to measure evaluative 
changes. A negative mean d-score indicates that valence ratings for a stimulus became negative 
while a positive mean d-score indicated that ratings became positive. A repeated measure 
ANOVA was calculated to assess the effect of stimuli on valence change.  
Where Mauchly’s test revealed that sphericity could not be assumed the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction is reported. Effect size was calculated using the partial ETA squared (ƞP²). The alpha-
level was set at .05 and Bonferroni corrections were used as the rejection criterion when pairwise 
comparisons were calculated. 
Results 
Sham-US Selection 
 The sham-US from level-1 was the least aversive (M unpleasantness = 1.63, SE = 0.29; 
3.30% of participants).  The next lowest was level-2 (M unpleasantness = 2.74, SE = 0.33; 
16.70% of participants) and then level-3 (M unpleasantness = 4.04, SE = 0.33; 36.70% of 
participants). Finally, level 4 was the most aversive option (M unpleasantness = 6.31, SE = 0.38; 
43.00% of participants).   
Matching-to-Sample Task 
 A mean of 66.13 MTS training trials (SE = 14.89) was completed and there was a high 
accuracy of responding (M accuracy = 86.85%, SE = 1.39%). All participants passed the 
subsequent testing phase with a mean of 15.9 correct responses (SE = 0.06) and a high accuracy 
of responding (M accuracy = 98.43%, SE = 0.35). This suggests that two stimulus equivalence 
categories (CAT+, & CAT-) were reliably established. 
Generalized Avoidance 
 There was a main effect of stimulus on generalized avoidance, F (38, 61) = 38.26, p  
= .01, ƞP² = 0.57 (see Figure 3a). Planned comparisons revealed a significant difference in 
category stimuli-, t = 9.85, p < .001, df = 29. Therefore, avoidance specifically generalized to 
animal-like objects within the aversive equivalence category (CAT+) and not the appetitive 
category (CAT-). In addition, there was a significant difference between the perceptually similar 
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Figure 3. (A) Mean number of avoidance responses. (B) Mean US expectancy ratings when the 
avoidance response was assumed to be present. (C) Mean US expectancy ratings when the 
avoidance response was assumed to be absent. (D) Mean valence change for stimuli. Error bars 
represent standard error. * p < .05, ** p < .01,  *** p < .001. 
 
stimuli, t = 4.63, p < .001, df = 29. Avoidance also generalized to animal like-objects that were 
Perceptually similar to members of the CAT+ and not CAT-.  However, C1 prompted more 
avoidance than pC1, t = 3.31, p = .003, df = 29, indicating more generalization to the category 
stimulus than its perceptual variant. 
Retrospective US Expectancy 
 US expectancy was reported retrospectively while assuming that an avoidance response 
was present. There was no main effect of stimulus on these ratings, F (3, 61) < 1, p  = .41 (see 
Figure 3b). The mean rating for each stimulus was low suggesting that participants associated 
avoidance with an absent US.  
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 US expectancy was also reported assuming that an avoidance response was absent. A 
main effect of stimulus was observed, F (2, 42) = 9.19, p  < .01, ƞP² = 0.27 (see Figure 3c). 
Planned comparisons revealed that the conditioned stimuli significantly differed, t = 3.34, p 
= .002, df = 25. Information successfully apparently conditioned B1 to predict an aversive 
outcome and B2 to predict a non-aversive outcome. Planned comparisons also indicated that the 
US expectancy ratings for category stimuli significantly differed, t = 3.31, p = .003, df = 25. 
Therefore, US expectancy generalized to animal-like objects within the aversive equivalence 
category (CAT+) and not the appetitive equivalence category (CAT-). Mean US expectancy for 
stimuli perceptually similar to the members of CAT+ and CAT- did not differ (using 
Bonferroni’s correction), t = 2.53, p = .01, df = 25. However, the category member of CAT+ 
(C1) did not significantly differ from its perceptually similar stimulus (pC1), t = 1.84, p = .07, df 
= 25, but did differ from the other perceptual stimulus (pC2), t = 3.44, p = .002. This suggests 
that there was some generalization of US expectancy to animal-like objects perceptually similar 
to members of the aversive equivalence category.  
Stimulus Valence 
 There was a main effect of stimulus on valence change, F (2, 49) = 29.11, p  < .01, ƞP²   
= 0.52 (see Figure 3d). Planned comparisons indicated that conditioned stimuli significantly 
differed, t = -6.39, p < .001, df = 27, suggesting that instructions successfully conditioned B1 as 
aversive and B2 as appetitive. Planned comparisons also indicated a significant difference in the 
valence scores of the category stimuli, t = -5.46, p < .001, df = 27. Therefore, negative 
evaluations generalized to animal-like objects from the aversive equivalence category (CAT+) 
while positive evaluations generalized to animal-like objects from the appetitive equivalence 
category (CAT-). Planned comparisons also revealed a significant difference between perceptual 
similar stimuli, t = -5.49, p < .001, df = 27. This suggests that (i) negative evaluations 
generalized to animal-like objects perceptually similar to those from the aversive equivalence 
category (pC1) and (ii) positive evaluations generalized to animal-like objects perceptually 
similar to those from the appetitive equivalence category (pC2).  
Discussion 
 The present study demonstrates that conceptual and perceptual similarity can 
simultaneously facilitate the spreading of instructed fear. First, the results clearly show that fear 
generalized from aversively conditioned nonsense words to animal-like objects within the same 
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stimulus equivalence category. This finding is especially interesting when considering that these 
objects (i) were never explicitly related to the nonsense words, (ii) were perceptually dissimilar 
from the nonsense words and (iii) were never directly or indirectly paired with a US (Auguston, 
& Dougher, 1997; Dymond et al., 2011; Vervoort et al., 2014). Second, physically similar 
animal-like objects, which were not explicitly category members, also evoked heightened fear. 
The scope of fear generalization essentially increased as the perceptual features of one object 
overlapped with another that was conceptually connected to a threat relevant word. These 
findings show how learned fear might spread to a variety of arbitrary events that never featured 
in an aversive episode. In the case of a phobia, for example, a person might develop a fear of 
blood-injections which might generalize to categorically related events (e.g. nurses with white 
coats) as well as to their perceptual variants (e.g. science teachers with white coat; e.g. 
Dunsmoor et al., 2012).  
 The current study attempted to model real-life fear learning and generalization in two 
ways. First and most notably, the potential for both the perceptual and conceptual relations 
between stimuli to interact and exacerbate fear generalization was demonstrated. Presently, 
perceptual generalization research scarcely speaks to the role of conceptual meaning while 
conceptual generalization research rarely addresses the importance of physical form. While 
examining these mechanisms separately can afford an unambiguous focus for individual studies, 
it may be at the cost of external validity. Real-world events are laden with both perceptual and 
conceptual information and not just one or the other. Second, we employed an instructed fear 
conditioning paradigm where nonsense words were paired with threatening information. 
Typically in fear research, stimuli are directly paired with an intense US but origin of anxiety can 
often be traced to verbal exchanges (Rachman, 1977). We have mimicked this important 
pathway for fear acquisition and, also, furthered the scope of inquiry by demonstrating that 
instructed fear can generalize to perceptually and conceptually related events. Overall, 
investigating the both conceptual and perceptual generalization of instructed fear is an important 
step towards better understanding the expansion of fear in anxiety disorders. Indeed, our 
experimental model bears a surprising resemblance to the experiences of a patient with OCD 
who struggled with fears of contamination and an ever-increasing network of triggers (described 
by McGinn & Sanderson, 1999). On one occasion, for instance, the patient was verbally 
informed that her sister-in-law was ill with a bout of diarrhea. This information altered the 
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patient’s emotional responding to her actual sister-in-law who now elicited disgust and triggered 
compulsive behaviors- an instance of conceptual generalization. Moreover, this maladaptive fear 
spread to the extent that even photographs of her sister-in-law triggered her OCD symptoms 
causing her to remove them from the home- an instance of perceptual generalization. 
 Participants grouped stimuli into meaningful categories, which facilitated the 
generalization of instructed fear. That is, nonsense words and animal-like objects were 
functionally interchangeable such that an aversive experience with one altered emotional 
responding to the other. The question remains as to why the perceptually similar objects evoked 
fear. One explanation is that the physically similar objects also became category members. Fields 
and colleagues (1991) indeed demonstrated that physical variants of category members become 
interchangeable with other category members. In that study, a MTS task established a stimulus 
equivalence category where nonsense word stimuli and dashed-lines were equivalent. In 
subsequent MTS trials, dashed-lines were replaced with physical variants and these were more 
likely to be related to the nonsense words when they resembled the original lines. In the present 
study, animal-like objects that resembled members from the stimulus equivalence category could 
have also become part of the artificial category and, therefore, related to the conditioned stimulus. 
In this case, category membership generalized perceptually to variants of members of the 
category and fear then generalized to these new members. Alternatively, of course, the common 
elements shared between the actual members of the stimulus equivalence category and the 
perceptually variants could have facilitated the generalization of fear.  
 It is interesting to note that avoidance generalized more to category stimuli than to the 
perceptual variants, despite the fact that both were physically unlike the conditioned stimulus. A 
similar trend was also observed for the US expectancy ratings and valence ratings but did not 
reach statistical significance. Still, this outcome suggests that a close category relationship 
between stimuli has a marked impact on generalized avoidance. That is, the category stimulus 
participated in the MTS training, which rendered it a more typical category member than the 
perceptual stimulus. This is consistent with recent research showing that the degree of conceptual 
similarity between two stimuli facilitates the generalization of learned fear (e.g. Dunsmoor, 
White, & LaBar, 2011; Dunsmoor & Murphy, 2014). Generally speaking, the current study adds 
to a growing body of literature indicating how the representation of an entire category can 
become involved in a conditioning episode (Dunsmoor & Murphy, 2015). Moreover, category 
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relationships can be rather arbitrary and generalization can, as a consequence, be unrestricted by 
physical form. This creates the possibility for a broad network of events to become emotionally 
significant; perhaps more than could be achieved by perceptual generalization alone (e.g. Bennett, 
Hermans, Dymond, Vervoort, & Baeyens, 2015). 
 Our findings are consistent with previous research by Barnes and Kennan (1993) that 
investigated how both conceptual and perceptual relations interact in the generalization of basic 
operant responses. Two stimulus equivalence categories were shaped using a MTS task with 
nonsense word stimuli. Specific key press patterns were then shaped. A member from one 
category controlled a low rate of responding and a member from the other category controlled a 
high rate of responding. In a final testing phase, response rates specifically generalize to 
members of the same category and previously unseen stimuli that physically resembled these 
other members. The present study has extended on this earlier research in the context fear.  
 An expectancy-based account of avoidance asserts that avoidance is mediated by beliefs 
about potential threat and about the reliability of the avoidance in averting threat (Lovibond, 
2006). It is therefore unusual that category and perceptual stimuli elicited equal US expectancy 
ratings but different levels of avoidance. This could suggest that expectancy does not underlie 
perceptually and conceptually generalized avoidance to the same extent. Alternatively, this could 
point to a procedural limitation as US expectancy was retrospectively rated and relied on 
memory. As such, these reports may not have been sensitive to subtle differences between these 
stimuli when they were first encountered. Future research should examine if the dissociation 
between US expectancy and avoidance is erased when more reliable trial-by-trail ratings are 
employed (Lovibond, 2006). In addition, our measures were mostly self-reported and, as such, 
may have been sensitive to desirability effects. It could therefore be interesting for future studies 
to employ direct physiological measures of fear including skin conductance and fear-startle 
potentials that are less likely to be subject to voluntary control (e.g. Vervoort et al., 2013). 
 This study speaks solely to the expansion of fear and it will be important for future 
research to investigate the therapeutic implications of both generalization processes. A goal of 
exposure therapy, for instance, is that extinction learning generalizes to a network of fear-
relevant stimuli. But the evidence suggests that the generalization of extinction is limited when a 
perceptual or conceptual variant of the originally conditioned stimulus is extinguished (see 
Vervliet, Kindt, Vansteenwegen, & Hermans, 2010; Vervoort et al., 2014). Our position, 
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however, could imply that extinction research should capitalize on both the perceptual and 
conceptual relations that stimuli have with conditioned stimuli. Perhaps extinction learning 
would readily generalize if the extinguished stimuli were both similar to the originally 
conditioned stimulus as well as highly typical category exemplar.  
 In conclusion, the present study highlights how complex conceptual and perceptual 
relations between stimuli might exacerbate the spreading of instructed fear. Under the 
assumption that overgeneralization is a characteristic symptom of anxiety disorders, these 
findings may be important in understanding how a nexus of innocuous events can evoke fear 
following a threatening episode.  
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Abstract 
Patients with chronic pain are often fearful of movements that never featured in painful episodes. 
This study examined whether a neutral movement’s conceptual relationship with pain-relevant 
stimuli could precipitate pain-related fear; a process known as symbolic generalization. As a 
secondary objective, we also compared experiential and verbal fear learning in the generalization 
of pain-related fear. First, two artificial categories were established wherein nonsense words and 
joystick arm movements were equivalent. Using a between-groups design, nonsense words from 
one category were paired with either an electro-cutaneous stimulus (pain-US) or threatening 
information, while nonsense words from the other category were paired with no pain-US or 
safety information. During a final testing phase, participants were prompted to perform specific 
joystick arm movements that were never followed by a pain-US, although they were informed 
that it could occur. The results showed that movements equivalent to the pain-relevant nonsense 
words evoked heightened pain-related fear as measured by pain-US expectancy, fear of pain, and 
unpleasantness ratings. Also, experience with the pain-US evinced stronger acquisition and 
generalization compared to experience with threatening information. The clinical importance and 
theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.  
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 Over the past thirty years, health psychologists have discovered that not just the intensity 
of pain, but the fear of pain is associated with functional disability, physical inactivity, and 
feelings of anxiety and depression in patients with chronic pain disorder (Crombez, Vlaeyen, 
Heuts, & Lysens, 1999; McCracken, Gross, Aikens, & Carnkike, 1992; Vlaeyen, Kole-Snijders, 
Boeren, & Van Eek, 1995; Zale, Lange, Fields, & Ditre, 2013). Prospective studies have shown 
that fear of pain predicts the development of chronic pain better than other physiological 
complaints, such as the severity of the original injury (Gheldolf, Crombez, Van den Bussche, 
Vinck, Van Nieuwenhuyse et al., 2012; Jensen, Karpatschof, Labriola, & Alberston, 2010). Also, 
psychological treatments that foster adaptive emotional regulation strategies can lead to 
meaningful reductions in disability, distress and life dissatisfaction even in the absence of pain 
reduction (George, Fritz, & McNeil, 2006; Leeuw et al., 2008; Morley, Eccleston, & Williams, 
1999; Wicksell, Ahlqvist, Bring, Melin, & Olsson, 2008; Wicksell, Olsson, & Hayes, 2010). 
This evidence collectively suggests that the emotional response to pain is a significant clinical 
issue that deserves attention in both research and therapy.  
 The fear-avoidance model of chronic pain appeals to associative learning processes to 
describe how fear of pain leads to the functional disabilities experienced by some patients 
(Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000, 2012). Here, pain is thought of as an unconditioned stimulus (pain-
US) that motivates emotional learning. Pain’s impetus comes from its sensory salience and also 
the catastrophic cognitions that an individual might have about its consequences, e.g. a belief 
that pain signifies damaged nerves. Neutral bodily movements that have been paired with pain 
can therefore signal the possibility of more pain or (re)-injury (conditioned stimulus; CS+) and 
evoke pain-related fear. Safety behaviors might then develop in a desperate attempt to reduce 
pain and avoid (re)-injury, e.g. adopting rigid gait (Volders, Meulders, De Peuter, Vervliet, & 
Vlaeyen, 2012). Any transient relief is likely to be attributed to these coping strategies and 
increase the likelihood that they will be employed again. However, safety behaviors are often so 
pervasive that they disrupt valued activities and this in turn has a deleterious impact on mood and 
sense of self. 
 A challenge for the fear-avoidance model has been to understand patients who are fearful 
of movements that never featured in pain episodes. In these cases, there appears to be a 
problematic overgeneralization of fear to innocuous movements. It could be that a neutral 
movement evokes pain-related fear because it is proprioceptively similar to a conditioned 
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movement; a process known as stimulus generalization (Meulders & Vlaeyen, 2013a). To 
examine this possibility Meulders, Vandebroek, Vervliet, and Vlaeyen (2013b) recently used a 
voluntary joystick arm movement paradigm and paired a painful electrocutaneous stimulus 
(pain-US) with a specific movement (e.g. moving left; CS+) and did not pair the pain-US with 
another movement (e.g. moving right; CS-). In a subsequent testing phase without the pain-US, 
participants were prompted to perform intermediate movements varying in similarity to the 
conditioned movements. Those that were more similar to the CS+ evoked more pain-related fear 
than those more similar to the CS- such that a gradient was observed; the more similarity with 
CS+ the more fear. These findings broadly indicate that proprioceptive similarity can indeed 
facilitate the spreading of pain-related fear. In real-life, generalization could exacerbate the 
difficulties of chronic pain patients as an increasing number of movements come to elicit distress 
and avoidance behavior. 
 An interesting observation is that fear can spread to previously neutral events even if they 
are physically dissimilar from a conditioned stimulus. For instance, a conceptual sameness 
shared between arbitrary events might contribute to the overgeneralization in learned fear and 
this has recently been referred to as category-based or symbolic generalization (see Dymond, 
Dusnmoor, Vervliet, Roche, & Hermans, 2015; Dunsmoor & Murphy, 2015). For example, 
Dunsmoor, Martin, and LaBar (2012) demonstrated that when members from a specific category 
(e.g. types of tools) are paired with a pain-US, other members spontaneously produce heightened 
fear in the absence of the US (also, see Boyle, Roche, Dymond, & Hermans, 2015). One method 
to study the category-based generalization of fear involves the creation of artificial verbal 
categories with perceptually distinct stimuli, e.g. nonsense words or shapes. This is accomplished 
using a computer-based, operant learning procedure called a Matching to Sample (MTS) task. A 
single item (the sample stimulus) is presented onscreen for a few seconds and is followed by a 
set of other items. Participants then select one item from the set. From trial to trial, different sets 
are shown but there is always one correct item (the comparison stimulus): Correct choices are 
reinforced (“Correct” appears onscreen) while incorrect choices are punished (“Wrong” appears 
onscreen). As such, a number of stimulus relations first are taught using corrective feedback 
wherein different comparison stimuli are mutually related to a common sample stimulus. In a 
later phase, the emergence of untrained (or derived) stimulus relations is examined using a 
similar format but without corrective feedback. This phase examines whether participants can 
Generalization of pain-related fear 
 47 
reverse the previously trained stimulus relations: If presented with a comparison stimulus then 
they might select the appropriate sample stimulus from a set of items (derived symmetry 
relations). It is also examined whether participants can combine the previously trained stimulus 
relations: If presented with one comparison stimulus then they might select another comparison 
stimulus from a set of items (derived equivalence relations). Overall, physically distinct stimuli 
become functionally substitutable with one another and, therefore, are said to partake in a 
stimulus equivalence category. This emergent interchangeability between distinct stimuli 
arguably resembles a conceptual sameness between individual items in a natural language 
category (see Barnes-Holmes, Staunton, Whelan, Barnes-Holmes, Commins et al., 2005; Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Sidman, 1971). To study the extension of learned fear through 
these de novo verbal categories, an aversive US is repeatedly paired with one of the comparison 
stimuli (CS+). As a result, other comparison stimuli typically act as if they too predict threat and 
evoke fear. In this way fear generalizes to stimuli that are perceptually dissimilar to the CS+ and 
have not been explicitly related to the CS+ but instead share a rather abstract conceptual 
similarity (Augustson & Dougher 1997; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeet, & Luciano, 
2008; Dymond, Schlund, Roche, & Whelan, 2011; Valverde, Luciano, & Barnes-Holmes, 2009; 
Vervoort, Vervliet, Bennett, & Baeyens, 2014).  
  Very little, if anything at all, is known about the category-based generalization of pain-
related fear. Given that visual stimuli can evoke fear based on their membership in verbal 
categories, it is conceivable that proprioceptive stimuli during movements could also produce 
fear in this manner. As a real-world example, lifting could be thought of as a verbal category 
entailing different muscular-skeletal movements, e.g. raising a box with the back or picking up 
an infant with the arms, as well as different vocalizations and written words, e.g. “lift” or “raise”.  
Should one member of this category become associated with pain then perhaps pain-related fear 
could generalize throughout this entire category. For example, a well-intended physiotherapist 
might advise- “be cautious while lifting because it could damage the spine”. Here, the category 
label, “lifting”, becomes conceptually related to pain-relevant, threat attributes, “damage”. This 
evaluation might then extend to specific movements in the category and precipitate pain-related 
fear in the absence of a discrete painful experience. Generally speaking, the realization that pain-
related fear can spread in accordance with proprioceptive similarity was an important step in the 
development of a theoretical account of chronic pain-disorders symptoms. Furthering the scope 
Chapter 3 
 48 
inquiry to consider the complex verbal similarity movements’ share might contribute to a more 
complete framework.  
 The current study sought to examine if pain-related fear can emerge due to category-
based, or symbolic, generalization. Using a MTS task, two stimulus equivalence categories were 
established with nonsense shapes, words and joystick arm movements. First, selecting words or 
performing a movement in the presence of sample shapes was rewarded. Second, derived 
symmetry relations between movements (or words) and shapes were tested, as were derived 
equivalence relations between words and movements. Using a pain-related fear conditioning 
paradigm, a nonsense word from one stimulus equivalence category was associated with a pain-
US (CS+) while a nonsense word from the other stimulus equivalence category was not (CS-). 
Lastly, participants were prompted to perform movements from both equivalence categories and 
informed that the pain-US could follow; when in truth it never occurred. It was predicted that 
participants would report heightened pain-related fear for movements equivalent to the pain-
relevant nonsense words. Self-reported measures of pain-related fear, retrospective US 
expectancy and unpleasantness ratings were administered as proxies of pain-related fear. One 
could also imagine that participants would be more hesitant to initiate movements that are 
associated with pain. For that reason, it was predicted that movements equivalent to the CS+ 
would take longer to initiate than movements equivalent to the CS-. 
 The fear learning literature clearly indicates that fear could be installed through different 
pathways (Rachman, 1977; Ollson & Phelps, 2004;), including directly experienced CS-US 
pairings (e.g. Gillon, & Davis, 1997) and verbal threat information (e.g. Fields & Schorah, 2007). 
As a secondary aim, the present study investigated if verbal information about pain alone could 
catalyze the generalization of pain-related fear to particular movements. Using a between-groups 
design, one group experienced the CS+ being directly paired with the pain-US while the CS- was 
not. In a second group, the CS+ was paired with threatening information (e.g. “painful” and 
“dangerous”) while the CS- was paired with safety information (e.g. “gentle” and “secure”). We 
predicted that both groups would show generalization of pain-related fear to the actual, 
equivalent movements. This could mimic the real-life emergence of pain-related fear due to the 
conceptual relationships between movements and certain evaluative attributes. For instance, and 
in real life scenarios, words (e.g. “lifting”) are paired with verbal information (e.g. “is 
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dangerous”) and this can prompt evaluative change in the specific referents (i.e. the musculature 
involved in lifting) (e.g. Muris & Fields, 2011).  
Method 
Participants 
 Eighty healthy participants (52 female) were recruited for this study through an online 
experimental management system (Mage = 23.04 years, SD = 6.80 years, range = 18 - 49 years) 
and paid €8/hour remuneration. The ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences of the University of Leuven approved the procedure (S55215). All 
participants signed an informed consent form. Exclusion criteria were pregnancy, cardio-
pulmonary difficulties, diagnosed psychiatric disorders or neurological conditions like epilepsy, 
and wrist pain. Participants were randomly assigned into one of two groups; the pain-US group 
(N = 41, Mage = 22.95 years, SD = 6.80 years) and the instructed-US group (N = 39, Mage = 
23.13 years, SD = 5.86 years). Due to an experimenter error, one participant was placed into the 
wrong experimental condition, hence the uneven group size. The chosen sample size was based 
on previous research conducted in our lab (see Bennett, Vervoort, Boddez, Hermans, & Baeyens, 
2015; Vervoort et al., 2014). 
Apparatus 
 Experimental sessions were conducted in a sound-attenuated cubicle using a Dell desktop 
PC (17” monitor with a black background; 1024x768 pixels). Stimulus presentations and 
response recordings were controlled using Affect 4.0 (Spruyt, Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, 
Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010). The pain-US group experienced an electrocutaneous stimulus. A 
commercial constant current stimulator (i.e. DS7A, Digitimer, Welwyn Garden City, England) 
delivered a 2 ms electrocutaneous stimulation (pain-US) to the wrist of the right hand, via 
Sensormedics electrodes (8 mm) filled with K-Y gel. An individual pain-US intensity level was 
decided upon during a pre-experimental calibration procedure (M intensity = 16.00 mA; SE = 
1.70 mA).  The pain-US was reliably aversive as indicated by participants ratings using a pencil 
and paper Likert scale where 0 = not at all unpleasant and 10 = highly unpleasant 
(Munpleasentness = 7.33; SE = 0.35). The instructed-US group was shown safety and threat 
information in size 32 white Arial fonts instead of the pain-US. Five threatening terms were 
used- injury, terrible, danger, pain and hurt. Five safety terms were used- safe, secure, gentle, 
trust and peace. 
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Figure 4. An overview of the shapes (A1 & A2), nonsense words (B1, B2, & B3) and joystick 
arm movements (C1, C2, & C3) that were used to establish two separate stimulus equivalence 
categories (A1=B1=C1 & A2=B2=C2). 
 
 During the MTS task, two nonsense shapes (A1 & A2), 150x150 pixels in white font, 
were used as sample stimuli (see Figure 4). Three nonsense 3-letter words (B1, B2, & B3) were 
shown in size 32 white Arial fonts, i.e. Mau, Zid and Ler, and these acted as comparison stimuli 
(see Figure 3). These words were chosen as previous research has indicated that they are neutral 
and not associated with a particular evaluative state, prior to conditioning (see Bennett et al., 
2015). Three arm movements (C1, C2, & C3) were made using a Logitech Attack 3 joystick, i.e. 
left, right and down, and these acted as comparison stimuli (see Figure 3). Joystick was operated 
by the participants’ right arm and movements were represented as mouse coordinates on the 
computer screen (the cursor was not visible). A left, right, and downward arm movement was 
defined by the cursor moving from the middle of the screen, 0x0x0x0 pixels (top x left x bottom 
x right), into a rectangular target region (200x200 pixels) positioned at the left side 
(0x284x200x484 pixels), the right side, (412x568x612x768 pixels), and bottom 
(824x284x1024x484 pixels) of the screen, respectively. Stimuli were assigned to one of two 
stimulus equivalence categories; A1=B1=C1 and A2=B2=C2. During some MTS trials, 
participants chose to perform one of the three movements and this was cued using a 1.50 s image 
of 3 intersecting white arrows pointing left, right and down (50 x 50 pixels); the comparison-
signal (see Figure 4). During other MTS trials, participants were required to perform one specific 
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movement and this was cued using a 5 s image of a white arrow that pointed either left, right or 
down (50 X 50 pixels); the movement-signal (see Figure 5). Participants could only move once 
the signal was removed from screen and moving too early caused a red X, size 32 font, to appear 
in the center of the screen. This remained onscreen until the joystick was returned to its resting 
position, which was defined by a virtual circle located in the center of the screen, 512 x 384 
pixels and radius 328 pixels. 
Procedure 
 Pain-US calibration  
Participants confirmed that they did not meet any of the exclusion criteria and signed an 
informed consent form. They were then brought to the experimental room and a work-up 
procedure established an intensity of electrocutaneous stimulus for the experiment. The 
experimenter explained that it was important for the experiment that the electrocutaneous 
stimulus be uncomfortable and somewhat painful. Two electrodes were placed on the 
participant’s right wrist, 1.00 cm apart. Starting at 1.00 mA, an electrocutaneous stimulus was 
delivered with increasing intervals of 1.00 or 2.00 mA until the stimulus was “painful but 
tolerable”. While progressing upwards through these intensities, the experimenter asked the 
participant to describe aloud the painfulness of the electrocutaneous stimulus, where 0 = feel 
nothing, and 10 = maximum tolerable pain. Once the intensity was selected, participants were 
asked to rate the unpleasantness of the pain-US using an 11-point Likert scale. 
 Matching-To-Sample Task 
 Pre-training. Six practice trials were completed to familiarize participants with the MTS 
task and joystick arm movements. Participants were told that the electrocutaneous stimulus 
would not yet occur. Instructions stated that on some trials a sample stimulus (A1 or A2) would 
first appear at the center of the screen and they would then have to choose one of three 
movements to perform (C1, C2 or C3). Participants were told that the presentation of the 
comparison-signal in the center of the screen would indicate when they were required to choose 
a movement. Finally, participants were instructed to only perform a movement once the signal 
terminated and that moving too soon would cause a red X to appear. Over 3 trials, A1 or A2 
randomly appeared at the center of the screen for 5 s. The offset of the sample stimulus was 
followed by the comparison-signal for 1.50 s in the center of the screen (e.g. Figure 5, A→C  
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Figure 5. A schematic overview of the Matching-to-Sample (MTS) task trials. The three different 
panels depict the trial formats for the different MTS phases; (1) training trials, (2) symmetry 
trials, and (3) equivalence trials. Within each panel is a depiction of the trials types found in a 
specific phase; training trial phase included [A!B] trials and [A!C] trials; symmetry trials 
included [B!A] trials and [C!A] trials; and equivalence trials included [B!C] trials and 
[C!B] trials. 
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trials). Over three trials, the experimenter directed the participant to make each movement 
following the offset of the comparison signal. No feedback was given.  
 Instructions then stated that other trials would require performing a movement (C1 or C2 
or C3) and then selecting 1 of 3 items. Participants were told that the presentation of a 
movement-signal would indicate the specific movement they needed to perform. Participants 
were again instructed to only make the movements once the signal disappeared otherwise a red X 
would appear. Over 3 trials, a movement-signal for C1, C2 or C3 randomly appeared in the 
center of the screen for 5 s. When the movement-signal terminated, the experimenter directed the 
participant to make the movement and this resulted in the presentation of B1, B2 and B3 in a line 
at the center of the screen. The experimenter explained that they could select the stimulus on the 
left by pressing 1, select the stimulus in the middle by pressing 2, or select the stimulus on the 
right by pressing 3 (e.g. Figure 5, C→B trials). Selecting a stimulus removed all other stimuli 
and started the next trial. Again, no feedback was given.  
 Trained stimulus relations.  Participants were reminded that they should (i) press 1, 2 or 
3 to select items, (ii) choose 1 of 3 movements to perform when the comparison-signal appears, 
and (iii) perform a specific movement when a movement-signal appears. No further instructions 
were given for the rest of the MTS task. In the first set of trials, A1 and A2 stimuli were sample 
stimuli, and B1, B2 and B3 were comparison stimuli (see Figure 5, A→B trials). Two trials were 
presented; [A1→ B1, B2, B3] and [A2→ B1, B2, B3] (the correct comparison is shown in bold). 
Here, A1 (or A2) appeared in the center of the screen for 5 s. Its offset was then followed by the 
presentation of B1, B2 and B3 in a line at the center of the screen (the linear order was 
randomized). Selecting B1 (or B2) was reinforced by the following feedback, “Correct”, whereas 
incorrect responses were followed by the following feedback, “Wrong”. Feedback was presented 
for 1 s and trials were separated by a 3-5 s inter-trial interval (ITI). Trials continued until 12 
consecutively correct responses were made. In the second set of trials, A1 and A2 were sample 
stimuli, and C1, C2 and C3 were comparison stimuli (see Figure 5, A→C trials). Two trials were 
presented; [A1→ C1, C2, C3] and [A2→ C1, C2, C3]. A1 (or A2) appeared in the center of the 
screen followed 5 s later by the presentation of the comparison-signal for 1.5 s. Following the 
offset of the comparison-signal, performing C1 (or C2) was reinforced by the following 
feedback: “Correct”, whereas incorrect movements were followed by the feedback: “Wrong”. 
The trials continued until 12 consecutively correct movements were made. In a final set of  
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training trials, participants were presented with a mix of all 4 trial types; [A1→ B1, B2, B3], 
[A2→ B1, B2, B3], [A1→ C1, C2, C3] and [A2→ C1, C2, C3]. Trials were presented quasi-
randomly (with no more than 2 consecutive presentations of the same type) until 24 
consecutively correct responses were made.  
 Derived symmetry relations. Four trials tested if participants would reverse the relation 
between the sample and comparison stimuli; [B1→ A1, A2, A3], [B2→ A1, A2, A3], [C1→ A1, 
A2, A3] and [C2→ A1, A2, A3]. These were presented 4 times each in a block of 16 trials 
without feedback. On some trials, B1 or B2 appeared in the center of the screen for 5 s followed 
by A1, A2 and A3 in a line on the center of the screen (see Figure 5, B→A trials). On other trials, 
a movement-signal appeared for 5 s and then participants performed the appropriate arm 
movement (C1 or C2). Once the movement was complete, A1, A2 and A3 appeared in the center 
of the screen. Pressing 1, 2 or 3 to select an item caused all stimuli to be removed from the 
screen (see Figure 5, C→A trials).  
 Derived equivalence relations. Four trials were presented to examine the relationship 
between comparison stimuli; [B1→ C1, C2, C3], [B2→ C1, C2, C3], [C1→ B1, B2, B3] and 
[C2→ B1, B2, B3]. These were presented 4 times each in a block of 16 trials, without feedback. 
On some trials B1 and B2 appeared in the center of the screen for 5 s followed by a 1.5 s 
comparison-signal. Participants then chose whether to perform C1, C2 or C3 (see Figure 5, B→C 
trials). On other trials, a movement-signal appeared for 5 s and then participants made the 
appropriate arm movement (C1 or C2). B1, B2 and B3 then appeared in the center of the screen 
and one of these was selected (see Figure 5, C→B trials).  
 Pain-related fear conditioning 
 For the pain-US group, instructions stated that nonsense words would appear in the center 
of the screen and that the pain-US could follow. B1 was conditioned to predict the pain-US (i.e. 
B1 was the CS+). B1 was presented 4 times for 5 s followed by the onset of the 2 ms pain-US. 
B1 appeared once for 5 s and was not followed by the pain-US. B2 appeared on screen 5 times 
and was never followed by the pain-US (i.e. B2 was the CS-). Trials were presented quasi-
randomly, with no more than 2 consecutive trials with the same stimulus, and separated by a 5-9 
s ITI. For the instructed-US group, instructions stated that extra information would be given 
about the nonsense word that had been seen. B1 was presented in the center of the screen 5 times 
for 5 s and followed by the onset of a 3 s threatening term, i.e. injury, terrible, danger, pain or 
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hurt. B2 was also presented 5 times for 5 s and followed by the onset of 3 s safety term, i.e. safe, 
secure, gentle, trust or peace. Trials were presented quasi-randomly and separated by a 5-9 s ITI. 
As such, and in both groups, a member of one equivalence category (A1=B1=C1) was associated 
with a pain-US while a member of the other equivalence category (A2=B2=C2) was not. 
 Signaled joystick arm movement task 
Instructions stated that participants were now required to make certain arm movements and that 
the pain-US might follow certain movements. However, at no point in this task was the pain-US 
presented. Participants were also reminded to wait until the movement-signals disappeared 
before moving otherwise a red X would appear. Here, movement-signals for C1 or C2 were 
presented for 5 s after which participants made the appropriate arm movements. C1 and C2 were 
randomly presented once each in a single block. Overall, 4 blocks were presented. Trials could 
only be completed once a movement was performed and were separated by a 5-9 s ITI.  
Outcome measures 
 Manipulation checks 
 This experiment required (i) the establishment of a stimulus equivalence category and (ii) 
a learned fear response. To check for the first criterion, the number of correct responses during 
the derived symmetry and derived equivalence phases were recorded. Accuracy scores were then 
calculated for each participant by expressing the total of correct responses as a percentage of the 
number of trials in each part. An accuracy score greater than 87.50% (14/16 correct responses) 
was taken to indicate the successful completion of the symmetry and equivalence phases. The 
mean number of MTS training trials was also calculated and a one-way ANOVA was run to 
examine if the pain-US and instructed-US group differed in the number of MTS training trials. 
Three one-way ANOVAs were calculated to examine if the pain-US group and instructed-US 
group differed in performance during (i) MTS training, (ii) symmetry testing and (iii) 
equivalence testing. To check for the second criterion, participants were asked to report the 
unpleasantness of the CS+ (i.e. B1) and CS- (i.e. B2). This was assessed at the very end of the 
experimental study. The question “How unpleasant did you find this word? ” appeared on the top 
of the screen with B1 or B2 presented in the center of the screen and followed 1.50 s later an 11-
point Likert scale, where 0 = not at all, 5 = uncertain and 10 = highly unpleasant.  A repeated 
measures ANOVA was then calculated to examine the effect of (i) stimulus and (ii) type of US 
on unpleasantness ratings for CSs. There was 1within-subjects factor (stimulus) with 2 levels; 
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CS+ and CS-. There was also 1 between-subjects factor (group) with 2 levels; pain-US group 
(directly experienced the pain-US) and the instructed-US group (informed about threat/safety). 
 Generalization of pain-related fear 
 Self-report measures. After the signaled joystick arm movement task, participants were 
informed that they would be asked a series of questions. Each question appeared on the top of the 
computer screen with the movement-signal for C1 or C2 in the center of the screen. Answers 
were provided using a mouse-click on an 11-point Likert scale (where 0 = not at all, 5 = 
uncertain and 10 = definitely), which was shown at the bottom of the screen. The first two 
questions measured retrospective pain-US expectancy for C1 and C2; participants were asked, 
“How much did you think the electrical stimulation would follow this movement? ”. The next two 
questions measured pain-related fear for C1 and C2; participants were asked, “How fearful where 
you while making this movement? ”. The final two questions measured the valence for C1 and 
C2; participants were asked, “How unpleasant did you find this movement?”.  
 The mean pain-US expectancy rating, mean pain-related fear rating and mean 
unpleasantness of movements were calculated for the C1 and C2 movements. A series of mixed 
repeated measures ANOVAs were then calculated to examine the effect of (i) stimulus and (ii) 
group on the self-report measures. For each ANOVA there was 1 within-subjects factor 
(stimulus) with 2 levels; C1 (equivalent to the CS+) and C2 (equivalent to the CS-). There was 1 
between-subjects factor (group) with 2 levels; pain-US (experienced pain) and instructed-US 
(instructed about threat). 
 Reaction time. Response latency was recorded for each movement in each block during 
the signaled joystick arm movement task. This was defined as time between the termination of 
the movement-signal and the time taken to initiate an arm movement (the joystick deviating from 
its resting-position). In accordance with the recommendation of Meulders and Vlaeyen (2013), 
all reaction times shorter than 250 ms and longer than 3000 ms were eliminated. In addition, 
mean response latency scores for the C1 and C2 were calculated for each participant, and 
latencies more than 3 SDs from the mean were eliminated (see Meulders,& Vlaeyen, 2013). 
Overall, 2.35% of the overall data set was discarded. A repeated measures ANOVA was 
calculated to compare the effects of (i) stimulus and (ii) group on the response latency. This 
model entailed 2 within-subjects factor; stimulus, which had 2 levels (C1 and C2) and block, 
which had 4 levels (block 1-4). There was 1 between-subjects factor (group), which had 2 levels 
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(pain-US and instructed-US). Where Mauchly’s test revealed that sphericity could not be 
assumed, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is reported. The alpha-level was set at .05 and effect 
size was calculated using the partial ETA squared (ηp2). Bonferroni corrections were used as the 
rejection criteria when pairwise comparisons were calculated.  
Results 
Matching-to-Sample task 
 A mean of 68.47 MTS training trials (SE = 1.56) were required and there was high 
accuracy of responding (M = 88.99%, SE = 0.57%). The one-way ANOVA indicated that the 
pain-US group required significantly more MTS training trials than the instructed-US, F(1, 78) = 
4.49, p = .04, ηp2 = 0.04. However, just 4 outliers in the pain-US group drove this difference. In 
addition, a one-way ANOVA indicated that the groups did not significantly differ in terms of 
accuracy during MTS training, F < 1.00, p = .43. More importantly, a high level of accuracy was 
achieved during the symmetry testing (M = 88.75%, SE = 2.25%). One-way ANOVA indicated 
that the two groups did not significantly differ in terms of their accuracy during symmetry testing, 
F < 1, p = .33. Finally, a high level of accuracy was achieved during the equivalence testing (M = 
89.66%, SE = 2.57%) and a one-way ANOVA indicates that the two groups did not differ in their 
performance, F < 1, p = .93. The accuracy during the symmetry and equivalence testing suggests 
that stimulus equivalence categories were reliably established. Therefore, the criterion of the first 
manipulation check was met. 
Unpleasantness of the original CSs 
  The 2 (stimulus) x 2 (group) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
stimulus, F(1, 78) = 148.22, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.66 (see Figure, 6a). The CS+ was rated as more 
unpleasant than the CS- for the pain-US group, t(40) = 9.82, p < .001, d = 5.34, and the 
instructed-US group, t(38) = 7.33, p < .001, d = 3.36. This suggests that conditioning was 
complete. The criterion of the second manipulation check was therefore met. Interestingly, a 
main effect of group was also observed, F(1, 78) = 14.17, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.15, as was a 
significant interaction between stimulus and group, F(1, 78) = 7.69, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.09. The 
CS+ was rated as more unpleasant in the pain-US group than in the paired with the actual US as 
opposed to threatening information. On the other hand, the two groups did not significantly differ 
in terms of CS- unpleasantness ratings, t(78) = 0.78, p = .44.  
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Figure 6. (A) Mean unpleasantness ratings for the original CSs. This was a manipulation check 
to ensure complete conditioning. (B) Mean pain-US expectancy ratings for movements 
equivalent to the original CSs. (C) Mean fear of pain ratings for movements equivalent to the 
original CSs (D) Mean unpleasantness ratings for movements equivalent to the original CSs. 
Error bars represent standard error. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
. 
Pain-US expectancy  
   A 2 (stimulus) x 2 (group) repeated measures ANOVA indicated a main effect of 
stimulus, F(1, 77) = 94.10, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.55 (see Figure 6b). In line with our predictions, 
movements equivalent to the CS+ prompted higher pain-US expectancy than movements 
equivalent to the CS- in both the pain-US group, t(40) = 7.91, p < .001, d = 4.53, and the 
instructed-US, t(37) = 5.82, p < .001, d = 3.21 (see Figure 6b). There was no main effect of 
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group, F = 1.20, p = .27, nor was there an interaction between group and stimulus, F = 2.76, p 
= .10. This indicates that the groups did not differ in their expectancy ratings for movements 
equivalent to the CS+, t(77) = 1.60, p = .12, and movements equivalent to the CS-, t(77) = 0.33, 
p = .74. 
Fear of pain 
 A 2 (stimulus) x 2 (group) ANOVA indicated a main effect of stimulus on self-reported 
fear of pain, F(1, 77) = 70.75, p < .001, ηp2 =  0.48 (see Figure 6c). As predicted, movements 
equivalent to the CS+ evoked higher pain-related fear ratings than movements equivalent to the 
CS- in the pain-US group, t(40) = 6.89, p < .001, d = 3.71, and the instructed-US, t(37) = 4.98, p 
< .001, d = 2.32. Interestingly, a main effect of group was also observed, F(1, 77) = 5.98, p = .01, 
ηp2 = 0.07, and the interaction between group and stimulus was nearing significance, F(1, 77) = 
3.78, p = .056, ηp2 = 0.05. The pain-US group reported significantly more pain-related fear in 
response to movements equivalent to the CS+ than the instructed-US group, t(77) = 2.54, p = .01, 
d = 1.73. On the other hand, the two groups did not differ in pain-related fear in response to 
movements equivalent to the CS-, t(73) = 0.88, p = .38. 
Unpleasantness of the movements  
 A 2 (stimulus) x 2 (group) repeated measures ANOVA indicated a main effect of 
stimulus on the self-reported unpleasantness of movements, F(1, 78) = 40.68, p < .001, ηp2 = 
0.34 (see Figure 6d). As predicted, movements equivalent to the CS+ were rated as more 
unpleasant than movements equivalent to the CS- in both the pain-US group, t(40) = 5.19, p 
< .001, d = 2.83, and the instructed-US group, t(38) = 3.79, p < .01, d = 1.61. A main effect of 
group was also observed, F(1, 78) = 13.31, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.15, but there was no significant 
interaction effect, F = 3.04, p = .09. Interestingly, the pain-US group rated the CS+ equivalent 
movements as significantly more unpleasant then the instructed-US, t(78) = 3.26, p < .01, d = 
2.07. Finally, there was no difference in how the two groups rated the unpleasantness of the CS- 
equivalent movements, t(62) = 2.18, p = .03. (corrected α = .01), 
Response latency 
 A 2 (stimulus) x 2 (group) x 4 (block) ANOVA indicated no main effect of stimulus, F < 
1, p = .87 (see Figure 7). There was also no main effect of group, F = 1.98, p = .16. There was 
however main effect of block, F(3, 198) = 5.60, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.08. Pairwise comparisons  
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Figure 7. Response latency as measured during the signaled joystick movement task: The mean 
response latency shown per block for each stimulus, and for both the pain-US group and 
instructed US group. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
indicated that the mean response latency during the first block were significantly longer than 
those in the third block, d = 95.11, SE = 30.91, p = .02, and fourth block, d = 117.22, SE = 36.10, 
p = .01. Also, the mean response latency during the second block were significantly longer than 
those in the fourth block, d = 100.47, SE = 34.79, p = .03. This suggests that participants 
performed the specific movements quicker as the signaled joystick arm movement task 
progressed.  
Discussion 
 Previous research has clearly shown that a conceptual sameness between individual 
events can facilitate the generalization of learned fear. The present study investigated if 
movements could come to specifically evoke pain-related fear in this manner. The results 
demonstrated that pain-related fear spread from conditioned nonsense word stimuli (CS) to 
joystick arm movements from within the same stimulus equivalence category. In accordance 
with our predictions, movements from the pain-relevant stimulus equivalence category 
spontaneously prompted higher pain-US expectancy ratings, fear of pain ratings and 
unpleasantness ratings than movements from the pain-irrelevant stimulus equivalence category. 
This finding is particularly interesting given that the movements themselves were never paired 
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with pain-US, nor were the movements in anyway perceptually similar to the nonsense word 
stimuli that had been associated with pain. It is also interesting given that the movements and 
nonsense words were never explicitly related to one another. Participants derived the stimulus 
equivalence category without any corrective feedback during the derived symmetry and 
equivalence phases. Overall, it appears that movements can become conceptually related to pain-
relevant words through a process of stimulus equivalence-based category formation and that this 
conceptual relation can facilitate the emergence of pain-related fear. To the extent that stimulus 
equivalence is involved in real-world verbal behavior (for further discussion see Barnes-Holmes 
et al., 2005; Dymond, 2014; Hayes et al, 2001), the current study may describe a unique means 
for movements to evoke pain-related fear in the absence of a pain episode. 
 The present study also investigated if verbal information about potential harm could also 
promote the generalization of pain-related fear. First, nonsense words that were paired with 
threat information prompted higher unpleasantness ratings than those paired with safety 
information, suggesting a change in stimulus valence following conditioning. As predicted, 
movements that were equivalent to the threat-associated nonsense words then evoked higher 
pain-US expectancy ratings, fear of pain ratings and unpleasantness ratings than movements 
equivalent to the safety-relevant stimuli. This observation points to the impressive control that 
verbally relating movements and evaluative terms can have over emotional responding (also, see 
Blackledge, 2007; McCracken, & Morley, 2014; McCracken & Vowles, 2014). Neutral joystick 
arm movements evoked heightened fear because of a derived equivalence relation with nonsense 
words, which were themselves paired with threatening information. Overall, this indicates that 
conceptually linking movement-terms (e.g. “lifting”) to particular evaluative attributes (e.g. 
“danger” or “safe”) can alter emotional responding to the actual movements.   
 Response latencies were expected to be longer for movements from the pain-relevant 
stimulus equivalence category relative to movements from the pain-irrelevant category. This 
would suggest a hesitation to perform movements associated with pain, and strengthen the claim 
that pain-related fear and affiliated avoidance behavior generalized through verbal relations. No 
such difference was observed. However, previous research suggests response latencies may be 
less sensitive to the generalization of pain-related fear than other fear measurements. Meulders et 
al. (2013) found that joystick arm movements that were paired with a pain-US elicited an 
elevated eye-blink startle response and this subsequently generalized to proprioceptively similar 
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movements. On the other hand, longer response latencies were observed for arm movements that 
were paired with the pain-US but the same was not observed for proprioceptively similar 
movements. Future research will be required to examine why such an asymmetry is observed 
across different fear measurements. One commonality between our study and Meulders et al. was 
the use of a basic Logitech Attack 3 joystick. Perhaps future research could benefit from the use 
of more sensitive and informative technologies to measure arm movements (e.g. Houstma & Van 
Houten, 2006). On a related note, it will also be important for future research to measure pain-
related fear more directly using physiological measures like skin conductance and startle-reflex 
potentials (e.g. Vervoort et al., 2014). This would provide clearer evidence that the conditioning 
procedure did indeed install fear/safety of the conditioned stimuli. A limitation of the current 
study is that we rely self-reported stimulus valence for this information. 
 Importantly, the current findings indicated that direct experience with pain-US is 
dominant over verbal information in the initial acquisition and subsequent generalization of pain-
related fear. Participants who directly experienced the pain-US demonstrated stronger pain-
related fear conditioning than those who received verbal threat information. And this heightened 
acquisition of pain-related fear may have lead to the heightened generalization of pain related 
fear. That is, movements prompted higher fear of pain and higher unpleasantness ratings when 
equivalent to CSs that were paired with the pain-US rather than threat information. These results 
are congruent with recent research found elsewhere. In a within-subjects design, Raes, De 
Houwer, De Schryver, Brass and Kalisch (2014) first paired one stimulus (CS1+) with an 
electro-cutaneous US and another stimulus (CS2+) with a ‘placeholder’ that represented the US. 
This placeholder was explained to participants as a way of preventing the delivery of too many 
shocks so early in the experiment. In a second phase, participants were instructed that both 
stimuli would be followed by the actual US for real. Prior experience with a CS-US contingency 
had an additive effect over instructed fear as CS1+ then prompted higher fear ratings than CS2+. 
It appears that direct experience with CS-US pairings makes a distinct contribution to fear 
learning over verbal information. Such nuances between different pathways for pain-related fear 
learning could be consequential in the assessment and treatment of chronic pain. For instance, it 
may be important to consider whether a patient had any (in)-direct experience with pain to gauge 
the intensity of pain-related fear and evaluate the risk of generalization. However, we cannot 
discount the possibility that the between group difference reflects a procedural artifact. During 
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the pain-related fear conditioning, participants were given quite general information about the 
CS, e.g. MAU→ “hurt” & VEK→ “safe”. Perhaps conditioning effects would be more 
comparable between the groups if threat information was more specific, e.g. “MAU will be 
followed by a electric stimulus” (see Raes et al., 2014).  
 As far as we are aware, no other study has shown that proprioceptive stimuli can partake 
in stimulus equivalence categories. Although Tierney, DeLargy and Bracken (1995) designed an 
innovative MTS task to establish stimulus equivalence categories with haptic stimuli. Three 
sticks, each of which had a different center of mass, were placed within the grasp of participants 
but beyond their visual range. Therefore, the sticks could only be discriminated by their haptic 
properties once they were placed in the participants’ hands. During some training trials, a 
sample-word was presented and the selection of one stick was reinforced. During other training 
trials, a stick was placed in the participants’ hands as the sample stimulus and the selection of a 
different comparison-word was reinforced. Symmetry relations emerged during the testing phase. 
Participants selected the appropriate previous sample-word when holding a particular stick and, 
also, selected the appropriate stick when presented with one of the comparison-words. Derived 
equivalence relations were also observed. Participants selected the appropriate comparison-word 
stimulus in the presence of one of the sample-words, and vice versa. Tierney et al. trained the 
baseline stimulus relations such that the comparison haptic stimulus for one relation was the 
sample stimulus for the next relation (a linear MTS task). As a result, haptic stimuli could only 
take part in symmetrical relations with words and not equivalence relations. In our procedure 
nonsense words and proprioceptive stimuli both served as comparison stimuli to a common 
sample symbol (a one-to-many MTS task). A benefit of our approach is that proprioceptive 
stimuli could be observed to participate in both (i) derived symmetry with the sample symbol 
and (ii) derived equivalence relations with the nonsense words.   
 A key finding in the current study is that verbally categorizing movements with pain-
relevant words (through stimulus equivalence learning) can create a potential for unwarranted 
pain-related fear. It is worth mentioning that a very similar, if not an identical, mechanism is 
supposed by some to be at the core of human psychopathology. Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Stroshal, & Wilson, 1999) is a relatively recent addition to the behavior 
and cognitive therapies, and has been found to significantly improve emotional, social and 
physical functioning in chronic pain patients (e.g. McCracken & Velleman, 2010; McCracken & 
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Vowles, 2007; Vowles & McCracken, 2008). A central assertion in ACT is that humans readily 
infer verbal rules or relationships and this often becomes a problematic source of behavioral 
control that dominates over actual experiences; this is referred to as cognitive fusion (Blackledge 
& Drake, 2015; Hayes, Levin, Plumb-Vilardaga, Villatte, & Pistorello, 2013; Vilardaga, Hayes, 
& Levin, 2009). As a simple example, individuals with chronic pain might conceptualize certain 
movements as ‘pain-relevant’ and ‘disabling’ and reify this rule, despite the fact these 
movements might have never causally featured in a pain episode. Cognitive fusion is often 
described as a therapeutic construct that speculated to be based on basic learning processes such 
as symmetry and equivalence relations, symbolic generalization as well as Pavlovian and operant 
conditioning (Hayes et al., 1999, 2013). However, a drawback of this novel approach is a paucity 
of research that clearly describes how learning processes might relate to the components of ACT, 
like cognitive fusion (see Arche & Craske, 2008; Vlaeyen, 2014). In the context of the current 
study, we demonstrated that verbal relations could indeed influence emotional response to 
physical pain; this experimental model might elaborate on the learning mechanisms underlying 
cognitive fusion in chronic pain disorders. Particular arm movements, which were never before 
painful, controlled pain-related fear because of their derived equivalence to words that were 
associated with physical pain (also, see Blackledge, 2007; Dymond & Roche, 2009; Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2004). This represents a first step in our research unit to investigate the role of 
verbal categories in the generalization of pain-related fear and chronic pain disorders. In future, it 
will be important for us to further explore the core learning processes underlying ACT.  
 In conclusion, the present study investigated whether joystick arm movements could 
evoke pain-related fear due to their participation in a de novo verbal category. An artificial 
stimulus equivalence category was established in which nonsense words and joystick arm 
movements were equivalent. When nonsense words were associated with pain, joystick arm 
movements from within the same stimulus equivalence category spontaneously elicited pain-
related fear. This highlights a unique pathway for the emergence of pain-related fear in the 
absence of a discrete pain episode. The present study also employed a between-groups design in 
which words were associated with pain through direct pairing with the pain-US or through verbal 
information about threat. While both pathways excited the category-based generalization of pain-
related fear, direct experience with the pain-US had a stronger effect. This may be valuable 
information when considering the etiology of pain-related fear in chronic pain disorders.  Finally, 
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and from a broad clinical perspective, we imagine that this experimental study may speak to the 
learning mechanisms underlying cognitive fusion in ACT. When considering these promising 
first results, we contend that it will be particularly intriguing for future research to further 
explore the role of complex verbal relations in the acquisition, and possibly even the attenuation, 
of pain-related fear.  
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Abstract 
The present study compared the impact of conceptual equivalence and opposition relations on 
fear generalization. In a procedure using nonsense words, some stimuli became relationally 
equivalent to an aversively conditioned stimulus while others were opposite. The generalization 
of fear to equivalently and oppositely related stimuli was then measured using behavioral 
avoidance, retrospective US expectancy and stimulus valence ratings. Equivalence relations 
facilitated fear generalization while opposition relations constrained generalization. The potential 
clinical implications of symbolic, or category-level, generalization is discussed  
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 Individuals with anxiety often fear events that were absent from a threatening episode 
and that lack any perceptual similarity to events present at the time of conditioning (Augustson 
& Dougher, 1997; Hermans, Baeyens, & Vervliet, 2013). In such instances, category-level or 
symbolic generalization, whereby learned fear spreads to neutral events based on pre-existing 
conceptual relationships, is likely to be involved. For example, Dunsmoor, Martin and LaBar 
(2012) paired certain members of category (e.g. types of animals) with an unpleasant shock and 
later observed different members to evoke heightened fear in the absence of shocks. While 
generalization is interesting in the context of anxiety disorders, the contribution of conceptual 
connections between stimuli relatively understudied and deserving of further scrutiny. 
 This form of generalization relies on the ability to spontaneously respond to an event in 
terms of its arbitrary relationship to other events (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). One 
approach to study this involves training relations between perceptually dissimilar (arbitrary) 
stimuli and then testing for untrained derived stimulus relations. For instance, using nonsense 
words, Dymond, Roche, Forsyth, Whelan and Rhoden (2008) trained two stimuli as the ‘same’ 
as a central stimulus (trained equivalence relations). Two other stimuli were trained as the 
‘opposite’ of this central stimulus (trained opposite relations). This established an equivalence-
pair and an opposite-pair of stimuli. Participants then spontaneously (i.e. in the absence of 
feedback) combined these trained relations to derive equivalence relations within both pairs and 
derive opposition relations between both pairs. In a subsequent fear-conditioning paradigm, a 
stimulus from the equivalent-pair was aversively conditioned to control avoidance; pressing a 
space bar prevented an unconditioned stimulus (US). A stimulus from the opposite-pair was non-
aversively conditioned and prompted a withheld space bar press. The remaining stimulus of the 
equivalence-pair then produced a higher rate of generalized avoidance than the remaining 
stimulus of the opposite-pair. Derived equivalence with an aversively conditioned stimulus (CS) 
seemed to facilitate generalized avoidance while derived opposition did not. In this way, the 
control exerted by stimuli over emotion may be said to change in accordance with their derived 
stimulus relations.  
 Dymond et al. (2008) found that if one stimulus was directly paired with a threatening 
outcome, then equivalently related stimuli functioned as if they too predicted threat while 
opposite stimuli did not. However, a potential shortcoming of the procedure employed was that 
the stimuli belonging to the opposite-pair were also equivalent and one of these was non-
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aversively conditioned. It is possible that opposite stimuli prompted little generalized avoidance 
because of derived equivalence with a non-aversive CS rather than opposition to an aversive CS. 
Therefore, it cannot be conclusively stated that derived opposition restricted generalization and 
that relations had a different impact on generalized avoidance.  
 The present study further compared the impact of conceptual equivalence and opposition 
relations on fear generalization. We sought to exclude equivalence with a non-aversive CS as an 
alternative explanation for poorly generalized avoidance to an opposite stimulus. To accomplish 
this, related stimuli were never non-aversively conditioned. This allowed for an unambiguous 
comparison of different derived relations in fear generalization. We employed avoidance 
behavior, US expectancy reports and stimulus valence ratings as proxies of fear. This offers a 
more exhaustive analysis of the construct of fear than previous studies that solely examined 
behavioral avoidance. It was hypothesized that stimuli in derived equivalence relations with a CS 
would produce more generalized fear than stimuli in derived opposite relations with a CS.  
 An important question yet to been addressed is whether stimuli in derived opposition 
with a CS are in some way ‘safe’ or ‘pleasant’ or simply ‘non-threatening’? It could be that 
stimuli in derived opposition relations with an aversive CS are negatively associated with threat. 
That is, conceptual opposition with threat may drive individuals to believe there is no danger. As 
a secondary aim, we hypothesized that stimuli in derived opposition with a CS would prompt (i) 
lower US expectancies and (ii) more positive valence ratings than a neutral stimulus. 
Method 
Participants 
 Seventy-two undergraduate students (58 female) participated in exchange for course 
credits (M = 18.40 years old, SD = 1.10 years). The sample size was based on prior research from 
our lab that employed a similar paradigm. Approval was granted by the ethical committee of the 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Science (S55215) and participants provided informed 
consent. Exclusion criteria are detailed in the next section, and all manipulations and measures 
are reported.  
Apparatus 
 Experiments were conducted in a sound attenuated cubicle on a Dell desktop PC with a 
17” monitor, and programmed using the Relational Completion Procedure (Dymond & Whelan, 
2010) and Affect 4. Two wingdings characters were selected as cues for equivalence and  
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Figure 8. Schematic representation of the trained and derived stimulus relations. Solid lines 
indicate stimulus relations trained and dashed lines indicate derived stimulus relations. 
 
opposite relations. Relations were established between 9, 3-letter non-words (BEH, FIH, CUG, 
VEP, MAU, SUG, GAJ, ZID, RUV, LER). These are alphanumerically represented as A, S1, S2, 
O1, O2, N1, N2, & N3. Here, ‘S’ indicates stimuli trained in equivalence relations; ‘O’ indicates 
stimuli trained in opposite relations; and ‘N’ indicates stimuli with no specified relations. These 
words appeared in capitals letters, size 32 black Arial, against a blue background. Stimuli were 
counterbalanced across participants. In line with Dymond et al. (2008), multiple unpleasant USs 
were used comprising of co-occurring images and sound. One of 12 body mutilation images 
from the International Affective Picture System was shown for 3 s, 1024x768 pixels (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001). Normative data indicate that these 12 images are unpleasant (M 
valence = 1.49, SD = 0.53; Libkuman, Otani, Kern, Viger, & Novak, 2007). The IAPS images 
selected included #3000, #3010, #3030, #3051, #3062, #3063, #3064, #3080, #3100, #3102, 
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#3130, #3150. An aversive sound of a female scream was modified using Audacity 1.2.6, and 
played via headphones for 2 s at 90dB. Previous data indicated that this sound is unpleasant (M = 
1.21, SD = 0.51; Van Diest, Bradley, Guerra, Van den Bergh, & Lang, 2009).  
 US expectancy was recorded with a 21-point Likert scale where, -10 = definitely unlikely, 
0 = uncertain and 10 = definitely likely. Stimulus valence was recorded with a 21-point Likert 
scale where, -10 = highly unpleasant, 0 = neutral and 10 = highly pleasant. Scales appeared 
horizontally at the bottom of the screen and responses were made via mouse clicks.  
Procedure 
 Relational MTS task 
 On each trial, a sample stimulus first appeared in the upper-left screen, e.g. [A]. A 
relational cue appeared 1 s later in the upper-middle screen, e.g. [same]. Finally, an empty 
square appeared 1 s later in the upper-right screen, e.g. [?]. These items collectively represented 
an incomplete relational ‘sentence’ i.e. [L] same [?]. Five optional stimuli then appeared in the 
lower screen, e.g. [S1,O1,N1,N2,N3]. Participants were instructed to use the mouse and place 1 
optional stimulus into the empty box. Four parts ran without any pauses or additional instructions.  
 Part A. Two wingdings characters were trained as the ‘same’ and ‘opposite’ relational 
cues. Sample and optional stimuli were familiar objects that differed along a physical dimension. 
There were 6 sets of objects; 5 boxes (small to large), 5 lines (short to long), 5 discs (crescent to 
full circle), 5 faces (sad to happy), 5 sets of dots (few to many) and 5 trees (short to tall). An 
equivalence trial, e.g. [small box] same [?], required the selection of the optional stimulus 
perceptually identical to the sample i.e. [small box] same [small box]. An opposite trial, e.g. 
[small box] opposite [?], required the selection of the optional stimulus perceptually furthest 
from the sample i.e. [small box] OPPOSITE [largest box]. Corrective feedback (“Correct” or 
“Wrong”) followed each trial for 3 s and then a 3 s ITI. Trials appeared randomly until 12 
consecutively correct responses were made. At this point, Part B began. 
  Part B. Trials were identical to Part A except 6 different object sets were used; 5 
buildings (small to large), 5 wavelengths (low to high frequency), 5 columns (narrow to wide), 5 
shades (black to white), 5 trees (straight to bent) and 5 stars (few to many points). Four 
equivalence trials and 4 opposite trials were randomly presented without corrective feedback. 
This ensured that relational cues were successfully trained. Trials were separated by a 3 s ITI. If 
8 correct responses were made, then Part C began. If not, then Part A restarted.  
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 Part C. Sample and optional stimuli were now nonsense words. Four trials were 
randomly presented; [A] same [S1,O1,N1,N2,N3], [A] same [S2,O2,N1,N2,N3], [A] opposite 
[S1,O1,N1,N2,N3] and [A] opposite [S2,O2,N1,N2, N3] (see Figure 8). Optional stimuli for 
each trial are indicated in the second set of brackets with the correct choice in italics. Corrective 
feedback (“Correct” or “Wrong”) displayed on screen for 3 s after each selection, followed by a 
3 s ITI. Part D began after 32 consecutively correct responses were made. 
 Part D. Eight trial types were presented twice in a random order and without feedback; 
[S1] same [S2,O2,N1,N2,N3], [S2] same [S1,O1,N1,N2,N3], [S1] opposite [O2,S2,N1,N2,N3], 
[O2] opposite [S1,O1,N1,N2,N3], [O1] same [O2,S2,N1,N2,N3], [O2] same [O1,S1,N1,N2,N3], 
[O1] opposite [S2,O2,N1,N2,N3] and [S2] opposite  [O1,S1,N1,N2,N3] (the correct choice is 
indicated in italics) (see Figure 8). Trials were separated by a 3 s ITI. 14/16 correct responses 
were needed to continue. A lower score restarted Part A and 4 attempts at Part D were allowed.  
 Acquisition of fear and avoidance 
 Instructions stated that nonsense words would appear in the center of the screen and 
could be followed by unpleasant images and sounds. S1 was aversively conditioned (S1+) and 
appeared 4 times for 5 s followed by a 3 s US. S1+ also appeared once for 5 s and was followed 
by a 3 s blank screen. A previously unseen nonsense word was used as a non-aversive CS- and 
appeared 5 times for 5 s followed by 3 s blank screen without the US. Trials were presented 
quasi-randomly, with no more than 2 consecutive trials with the same stimulus, and separated by 
a 10-14 s ITI. 
 An operant avoidance task then commenced. Instructions stated that unpleasant images 
and sounds could be avoided by pressing the spacebar. To facilitate discriminative avoidance, 
participants were instructed to avoid if they expected the US. S1+ or CS- appeared on screen for 
5 s.  A space bar press in their presence removed the stimulus and initiated a 3 s blank screen 
without a US. If the space bar was not pressed during a S1+ presentation, then a 3 s US followed. 
If the space bar was not pressed during a CS- presentation, then a 3 s black screen without a US 
followed. Trials were separated by a 10-14 s ITI and continued until 8 consecutive avoidance 
responses to S1+ were made. If CS- was avoided or S1+ was not avoided, then the number of 
correct responses was reset. Participants were not informed of this performance criterion.  
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 Generalization test 
 Instructions stated that nonsense words would appear, which could be followed by an 
unpleasant image and sound. Participants were informed that they could make whatever 
responses felt appropriate. S1+ (conditioned stimulus) was presented to ensure maintained 
avoidance and related stimuli were also presented; S2 (derived equivalence stimulus), O1 or O2 
(derived opposition stimulus) and Nx (an unseen neutral nonsense word). As 2 stimuli were in 
derived opposition with S1+, we introduced a between-groups factor with 2 levels. Group 1 was 
shown S1+, S2, Nx and O1, quasi-randomly 4 times each. Group 2 was shown S1+, S2, Nx and 
O2, quasi-randomly 4 times each. On each trial, a stimulus appeared for 5 s followed by a 10-14 
ITI. If the space bar was pressed whilst a stimulus was on screen, the stimulus was removed and 
a 10-14 s ITI began. If the space bar was not pressed the stimulus remained on screen for 5 s 
followed by a 10-14 s ITI. The US never followed any stimulus. 
 Self-report measures 
 In accordance with our between-group factor, group 1 reported US expectancy for S1, S2, 
O1, and NX. Group 2 reported US expectancy for S1, S2, O2 and NX. After generalized 
avoidance testing, participants rated their expectancy when (i) the avoidance response was 
assumed to be present and (ii) the avoidance response was assumed to be absent. Questions 
appeared in the center screen in a random order reading “Imagine that [e.g. S1] appears and you 
[press/do not press] the space bar. How likely is it that images and sounds will follow?”  
Stimulus valence was rated before fear conditioning and after the generalized avoidance testing. 
Due to a programming error, participants were not divided into two groups and they reported 
valence for both O1 and O2. Stimuli S1+, S2, O1, O2 and Nx appeared center screen in a random 
order and participants were asked to indicate how pleasant or unpleasant they found these words.  
Data Analysis 
 Generalization of fear requires (i) derived relations between stimuli and (ii) conditioned 
fear response. Participants were therefore required to derive stimulus relations within 4 attempts 
at Part D and 21 participants did not meet this criterion. Participants were also required to 
demonstrate reliable avoidance of S1+ (8 consecutive avoidance responses) and 5 participants 
did not fulfill this criterion. These data are not reported. This produced a final sample of N = 46 
(20 participants in Group 1 and 26 in Group 2).  
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 For avoidance and US expectancy, mixed repeated measures ANOVA with 1 within-
subjects factor (stimulus) with 4 levels (S1+, S2, O1/O2, and Nx) and 1 between-subjects factor 
(group) with 2 levels (Group 1 (shown O1) and Group 2 (shown O2)), were conducted. Due to a 
programming error, participants were not divided into two groups while reporting stimulus 
valence. There was 1 within-subject factor (stimulus) with 5 levels (S1+, S2, O1, O2, and Nx). 
Stimulus valence ratings were reported pre-conditioning (X) and post-generalization (Y). A 
mean difference score was then calculated (d = Y - X). A negative mean d-score indicates that 
valence ratings for a stimulus became negative while a positive mean d-score indicated that 
ratings became positive. A repeated measures ANOVA was calculated to examine the effect of 
stimulus on mean d-score. Where Mauchly’s test revealed that sphericity could not be assumed 
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is reported. Bonferroni corrections were used as the rejection 
criterion was adjusted when pairwise comparisons were calculated. Effect size was calculated 
using partial eta squared. The alpha-level was set at .05.  
Results 
MTS task  
 A mean of 2.04 attempts at Part D (SE = 0.05) were needed to establish the derived 
stimulus relations. A mean of 39.02 Part A trials (SE = 2.06) was completed. A mean of 23.04 
Part B trials (SE = 1.20) was completed. As such, relational cues reliably designated equivalence 
and opposition relations. A mean of 94.70 trials Part C (SE = 0.66) was completed. A mean of 
28.63 Part D trials (SE = 0.05) was completed.  As such, S1+ was in a derived equivalence with 
S2, and derived opposition with O1 and O2. Also, opposition stimuli were in derived 
equivalence with each other. 
Acquisition of fear and avoidance 
A mean of 11.04 S1+ trials (SE = 0.71) and 8.67 CS- trials (SE = 0.60) was completed. There 
was significantly more avoidance in the presence of S1+ (M = 9.89, SE = 0.55) than CS- (M = 
0.65, SE = 0.52), t(42) = 20.80, p < .001, df = 42, d = 2.54. 
Generalized Avoidance  
  There was a main effect of stimulus on generalized avoidance, F(2, 67) = 73.96, p < .001, 
partial η2 = 0.64 (see Figure 9a). Avoidance generalized to the equivalent stimulus; pairwise 
comparisons revealed it evoked more avoidance than both a neutral stimulus, p < .001, and  
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!
Figure 9. (A) Mean number of avoidance responses. (B) Mean US expectancy ratings when the 
avoidance response was assumed to be present. (C) Mean US expectancy ratings when the 
avoidance response was assumed to be absent. (D) Mean valence change for stimuli. Error bars 
represent standard error. 
 
opposite stimulus, p < .001. This suggests differential effects of equivalence and opposition 
relations on generalized avoidance. However, pairwise comparisons indicated that avoidance of 
the equivalent stimulus was lower than the CS, p < .001. Finally, there was no significant 
difference between neutral and equivalent stimuli, p = .08 There was no main effect of group, 
F(1, 42) = 1.58, p = .22, and no interaction between group and stimuli, F(3, 39) < 1, p = .80. 
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Therefore, there were no differences in generalized avoidance of the two opposite stimuli, O1 (M 
= 0.79, SE = 1.47) and O2 (M = 0.67, SE = 1.43).  
US Expectancy Ratings 
 Retrospective US expectancy was reported when the avoidance response was assumed to 
be present. There was no main effect of stimulus, F (3, 109)  = 1.77, p = .17, no main effect of 
group, F(1, 43)  < 1 ,  p = .33, and no interaction between stimulus and group, F(3, 109) < 1, p 
= .90. Mean ratings of each stimulus were low (all M’s ≤ -5.00) which suggests that participants 
learned avoidance reliably prevented the US (see Figure 9b).  
 US expectancy was also reported when the avoidance response was assumed to be absent. 
There was a main effect of stimulus on these ratings, F(3, 87) = 35.85., p < .001, partial η2 = 
0.45 (see Figure 9c). As predicted, pairwise comparisons revealed that the equivalent stimulus 
prompted higher ratings than the opposite stimulus, p = .01. As such, equivalent and opposition 
stimuli differed in terms of US expectancy. However, equivalent stimulus prompted lower US 
expectancy than the CS, p < .01. And, contrary to other predictions, ratings for the opposite 
stimulus were indistinguishable from novel stimulus, p = .77.  
 There was no main effect of group, F(1, 41) < 1, p = .40, and no  interaction between 
group and stimulus, F(2, 86) = 1.15, p = .32. Therefore, the ratings prompted by the two opposite 
stimuli O1 (M = -5.45, SE = 1.63) and O2 (M = -6.20, SE = 1.22), did not differ.  
Valence Ratings 
 There was a main effect of stimulus on valence change, F (2, 87) = 40.01, p < .001, 
partial η2 = 0.47 (see Figure 9d). Pairwise comparisons showed that the equivalent stimulus 
differed significantly from the first opposite stimulus (O1), p < .01, and the second opposite 
stimulus (O2), p < .01. This suggests that equivalent and opposition relations differentially 
effected evaluative changes. The CS became significantly more unpleasant than the equivalent 
stimulus, p < .01. In contrast to other predictions, valence change did not differ between the 
novel stimulus and O1, p = .90, and O2, p = .90.  
Generalized avoiders and non-avoiders 
 An unexpected, post-hoc, finding was bimodality in generalized avoidance to the 
equivalent stimulus. One group, non-avoiders, (N = 15, 32.60%) did not produce any generalized 
avoidance to the equivalent stimulus. The other group, avoiders, (N = 29, 67.40%) emitted 
generalized avoidance to the equivalent stimulus (M = 3.62, SE = 0.16). Here, generalized 
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avoidance of the equivalent stimulus was indistinguishable from that of the CS, t(28) = 1.88, p 
= .07, d = 0.49. 
Discussion 
 The present study found that equivalent stimuli spontaneously evoked avoidance and 
negative stimulus valence ratings, although they prompted neutral US expectancy. Also, opposite 
stimuli produced little avoidance and positive valence ratings, as well as low US expectancy. 
This demonstrates that equivalence relations facilitate fear and avoidance generalization while 
derived opposition relations may actually hamper generalization. These findings are especially 
interesting given that both equivalent and opposite stimuli were perceptually dissimilar from the 
CS and are unlikely to have involved perceptual generalization (e.g. Vervoort, Vervliet, Bennett, 
& Baeyens, 2014). 
 Our findings replicate and extend those of Dymond et al. (2008) who compared different 
derived relations in the context of avoidance. In that study, low avoidance of opposite stimuli 
may have resulted from equivalence with a non-aversive CS, rather than opposition with an 
aversive CS. In our procedure, the opposite stimulus was never in derived equivalence with non-
aversive stimuli. Poor avoidance to opposite stimuli could only be accounted by derived 
opposition with an aversive CS. The present findings therefore offer an unambiguous 
interpretation of the role of equivalence and opposition relations in fear and avoidance 
generalization. 
 A secondary objective was to examine the effect of opposition with a CS. We predicted 
that opposite stimuli would elicit low US expectancy and become positively valenced. That is, 
participants might conceive of opposite stimuli as the opposite of threat. The current study found 
no significant differences in the mean stimulus valence or US expectancy ratings between 
opposite and novel stimuli. A limitation, however, was that the novel stimulus was presented 
without the US (during generalized avoidance testing) before stimulus valence and US 
expectancy were self-reported. Repeated presentations of this stimulus without the US may have 
established it as a conditioned inhibitor that signaled the absence of a US. Future research will 
require novel stimuli that are not inhibitory (Rescorla & LoLordo, 1965). The consequences of 
derived opposition with a CS remain open to investigation. This is important given that 
opposition relations may motivate a search for safety, which is characteristic of certain anxiety 
disorders. For instance, should individuals with panic disorder experience distress in an open 
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public space, they could derive conceptually opposite places (i.e. indoor private spaces) to be 
more safe and subsequently limit themselves to these areas (Rachman, 1984).  
 An interesting but unpredicted finding was that one third of participants (non-avoiders), 
did not produce generalized avoidance to equivalent stimuli while the remaining participants 
(avoiders) did. An explanation for this dichotomy is unclear. Both groups related stimuli with the 
CS but one did not show fear generalization. Perhaps non-avoiders possessed some individual 
difference that reduced their propensity to generalize fear? For instance, the degree to which 
learned fear generalizes can be moderated by differences in neuroticism (e.g. Lommen, 
Engelhard, & van den Hout, 2010). Further research will be required to replicate and gain 
experimental control over this effect so to determine the critical variables. Measures of 
individual differences in negative affect and avoidance behavior may be useful in this regard.  
 A limitation of this study was the use of retrospective US expectancy ratings, which may 
have been influenced by the presentation of stimuli in extinction during the generalized 
avoidance test (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). This may also explain the neutral US expectancy 
prompted by the equivalent stimulus. It is possible that upon the first presentation of the 
equivalent stimulus both avoiders and non-avoiders initially expected an aversive outcome. By 
not avoiding the equivalent stimulus participants learned there was no US and had the 
opportunity to correct this flawed threat expectancy. Therefore, non-avoiders retrospectively 
reported that the equivalent stimulus was unlikely to be followed by the US. On the other hand, 
avoiding the equivalent stimulus blocked any opportunity to correct this flawed expectancy and, 
therefore, avoiders reported that the US was likely. As such, these two extremes of high and low 
expectancy may have generated an overall, neutral mean US expectancy. Future research will 
therefore greatly benefit from the use of trial-by-trial US expectancy ratings (e.g. Lovibond, 
2006).  
 In conclusion, neutral events can be treated like threat signals and evoke fear if they are 
related to an aversive CS. This generalization may be helpful as one can quickly respond to 
actual threat cues without prior learning. There is, however, the possibility that fear can spread to 
events that do not signal threat. In such cases individuals needlessly experience fear and engage 
in debilitating avoidance behaviors. Category-level generalization is particularly problematic 
given the extension of fear can go beyond the limits of perceptual similarity and be based on a 
rather arbitrary concepts of equivalence. But interestingly, conceptual relations appear to have 
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the capacity to limit this extension of fear on the basis of arbitrary concepts of opposition. 
Further research is needed on the facilitative or constraining effects of derived relations in the 
etiology and maintenance anxiety disorders (Hermans et al., 2013). 
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Abstract 
This study investigated whether the threat-value of neutral stimuli can alter because of a derived 
relation to a threat-relevant stimulus. In this procedure, some non-words were conceptually 
similar to a fear conditioned stimulus while others were conceptually opposite. Results indicate 
that conceptual relations play a dynamic role in fear generalization; similar stimuli elicited 
heightened fear and avoidance relative to opposite stimuli. It was also examined whether an 
opportunity to designate the derived stimulus relations is important. Participants differed in terms 
of (i) their prior experience with the derived stimulus relations (designated or not) and (ii) the 
qualitative nature of this experience (a computer or pencil-and-paper test). However, the 
between-groups factors had no effect. We contend these findings speak to excessive fear 
generalization in anxiety disorders and also have theoretical implications to generalization 
research. 
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 A conceptual similarity between physically dissimilar stimuli can facilitate the 
generalization of fear and avoidance. This is referred to as category-level generalization (e.g. 
Boyle, Roche, Dymond, & Hermans, 2015; Dunsmoor, Martin, & LaBar, 2012; Dunsmoor & 
Murphy, 2014; Dymond, Schlund, Roche, Whelan, Richards, & Davies, 2011; Vervoort, Vervliet, 
Bennett, & Baeyens, 2014). Interestingly, people also arrange environmental entities in terms of 
relations that exceed fundamental notions of similarity. An obvious example is the use of 
opposite sets like ‘up-down’, ‘happy-sad’, ‘boy-girl’ and ‘indoors-outdoors’ (DeDeyne, 
Voorspoels, Verheyen, Navarro, & Storms, 2013). A conceptual opposition between stimuli is 
also likely to influence category-level fear generalization but this has received considerably less 
attention in research. A person who suffered a traumatic accident while outside, for example, 
might infer a sense of security from opposite scenarios, i.e. inside in their home (Charlton & 
Thompson, 1996; Perkonigg, Kessler, Storz, & Wittchen, 2000; Rachman, 1984).  
 A challenge in experimental research is to isolate items that are conceptual opposites for 
all individuals. For instance, one person might relate indoors-outdoors as opposites while another 
person might say they are similar. A possible solution is to employ a relational Matching to 
Sample (MTS) task. This is a computer-based protocol that establishes artificial categories of 
physically dissimilar stimuli (Fields & Moss, 2008; Fields, Reeve, Adams, & Verhave, 1991; 
Galizio & Stewart, 2001; Sidman, 1971). In essence, laboratory controlled conceptual relations 
are created with which participants have no prior experience. A set of baseline stimulus-stimulus 
relations is initially trained across a MTS task. During these training trials, a sample stimulus is 
initially presented on the top of a computer screen. Next, a relational cue appears in the middle 
of the screen, e.g. ‘same’ (or ‘opposite’). A set of comparison stimuli is lastly presented the 
bottom; the task is to choose one comparison stimulus and corrective feedback is provided after 
each response. Across the training trials, participants directly learn that (i) two comparison 
stimuli are the ‘same’ as the sample (the same-pair) and (ii) two other comparison stimuli are the 
‘opposite’ of the sample (the opposite-pair). A network of untrained stimulus relations is then 
likely to emerge. Participants might particularly derive that stimuli within each pair are similar 
and stimuli between each pair are opposites (see Figure 8). These emergent conceptual 
connections are known as derived stimulus relations (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).  
 Importantly, a brief test is typically administered as part of the MTS task. This test 
checks the coherence of the derived stimulus relations. During these test trials, a member of the 
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same-pair (or opposite-pair) is first presented on screen on top of the screen. A relational cue is 
then presented in the middle, e.g. ‘same’ or ‘opposite’. A set of stimuli is then presented on the 
bottom of the screen and participants must choose the correct one. Corrective feedback is not 
given during these test trials. In general, the test requires participants to explicitly designate (i) 
stimuli within the same-pair as similar, (ii) stimuli within the opposite-pair as similar and (iii) 
stimuli between the same-pair and opposite-pair as opposites (see Bennett, Hermans, Dymond, 
Vervoort, & Baeyens, 2015a; Dymond & Whelan, 2010. 
 A small number of experimental studies have demonstrated the differential effect of 
same-opposite relations on category-level fear generalization (Bennett et al., 2015a; Dymond, 
Roche, Forsyth, Whelan, & Rhoden, 2008). A relational MTS task first establishes a network of 
derived stimulus relations amongst a same-pair and an opposite-pair. A member of the same-pair 
(conditioned stimulus; CS+) is then associated with an aversive outcome like unpleasant sounds 
(unconditioned stimulus; US). Finally, fear in response to other members of the same-pair 
(conceptually similar to the CS+) and opposite-pair (conceptually opposed to the CS+) is 
examined. Results indicate that stimuli from the same-pair evoke heightened fear and avoidance 
relative to stimuli from the opposite-pair (Bennett et al., 2015a; Dymond et al., 2008). This 
suggests that some stimuli can become fear-relevant by virtue of a conceptual similarity with an 
aversively conditioned stimulus and other stimuli may be shielded by virtue of a conceptual 
opposition. The first aim of this study was to replicate this effect. It was predicted that stimuli 
similar to the CS+ would prompt heightened fear relative to opposite stimuli (hypothesis #1). 
This was measured using trial-by-trial (online) US expectancy ratings and behavioral avoidance.  
  A remaining question is whether certain conditions must be met for derived stimulus 
relations to influence fear responding. As a staring point, we tested whether an opportunity to 
designate the derived stimulus relations was important. A between-groups factor (designation) 
with two levels was introduced. Those in the test condition were given the test for derived 
stimulus relations that typically features in a MTS task. Those in the no-test control condition 
were not given the test for derived stimulus relations, but instead reiterated the initial MTS task 
training trials. The MTS task testing trials represent an important opportunity to articulate the 
derived stimulus relations (Sidman, 1979, 1992). It was reasoned that this test would explicate 
the relations, leaving them more likely to influence generalization. As such, the test condition 
was expected to demonstrate heightened category-level fear generalization (hypothesis #2a). 
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Another factor worth considering is the quality of the test. The way in which derived stimulus 
relations are designated may be of importance to later generalization. A second between-groups 
factor, again with two levels, was introduced (format). Those in the computer condition 
completed the standard test for derived stimulus relations via a standard computer-based MTS 
task. Those in a written condition were instead asked write down any new relations on a blank 
piece of paper. The computer-based MTS task is rather explicit as it involves considerable visual 
feedback; stimuli are presented on screen and participants choose one answer out of a given set. 
A written check is far less explicit as it entails fewer visual prompts. Participants are simply 
given a blank piece of paper. Assuming that explicit articulation of the derived stimulus relations 
is important, participants who completed the computer-based test were expected to show 
heightened fear generalization (hypothesis #2b).  
 The current study represents an important opportunity to replicate and examine the 
robustness our previous findings (e.g. Bennett et al., 2015a). It also extends this work by 
exploring the boundaries of category-level fear generalization. Analyzing the conditions that are 
necessary for this phenomenon is clearly important. This functional knowledge will be 
conducive to the development of a psychological model that allows us to predict, and perhaps 
influence, whether derived stimulus relations affect fear generalization (e.g. De Houwer, 2009).  
 As a final objective, this study explored whether individual differences influence 
category-level fear generalization. The possible contribution of cognitive fusion was investigated 
(e.g. Bennett, Meulders, Baeyens, & Vlaeyen, 2015b). Cognitive fusion is central feature of 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999); it describes 
instances in which verbal inferences about environmental events regulate behavioral and 
emotional responding (Blackledge, 2007, 2015; Hayes et al., 2013; Hayes et al., 1999; Vilardaga, 
Hayes, Levin, & Muto, 2009). For instance, the survivor of a serious road traffic accident might 
relate (i) ‘other transport systems’ as similar to the trauma and (ii) ‘home’ to be the near opposite. 
Previously neutral means of transport (e.g. planes, trains or bicycles) might consequentially 
evoke heightened fear while the aspects of the home (e.g. proximity to a house or loved ones) 
might motivate debilitating safety behaviors (Charlton & Thompson, 1996; Perkonigg et al., 
2000; Yule, Bolton, Udwin, Boyle, O’Ryan, & Nurrish, 2000). The behavior studied in our 
experimental models closely resembles the notion of cognitive fusion; the threat-value of neutral 
stimuli shift because of derived (or conceptual) relations to an aversively conditioned stimulus. 
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In addition, derived relational responding is actually theorized to underlie real-world instances of 
cognitive fusion (Dymond & Roche, 2009; Hayes et al., 2013). Derived relational responding, 
according to some, does not just resemble cognitive fusion; derived relational responding is 
actually thought to underlie cognitive fusion (Hayes et al., 1999). It is therefore conceivable that 
people who report more cognitive fusion in their lives might perform differently in our 
experimental task (e.g. Gillanders et al., 2014). Individuals who self-reported more cognitive 
fusion were specifically expected to show heightened category-level fear generalization. That is, 
cognitive fusion was predicted be associated with increased fear of conceptually similar stimuli 
and lower fear of conceptually opposite stimuli (hypothesis #3).  
Method 
Participants 
 Eighty-nine participants (73 female) were recruited using an online experiment 
management system (M age = 21 years, SD = 2.12, range = 18 – 31). Individuals suffering from 
blood phobia or auditory sensitiveness were advised not to volunteer. Participants were randomly 
assigned into 4 groups based on a 2 (designation; test or no test) x 2 (format; computer or 
written) factorial design. Crossing these factors generated four groups; test-computer (TC; N = 
22) group, no test-computer (NC; N = 23) group, test-written (TW; N = 22) group and no-test 
written (NW; N =22) group. Informed consent was acquired and the ethical committee of the 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Science approved the study. Course credit (1/hr) or 
money (€8/hr) was offered as remuneration.  The study lasted about 50 minutes. 
Apparatus, stimuli and setting 
 Experiments were conducted in sound attenuated cubicles on a Dell desktop PC with a 17” 
monitor (white background; 1024x768 pixels) and programmed using Affect 4 (Spruyt, Clarysse, 
Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010). Five sets of objects were used during a brief pre-
training exercise (200x150 pixels); 4 boxes (small to large), 4 lines (narrow to broad), 4 discs 
(crescent to full circle), 4 sets of dots (few to many) and 4 stars (few points to many points). 
During the MTS task, the sample stimulus was a shape- a yellow triangle, blue diamond, pink 
hexagon or green star (200x150 pixels). The relational cues were familiar Flemish words for 
‘same’ (hetzelfde als) and ‘opposite’ (tegengestelde) (black Arial font, size 32). Comparison 
stimuli were three letter non-words (Mau, Zid, Ler, Cug, Beh, Jom, & Ruv; black Arial font size, 
32). During the MTS task, a scoreboard appeared in the upper-left hand corner of the screen. 
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This read, “Your score is [x]”, in white font against a black background (size 16 Arial). Sample 
stimuli and comparison stimuli were arranged into 4 counterbalances. No statistical differences 
were observed between these counterbalances on any of our dependent variables.  
 The TW-group and NW-group received pieces of A5 paper. Both groups were given one 
page that instructed them to (i) list the stimuli presented during the MTS task and (ii) write down 
the directly trained stimulus-stimulus relations (the recall-sheet). The TW-group was also given 
a page that instructed participants to write down any new stimulus relations they could think of 
based on what they had learned (the test-sheet) (see Figure 10, phase 2). 
 The US was a combination of an aversive image and a sound (see Bennett et al., 2015a). 
One of 12 images depicting body mutilation was displayed for 3 s (1024x768 pixels). These were 
selected from the International Affective Picture System. An aversive sound of a female scream 
was modified using Audacity 1.2.6, and played via headphones for 2 s at about 85 dB.  
Procedure 
 Pre-training exercise 
 Participants were greeted in the lab where they provided informed consent. First, a pre-
training exercise familiarized participants with same-opposite relations and the MTS task. 
Instructions stated that the first task was to practice same-opposite relations. Participants were 
told that an incomplete ‘sentence’ would appear on top of the screen and that they could 
complete this by selecting an item from the bottom. On each trial, a sample object appeared in 
the upper-left screen, e.g. [small box]. A relational cue appeared 1 s later in the upper-middle 
screen, e.g. same, followed 1 s later by a question mark in the upper-right screen, e.g. [?]. Four 
comparison stimuli appeared 1 s later at the bottom of the screen. These resembled the object 
already shown but varied along a physical continuum, e.g. small to large boxes. A same trial (e.g. 
[small box] same [?]) required the selection of the identical comparison, i.e. [small box]. An 
opposite trial (e.g. [small box] opposite [?]) required the selection of the most perceptually 
dissimilar comparison, i.e. [large box]. Clicking a comparison caused it to replace the question 
mark and removed all other comparisons. “Correct” or “Wrong” appeared above the completed 
sentence for 3 s, followed by a 3 s inter-trial interval (ITI). A scoreboard initially read, “Your 
score is 0/12”. A correct response increased the score by 1. An incorrect response reset the score 
to 0. Trials quasi continued in a random order until the scoreboard reached 12/12. There were no 
more than two consecutive same trials or opposite trials.   
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Figure 10. A schematic overview of the experimental procedure. Phase 1: Having completed a 
relational pre-training exercise, participants learned how comparison stimuli (right hand side of 
the box) related to a particular shape; this was the MTS task. The correct answer is in bold. Phase 
2: Participants were placed in one of four experimental groups that either (i) completed the test 
for derived stimulus relations or not, (ii) using the computer or a pencil-and-paper assessment. 
Phase 3: One stimulus was associated with an aversive US (+) while another stimulus was not (-). 
At times, an avoidance response was available (*). The number of stimulus presentations is 
indicated in the parentheses. Phase 4: Stimuli that were differentially to the conditioned stimuli 
were presented with the availability of an avoidance response (*). Phase 5: At the very end, all 
participants completed a computer-based test for derived stimulus relations. 
 
 MTS task 
 A set of baseline stimulus-stimulus relations was then directly trained (see Figure 8). 
Instructions stated that the task was to learn how non-words relate to a shape. On each training 
trial, the sample stimulus appeared in the upper-left of the screen, e.g. [Δ]. A relational cue 
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appeared 1 s later in the upper-middle, e.g. ‘same’. A question mark appeared 1 s later in the 
upper-right of the screen, e.g. [?]. Four comparison stimuli then appeared at the bottom, e.g. [S1, 
O1, N1, N2]. Selecting a comparison caused it to replace the question mark and removed the 
other comparisons. There were 4 types of training trials (see Figure 10, phase 1). Selecting S1 
and S2 as the same as the sample was reinforced (the same-pair). Selecting O1 and O2 as the 
opposite of the sample was reinforced (the opposite-pair). The scoreboard initially read, “Your 
score is 0/32”. A correct selection increased the scoreboard by 1. An incorrect selection reset the 
scoreboard to 0. “Correct” or “Wrong” also appeared for 3 s, followed by a 3 s ITI. Trials 
continued until the scoreboard reached 32/32.  
 Between-groups manipulation 
 The TC-group completed 8 test trials on a compute. The structure of the trials was 
identical to that of the previous training trials only the stimuli differed slightly (see Figure 10, 
phase 2). Test trials required participants to designate the derived stimulus relations. That is, test 
trials examined whether (i) stimuli within the same-pair were similar, (ii) stimuli within the 
opposite-pair were similar and (iii) stimuli between the same-pair and opposite-pair were 
opposite (see Figure 8.). Trials were presented quasi-randomly (no more than two consecutive of 
the same time) twice each in a block of 16 trials. No corrective feedback was given nor was the 
scoreboard shown.  
 The NC-group repeated the initial training trials that featured in the MTS task (see Figure 
10, phase 2). As such, participants in this group did not designate the derived stimulus relations. 
The 4 training trials were presented 4 times each in a block of 16 trials. Limiting participants to 
16 trials ensured that the TC-group and NC-group completed an equal amount of trials.  
 The TW-group was first presented with the ‘recall-sheet’ within 2 min (see Figure 10, 
phase 2). During this time, they listed (i) the shape and non-words they had encountered and (ii) 
the relationships they had just learned between these items. The experimenter took the recall-
sheet and presented a ‘test-sheet’ for 2 min. During this time, they were instructed to (iii) write 
any other possible relations based on what they had learned. As such, these participants were 
given an opportunity to designate the derived stimulus relations 
 The NW-group was only presented with the recall-sheet for 2 minutes. They were not 
given the test-sheet. As such, participants had no opportunity to designate the derived stimulus 
relations. 
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 Fear Acquisition 
 Instructions stated that the US could now follow non-words. Participants were instructed 
to use an 11-point Likert-scale to indicate their expectation of the US (0 = certainly no images & 
sounds, 5 = unsure and 10 = definitely images & sounds). Clicking on the scale completed the 
rating. S1 was explicitly associated with the US (CS+) and a novel stimulus was not (CS-) (see 
Figure 10, phase 3). Trials lasted 12 s and were separated by a 4-6 s ITI. A stimulus first 
appeared center-screen and after 5 s the Likert-scale appeared at the bottom. The scale was 
removed once clicked or else disappeared after 4 s. After 9 s, the stimulus terminated and was 
immediately followed by a 3 s US (or a 3 s blank screen). On 4 occasions S1 was followed 
immediately by a US and on 2 occasions it was by a blank screen. A previously unseen non-word 
was never paired with the US. The CS+ and CS- were presented across 6 separate trials. These 
were presented quasi-randomly with no more than 2 consecutive presentations of the same 
stimulus.  
 Participants were then informed that a cue reading ‘spacebar available’ would appear and 
this indicated the possibility of avoiding the US. Instructed also asked participants to use the 
Likert scale to indicate their initial (pre-avoidance) US expectancy. That is, participants could 
avoid the US but still indicate their initial expectancy. Trials were again 12 s long. For the first 4 
s, a stimulus appeared with the avoidance cue. Pressing the spacebar removed the cue but not the 
stimulus. After 5 s, the Likert-scale appeared at the bottom of the screen. After 9 s, the stimulus 
and Likert-scale terminated and were immediately followed by a 3 s US (or blank screen). If an 
avoidance response was not emitted in the presence of the CS+, then the US immediately 
occurred. If an avoidance response was emitted in the presence of the CS+, the US was cancelled. 
The US never followed the CS- (see Figure 10, phase 3). Trials appeared quasi-randomly until 8 
avoidance responses to the CS+ were made. Trials were also separated by a 4-6 s ITI. 
 Fear generalization 
 The CS+, a conceptually similar stimulus (S2) and a conceptually opposite stimulus (O2) 
were presented 4 times each (quasi-randomly) in a block of 12 trials. Trials were the same as 
before; each lasted 12 s. During the first 4 s, avoidance responding was possible. During the next 
5 s, US expectancy could be reported. After 9 s, the stimulus and Likert-scale terminated. The 
US never appeared; a 3 s blank screen followed each stimulus. Trials were also separated by a 4-
6 s ITI. 
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 Derived stimulus relations test and questionnaire 
At the very conclusion of the experiment, participants completed a set of computer-based testing 
trials from the MTS task. These examined whether (i) stimuli within the same-pair were similar, 
(ii) stimuli within the opposite-pair were similar and (iii) stimuli between the same-pair and 
opposite-pair were opposite (see Figure 10, phase 5). Finally, the CFQ was administered.  
Outcome measures 
 Manipulation checks 
 We examined whether the MTS task was reliably completed. The number of correct 
responses made during the initial training trials were counted (see Figure 10, phase 1). In 
addition, the number of correct responses made during the very last collection of testing trials 
was also counted (see Figure 10, phase 5). Accuracy scores were calculated by expressing the 
number of correct responses as a percentage of the overall number of trials. Scores above 
87.50% were taken to indicate accurate responding (e.g. Dymond & Whelan, 2010). Using 2 
(designation) x 2 (format) ANOVAs, we examined for any between group differences in 
accuracy. 
 During the between-groups manipulation, some participants were given an opportunity to 
designate the derived stimulus relations (test) while others were not (no test). Furthermore, some 
participants articulated these stimulus relations using a computer-based task while others 
completed a written assessment. We briefly checked whether participants completed these tasks. 
For the TC-group, we calculated the number of correct responses made during the testing trials 
and expressed this as a percentage of the overall number of trials (see Figure 10, phase 2). For 
the NC-group, we calculated the number of correct responses made during the training trials and 
expressed this as a percentage of the overall number of trials (see Figure 10, phase 2). The TW-
group and NW-group both completed a ‘recall-sheet’ (see Figure 10, phase 2). These participants 
firstly recalled the stimuli that were presented during the MTS task. To score this, 1 point was 
awarded for each correctly recalled shape and non-word. This created a possible maximum of 5 
points. These participants then recalled the stimulus-stimulus relations that were shaped during 
the training trials. To score this, 1 point was awarded for each correctly identified relation. This 
allowed for a possible 4 points. Lastly, the TW-group completed a written test sheet (see Figure 
10, phase 2), wherein the derived stimulus relations were designated. To score this, 1 point was 
awarded when participants wrote any relation to indicate that (i) stimuli within the same-pair 
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were similar (e.g. S1=S2), (ii) stimuli within the opposite-pair were similar (e.g. O1=O2), (iii) 
stimuli from a same-pair were opposite to stimuli from the opposite-pair (e.g. S1≠O2) and (iv) 
stimuli from the opposite-pair were opposite to stimuli from the same-pair (e.g. O1≠S2). This 
created a possible maximum of 4 points. Again, accuracy scores were calculated. 
 With respect to fear learning, it was examined whether the CS+ prompted heightened US 
expectancy ratings relative to the CS- (see Figure 10, phase 3). A rANOVA was calculated using 
stimulus as a within-subject factor (CS+ & CS-) and trial as a within-subject factor (trial 1-trial 
6). ‘Designation’ and ‘format’ were also included as between-group factors; this allowed us to 
test for any group differences in fear learning. With respect to avoidance learning, it was 
examined whether the CS+ evoked heightened avoidance responding relative to the CS-. The 
percentage of avoided CS+ and CS- trials were calculated. A rANOVA then tested the effect of 
stimulus (CS+ & CS-) on the proportion of avoidance. Again, ‘designation’ and ‘format’ were 
included as between-subject factors. Lastly, we checked whether there was heightened US 
expectancy to the CS+ relative to the CS- during avoidance learning. The median US expectancy 
ratings for the CS+ and CS- were calculated. A rANOVA was then calculated to examine the 
effect of stimulus on US expectancy with designation and format as between-subject factors.  
 Cognitive-fusion questionnaire and fear generalization  
 The CFQ is a 13-item self-report questionnaire that measures the extent to which 
cognitive fusion features in an individual’s life (Gillanders et al., 2014). Answers are given on a 
7-point Likert scale (1 = never true and 7 = always true). Higher scores indicate more cognitive 
fusion. Gillanders and colleagues (2010) have reported good reliability across a sample of 
healthy, young adults (N = 893, Cronbach’s α = .84, M = 40.2, SD = 11.04). Good test-retest 
reliability has also been reported over a one-month period (r = .82, p < .001 N = 74). We used a 
Dutch translation of the CFQ (Batink & de Mey, 2011) and our sample showed similar 
psychometric properties to those reported by Gillanders and colleagues (M = 46.59, SD = 11.17, 
N = 89).  
 Regarding fear generalization, the number of avoidance responses to the conditioned 
stimulus (CS+), conceptually similar stimulus (S2) and conceptually opposite stimulus (O1) were 
counted. A rANOVA then examine the effect of stimulus on avoidance. ‘Designation’ and 
‘format were included as between-groups factors while CFQ scores were included as a covariate. 
In addition, participants rated US expectancy in the presence of these stimuli on a trial-by-trial 
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basis. Another rANCOVA was therefore calculated using stimulus (CS+, S2 and O2) and trial 
(trial 1–trial 4) as within-subject factors. Again, ‘designation’ and ‘format’ were included as 
between-groups factors and CFQ was entered as a covariate measures.  
Results 
 With respect to the ANOVAs, Greenhouse-Geisser’s correction is reported when 
Mauchly’s test revealed that sphericity could not be assumed. Effect sizes were calculated using 
the partial ETA squared (ƞP²). The alpha-level was set at .05 and Bonferroni corrections were 
used as the rejection criterion during planned comparisons 
Pre-training and MTS task 
 A mean of 16.96 pre-training trials (SE = 0.80) was completed with a high degree of 
accuracy (M = 92.96%, SE = 0.73%). A 2 (designation) x 2 (format) ANOVA did not indicate a 
main effect of designation, F(1, 85) = 1.46, p  =.23, or format, F < 1, p = .99, on pre-training 
accuracy. There was also no interaction effect, F(1, 85) = 1.46, p = .23.  Therefore, all 
participants completed the pre-training exercises equally as well.  
 A mean of 58.69 training trials (SE = 2.11) was completed during the MTS task. These 
trials were completed with a high degree of accuracy (M = 81.72%, SE = 0.91%). A 2 
(designation) x 2 (format) ANOVA did not indicate an effect of designation, F < 1, p = .61, or 
format, F < 1, p = .99, on training accuracy. Also, there was no interaction effect, F < 1, p = .97, 
suggesting that all groups performed equally.  
 A high level of accuracy was observed during the final test for derived stimulus relations 
(see Figure 10, phase 5). In fact, all but 5 participants scored above 87.5% (M = 94.73%, SE = 
1.38). Again, a 2 (designation) x 2 (format) ANOVA did not indicate a main effect of 
designation, F < 1, p = .67, or of format, F < 1, p = .93. There was also no interaction effect, F 
<1, p = .11.  
 Overall, these findings indicate that (i) the pre-training exercise was completed with ease, 
(ii) baseline stimulus-stimulus relations were reliably established during the MTS task, (iii) 
derived stimulus relations could be articulated by the end of the experiment and (iv) all 
participants performed equally, irrespective of their group.  
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Between-groups manipulation 
 The TC-group completed a set of computer-based, testing trials during which derived 
stimulus relations were designated. High accuracy of responding was observed (M = 98.86%, SE 
= 0.53%). Therefore, the critical derived stimulus relations were reliably designated.  
 The NC-group was not given the opportunity to designate the derived stimulus relations. 
These participants instead re-completed a set of MTS task training trials. This was completed 
with a high degree of accuracy (M = 99.46%, SE = 0.38%). 
 The TW-group completed written assessments, i.e. the recall-sheet and test-sheet. 
Participants were able to recall the stimuli presented during the MTS task (M = 87.27% accuracy, 
SE = 2.66%). The stimulus-stimulus relations that featured in the training trials were also 
reproduced (M = 80.68% accuracy, SE = 8.38%). In addition, these participants were then given 
an opportunity to designate the derived stimulus relations using a written test-sheet. This was 
completed with moderately high accuracy (M = 70.46% accuracy, SE = 6.07%). This suggests 
that participants generally articulated the critical derive stimulus relations. 
 The NW-group only completed the recall-sheet; they had no opportunity to designate the 
derived stimulus relations. Again, participants were capable of writing down the previously seen 
stimuli (M = 88.18% accuracy, SE = 3.39%) and the directly trained stimulus relations (M = 
87.50% accuracy, SE = 6.53%). 
Fear acquisition 
 A 2 (stimulus) x 6 (trial) x 2 (designation) x 2 (format) rANOVA indicated a main effect 
of stimulus on US expectancy, F(1, 27) = 108.20, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.80. A significant interaction 
between stimulus and trial was also observed, F(3, 82) = 19.10, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.41 (see Figure 
11a). This suggests that US expectancy ratings to the CS+ and CS- differed as fear learning 
progressed (from trial 1-trial 6). Planned comparisons indicated that the CS+ and CS- did not 
differ on trial 1, t = -0.13, p  = .89, df = 45, but did on trials 2-6, all t’s > 6.00, p’s < .01. 
Furthermore, the CS+ prompted higher US expectancy at trial 6 compared to trial 1, t(57) = 4.05, 
p < .01. Conversely, the CS- prompted lower US expectancy at trial 6 relative to trial 1, t(66) = -
7.45, p < .01. Therefore, the CS+ reliably predicted the US while the CS- predicted the omission 
of the US. Regarding the between-subject factors, there was no main effect of designation, F < 1, 
p = .99, no main effect of format, F < 1, p = .32. There was also no interaction effect, F < 1, p 
= .86, which suggests there were no group differences in fear learning.  
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Figure 11. These graphs indicate the results of fear acquisition and avoidance learning. (A) The 
mean US expectancy ratings for CS+ and CS- are displayed on a trial-by-trial basis. (B) The 
mean portion avoidance responses to the CS+ and CS- are indicated. (C) The median US 
expectancy for CS+ and CS- as reported throughout avoidance learning. The error bars indicate 
standard error. *** p < .001. 
 A 2 (stimulus) x 2 (designation) x 2 (format) rANOVA indicated a main effect of 
stimulus on avoidance, F(1, 85) = 1882.98, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.96 (see Figure 11b). The CS+ 
produced significantly more avoidance responding than the CS-, t(88) = 43.78, p < .001. 
Regarding the between-groups factors, there was no effect of designation, F < 1, p = .53, no 
effect of format, F(1, 85) = 1.45, p = .23. There was also no interaction two-way interaction 
between designation and format, F < 1, p = .55. This suggests that there were no group 
differences in avoidance learning  
 A 2 (stimulus) x 2 (designation) x 2 (format) rANOVA also indicated a main effect of 
stimulus on US expectancy during avoidance learning, F (1, 83) = 223.62, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.73 
(see Figure 11c). The CS+ prompted significantly higher US expectancy ratings than the CS-, 
t(86) = 14.85, p < .001. With respect to the between-groups factors, there was no main effect of 
designation, F (1, 83) = 1.58, p < .21, and no main effect of format, F < 1, p = .47. There was no 
interaction between these factors, F < 1, p = .69. Again, this suggests that there were no group 
differences during this learning phase. 
Generalization of avoidance 
 A 3 (stimulus) x 2 (designation) x 2 (format) rANCOVA revealed a main effect of 
stimulus on avoidance, F(2, 151) = 9.55, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.10 (see Figure 12a). In accordance 
with our first hypothesis, stimuli that were conceptually similar to the CS+ evoked significantly  
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Figure 12. These graphs indicate the results of the generalization tests. (A) The mean number of 
avoidance responses for S1 (the conditioned stimulus), S2 (the conceptually similar stimulus) 
and O2 (the conceptually opposite stimulus). (B) The mean US expectancy ratings for each 
stimulus are displayed on a trial-by-trial basis. Error bars indicate standard error. *** p < .001. 
more avoidance than stimuli that were conceptually opposite, t(88) = 5.27, p < .001. This 
suggests that derived stimulus relations differentially influence the generalization of avoidance. 
In addition, there was more avoidance in the presence of CS+ relative to its conceptually similar 
stimulus, t(88) = 8.37, p < .001, and conceptually opposite stimulus, t(88) = 15.30, p < .001. 
 In contrast to our second hypothesis, there was no effect of ‘designation’ on avoidance, 
F(1, 85) = 1.47, p = .23, nor was there an effect of ‘format’, F(1, 85) = 1.46, p = .23. There was 
also no two-way interaction between these two factors, F < 1, p = .93. Also, there was no three-
way interaction between these factors and stimulus, F < 1, p = .80. This suggests that there were 
no differences between the 4 groups; designating the derived stimulus relations, via a computer 
or via a written assessment, had no impact on fear generalization.  
 With respect to the covariate measure, there was no main effect of CFQ, F < 1, p = .89. 
Also, there was no significant interaction between CFQ and stimuli, F(2, 150) = 1.51, p = 2.33. 
There is no evidence to support the third hypothesis. Individual differences in cognitive fusion 
did not relate to generalized avoidance. 
Generalization of US expectancy  
  A 3 (stimulus) x 4 (trial) x 2 (designation) x 2 (format) rANCOVA indicated a main 
effect of stimulus on US expectancy, F(2, 120) = 35.29, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.37 (see Figure 12b). 
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There was also a main effect of trial, F(3, 180) = 36.93, p < .001, ƞP² = .38, and a significant 
two-way interaction between trial and stimulus, F(6, 360) = 6.45, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.10. Across all 
trials, stimuli conceptually similar to the CS+ prompted significantly higher US expectancy 
ratings than conceptually opposite stimuli, all t’s > 4.18, p < .001. This supports our first 
hypothesis; derived stimulus relations differentially influenced US expectancy. Interestingly, the 
CS+ and its conceptually similar stimulus prompted equal US expectancy ratings on trial 1, t(77)  
= 2.28, p = .03 (Bonferroni’s corrected α = .004). From trial 2 onwards, this difference was 
erased; the CS+ prompted significantly higher US expectancy ratings, all t(77)’s > 4.32, p’s < .01. 
Also, the CS+ prompted significantly higher US expectancy ratings in comparison to its 
conceptually opposite stimulus across all trials, all t(77)’s > 4.65, p < .001.  
 In contrast to our second hypothesis, there was no significant effect of designation, F < 1, 
p  = .56, nor of format, F(1 ,60) = 1.30, p = .26. There was also no two-way interaction between 
these factors, F(1, 60) = 1.30,  p = .26. Also, there was no three-way interaction between these 
factors, F < 1, p = .71. This again suggests that there were no difference between the groups; 
designating the derived stimulus relations never had no influence on fear generalization. 
 There was no effect of CFQ on US expectancy, F < 1, p = .75. In addition, there was no 
interaction effect between CFQ and stimulus, F < 1, p = .84. This was also true across all trials 
individually as indicated by the absence of a three-way interaction between CFQ, stimulus and 
trial, F < 1, p = .94. There is no evidence to support the third hypothesis; individual differences 
in cognitive fusion did not relate to trial-by-trial US expectancy ratings. 
Avoiders and non-avoiders  
 Some participants never avoided stimuli that were similar to the CS+ (non-avoider; N = 
36). It seems that the derived stimulus relations did not affect fear in this group. Others reliably 
avoided this stimulus (avoiders, N = 53; M = 3.30, SE = 0.16). We explored this post-hoc finding. 
First, we examined how these two groups differed at the beginning of the generalization test. 
Avoiders and non-avoiders reported equally high US expectancy ratings for the CS+ on the first 
trial, t(82) = 1.62, p = .11. Avoiders generally gave higher US expectancy ratings for the 
conceptually similar stimulus relative to the non-avoiders, t(78) = 2.23, p = .03 (see Figure 13a 
& 13b). This suggests that conceptually similar stimuli increase in threat-value. But this 
difference was only approaching significance after Bonferonni’s correction (α = .02). 
Interestingly, the avoiders reported lower US expectancy ratings for the conceptually opposite 
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Figure 13. There were two (post-hoc) groups and their trial-by-trial US expectancy ratings are 
displayed. (A) These participants emitted some avoidance response during the generalization test. 
(B) These participants never emitted and avoidance response during generalization test. 
 
stimulus relative to the non- avoiders on the very first trial, t(79) = 3.00, p < .01. This could 
indicate that conceptually opposite stimuli can signal the absence of the US and inhibit fear. 
 Second, we used this opportunity to examine the consequences of avoiding the 
conceptually similar stimulus on US expectancy. For each participant, the change in US 
expectancy was calculated by subtracting the last rating from the first rating. In general, the 
conceptually similar stimulus prompted lower US expectancy from trial 1-4; this was true for 
both non-avoiders (M = -3.833, SE = 0.60) and avoiders (M = -1.30, SE = 0.46). However, this 
reduction was significantly greater for the non-avoiders, t(75) = 3.42, p < .01 (see Figure 13a & 
13b). By not avoiding the conceptually similar stimulus, the non-avoiders quickly learned that 
this stimulus was never followed by the US. As such, their US expectancy greatly reduced. On 
the contrary, avoiders likely attributed the absence of the US to the avoidance response and this 
hampered the reduction in their US expectancy ratings.  
Discussion 
 This study compared the impact of derived same-opposite relations on fear generalization. 
Non-words that were similar to a threat-relevant event (CS+) elicited significantly more 
avoidance than non-words that were opposite. Also, non-words that were similar to the CS+ 
prompted significantly higher US expectancy ratings than those that were opposite. It seems that 
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derived same-opposite relations differentially influence fear generalization (Bennett et al., 2015a; 
Dymond et al., 2008). 
 This finding has some implications for clinical psychology research. Anxiety disorders 
are characterized by an ever-increasing array of events that trigger distressingly intense fear, 
overgeneralization (APA, 2013; Dymond et al., 2014; Hermans, Baeyens, & Vervliet, 2013; 
Lissek et al., 2008). Derived stimulus relations could, in principle, contribute to this clinical 
phenomenon; the threat-value of neutral stimuli changed in accordance with their inferred 
relationship with a fear conditioned stimulus. This is a unique perspective as researchers 
typically appeal to associative learning mechanisms to account for overgeneralization (e.g. 
Lissek et al., 2008; Meulders & Vlaeyen, 2013; Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 2006). The 
associative approach holds that (i) representations of the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the US 
are associated in memory and (ii) encounters with the CS can excite the memory of the US thus 
evoking preparatory fear responses. If one should encounter a neutral stimulus that shares some 
of the physical elements of the originally CS, then it is likely to at least partially excite the 
memory of the US and elicit some preparatory fear (e.g. McLaren & Mackintosh, 2002; Rescorla, 
1976). While this is a useful heuristic, we contend that fear generalization is not always so 
straightforward. In this study, fear generalized between physically dissimilar non-words. We also 
observed generalization even though non-words were only indirectly associated with the CS+. 
Lastly and most importantly, findings suggest that the qualified nature of this indirect association 
actually gated fear generalization. A derived similarity between stimuli promoted fear 
generalization while a derived opposition actually blocked it. That stimuli are associated does not 
necessarily lead to generalization, but rather the propositional nature of this association seems to 
be also of importance (also, see Boddez, Bennett, Van Esch, & Beckers, 2015; De Houwer, 
2009).  
 To extend on previous research, we examined whether certain conditions enhanced 
category-level fear generalization. In particular, we were curious whether an opportunity to 
designate the derived stimulus relations was important. There were no observable benefits of 
completing a brief test during which the derived stimulus relations are articulated. A clear 
understanding of some baseline stimulus-stimulus relations, from which new relations could be 
derived, was sufficient. We also investigated whether the nature of this designation, or 
articulation, was consequential. There was no advantage in using an explicit computer-based test 
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to derive the stimulus relations over of a seemingly inexplicit paper-and-pencil test. This 
suggests that even scarcely rehearsed derived stimulus relations can facilitate changes in a 
stimulus’ threat-value.  
 In general, our attempt to uncover a boundary condition for category-level fear 
generalization fell short. This is not to say there are none. A recent study by Dunsmoor and 
Murphy (2014) demonstrated that the generalization of learned fear between conceptually similar 
stimuli is moderated by the typicality of the conditioned stimulus. For one group of participants, 
typical exemplars of a category (e.g. a sparrow, hummingbird and crow) were associated with a 
US and the generalization of fear to atypical exemplars of a category was tested (e.g. an emu, 
ibis and penguin). In another group, the atypical exemplars were associated with the US and 
typical exemplars were tested for their capacity to evoke heightened fear. Fear generalization 
was stronger in the former group in which conditioned stimuli were typical exemplars.  
 In light of the current findings, some important conditions for category-level fear 
generalization can be stipulated. First, conceptual connections are more likely to facilitate fear 
generalization when the originally conditioned stimulus is a definitive member of the category at 
hand (Dunsmoor & Murphy, 2014). Second, the relational nature of these connections can also 
influence this effect; fear readily generalizes between conceptually similar stimuli (e.g. crow and 
emu) but between conceptually opposite stimuli (e.g. inside and outside) (Bennett et al., 2015a; 
Dymond et al., 2008; Herbert et al., 2011). Third, explicit rehearsal of relations is not 
immediately important; rather, fear is likely to transfer between stimuli once a clear conceptual 
connection could potentially be derived. 
 Cognitive fusion describes instances wherein emotion is regulated by the inferred, 
conceptual properties of an event (Hayes et al., 1999, 2013). In a recent review, McEnteggeart 
and colleagues (2015) skillfully discuss how cognitive fusion can be viewed from two 
perspectives. The first is a process-based view; this attempts to pick out the learning mechanisms 
underlying cognitive fusion. Indeed, it has long been supposed that mechanisms like derived 
relational responding and category-level generalization (or the transformation of stimulus 
function) are central (Blackledge, 2007; Blackledge & Barnes-Holmes, 2009; Blackedge & 
Drake, 2015; Dymond & Roche, 2009; Hayes et al., 1999, 2009). The current findings, for 
example, indicate how neutral events elicit fear and avoidance due to their derived similarity to a 
conditioned stimulus (also, see Auguston & Dougher, 1997). The second perspective is an 
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outcome-based view; this captures the clinical consequence of cognitive fusion. For instance, the 
CFQ was designed as a generic measure of cognitive fusion with real-world implications close in 
sight (Gillanders et al., 2013). Some items index the extent to which cognition influences the 
emotional relevance of events, e.g. “my thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain”. Other 
items relate to the deleterious attempts to cope with these derived-to-be aversive events, e.g. “I 
get so caught up in my thoughts I’m unable to do the things I most want to do”. The question 
remains, to what extent do these two images of cognitive fusion mirror one another? Our 
findings indicate that the CFQ had no bearing upon on our experimental procedure. The CFQ 
was unable to predict whether neutral stimuli would (i) control fear based on a derived similarity 
to a CS+ or (ii) signal the absence of fear based on a derived opposition to the CS+. This might 
empirically point to disparity between a clinical tool that supposedly measures cognitive fusion 
and learning processes that theoretically underlie cognitive fusion (see Arch & Craske, 2008; 
Dymond, Roche, & Bennett, 2013; Vlaeyen, 2014). It will be paramount for future clinical 
research to bridge this gap and work towards therapeutic constructs that are unambiguously 
rooted in known psychological mechanisms.  
 We now turn to some methodological issues. A welcome finding was that only five 
participants failed the test for derived stimulus relations (6.85% of the sample). This is notably 
fewer than previous research. Bennett et al. (2015) reported that 29.17% of participants did not 
derive stimulus relations and were excluded from the final analysis. A small number of changes 
to the MTS task likely reduced dropout. Past research relied on novel cues to prompt relational 
responses, i.e. nonsense shapes that represented the words “same” or “opposite”. The current 
study simply used the familiar Flemish words for ‘same’ and ‘opposite’. This may have reduced 
task demand and afforded greater faculty to derive the stimulus relations. Also, previous research 
used limited feedback and participants were often unaware that consecutively correct responses 
were required. Our instructions explicated this issue and we also used a scoreboard to give online 
feedback (e.g. Munnelly, Freegard, & Dymond, 2013). Participants anecdotally reported that 
making a wrong response was highly displeasing when they had a high score; it meant losing 
more points. They also reported that correct responses were most rewarding when they had a 
high score as they were coming closer to the end goal. Beyond the MTS task, a unique 
component of this study relates to the US expectancy ratings. Previous research of this sort 
employed retrospective US expectancy whereby ratings were given at the very end of the 
Chapter 5 
 110 
experiment (Bennett et al., 2015a, 2015b; Boyle et al., 2014; Dymond et al., 2011). The present 
study made us of trial-by-trial ratings. This proved to be useful as we observed, for the first time, 
that the conditioned stimulus and its conceptual similar stimulus initially prompt identical US 
expectancy. Lastly, it is important to note that this study lack of any direct physiological 
measurements of fear. It will be important for future research to include direct measurements like 
skin conductance and startle reflex to test whether the similar stimuli continue to evoke 
heightened fear relative to opposite stimuli (e.g. Lissek et al., 2008; Vervoort et al., 2014). 
 Stimuli that were conceptually similar to a CS+ generally elicited heightened fear and 
avoidance. However, derived stimulus relations clearly failed to affect fear generalization in 
roughly one third of participants (non-avoiders). An exact explanation for this finding is still 
unavailable but it has been previously observed (Bennett et al., 2015a). In the past, appropriate 
measures to explore this caveat were lacking. In the present study, however, we could compare 
the online US expectancy ratings of these groups and this afforded some noteworthy information. 
The conceptually similar stimulus prompted heightened US expectancy for avoiders relative to 
non-avoiders. This indicates that the derived same relation was associated with an increase in the 
threat-value. Interestingly, the conceptually opposite stimulus elicited significantly lower US 
expectancy ratings for avoiders relative to the non-avoiders. This could be evidence that a 
conceptual opposition motivates inhibitory learning and causes stimuli to become affiliated with 
the absence of a US. In addition, we could examine the consequences of avoiding innocuous 
stimuli that were never actually paired with the US. The avoiders failed to learn that the 
conceptually similar stimuli were not followed by the US as they continued to report high US 
expectancy ratings throughout the generalization test. Here, the absence of the US was likely 
attributed to the emission of an avoidance response, which blocked extinction learning and the 
correction of certain threat beliefs (e.g. Wells, Clark, Salkovskis, Ludgate, Hackmann, & Gelder, 
1996). In contrast, the non-avoiders refrained from avoiding this stimulus and it subsequently 
prompted lower US expectancy ratings as the generalization test proceeded. First of all, this 
demonstrates how conceptual relations between stimuli can have a significant impact on 
emotional responding over and above direct experience. In addition, this demonstrates the 
deleterious consequences of safety behaviors like avoidance; they can serve to perpetuate 
unwarranted threat beliefs.  Ultimately, however, it is important to note that this is a post-hoc 
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finding and should be interpreted with caution. We are still unclear of what factors drive this 
split and future research will attempt to directly address this issue.  
 In conclusion, this study (i) compared influence of derived same-opposite relations on 
fear generalization and (ii) examined whether a prior history in explicitly deriving these relations 
was necessary. Regarding the first objective, a conceptual similarity between stimuli clearly 
facilitated fear generalization while a conceptual opposition did not. In fact, derived opposite 
relations were affiliated with a reduction in US expectancy. Regarding our second objective, 
however, explicitly designating the derived stimulus relations prior to fear conditioning had no 
impact on generalization. Overall, we contend that these findings speak to the overgeneralization 
of fear in human anxiety disorders. If this is so, then clinically important information might be 
gained from further analyzing the conditions under which derived stimulus relations affect fear 
responding. 
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Abstract 
This study examined whether a stimulus would signal safety due to its derived opposition 
with a threat-relevant stimulus. This would demonstrate a novel pathway through which 
safety signals are acquired. Using a between-groups design, participants were trained 
such that an aversively conditioned stimulus (CS1) was conceptually opposed to 
(opposite-group) or conceptually different (different-group) from another stimulus (CS2). 
A third control-group was never given the opportunity to derive a relation between these 
stimuli. In a test phase, stimuli that varied in perceptual similarity between CS1 and CS2 
were presented and fear was measured using US expectancy, self-reported fear and 
behavioral avoidance. If the opposite stimulus (CS2) signaled safety, then the opposite-
group should evince a steeper generalization gradient relative to the other groups. The 
results did not support this hypothesis. However, certain procedural artifacts may have 
confounded the study. Directions for future research are outlined.  
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 The ability to predict and access safety plays an important role in anxiety (Haddad, 
Bilderbeck, James, & Lau, 2015; Lau et al., 2010; Rachman, Radomsky, & Shafran, 
2008). However, the exact etiological contribution of safety is somewhat confused. It is 
both a boon and a bane. On the one hand, diminished access to safety precipitates fear 
and anxiety (Rachman, 1984). The symptoms of panic disorder patients, for example, 
commonly begin following the loss of a loved one who provided a sense of security 
(Thorpe, & Burns, 1983; Woody, & Rachman, 1994). Similarly, an inability to 
discriminate between safety and danger has been shown to exacerbate the expression of 
anxiety. A recent study by Lau and colleagues (2011), for example, linked adolescent 
anxiety to an impoverished capacity to demarcate safety cues (see Haddad et al., 2015; 
Lissek, 2012). This evidence generally suggests that the presence of safety cues can 
delimit fear. On the other hand, cues that signal safety can maintain deleterious coping 
strategies like avoidance and escape (see Dinsmoor, 2001; Gray, 1971; Mowrer, 1960). 
The omission of an aversive outcome affords relief and aspects of the environment 
associated with this reprieve can act as conditioned reinforcers; behaviors are likely to 
increase in future if they promote access to these cues (see Fernando, Urcelay, Mar, 
Dickinson, & Robbins, 2014). Also, recent research has suggested that habitual safety 
behavior can actually give rise to new fear (see Engelhard, van Uijen, van Seters, & Velu, 
2015). This evidence indicates that safety can actually maintain anxiety.  
 Putting this paradox aside, safety is clearly a core feature of anxiety. There is 
therefore a need to understand precisely how safety is learned. For example, an industry 
of experimental research explicates the functional conditions that propagate warning 
signals (Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 2013); neutral stimuli can evoke 
preparatory fear through a range of pathways (e.g. direct experience, instruction, 
observation and inference), which can then transfer to other stimuli by virtue of their 
physical and/or conceptual similarity (Rachman, 1978). We contend that a similar in-
depth investigation of safety signals is wanting. The current study explores a novel 
pathway for safety learning. It examined whether a neutral stimulus will signal the 
absence of threat due to its conceptual opposition with a fear conditioned stimulus.  
 Safety is typically related to inhibitory learning in contexts that featured an 
aversive unconditioned stimulus (US); it is meaningless to discuss safety without 
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potential danger. If there is a low probability of a US in the presence of a neutral stimulus, 
then this stimulus is said to be in a negative contingency with the US. It is referred to as 
an inhibitor (CS-) (Bouton, 2007). Inhibitors actively designate the absence of threat and 
this is evident in their capacity to attenuate fear. For example, Rescorla and LoLordo 
(1965) investigated the conditions whereby neutral stimuli would inhibit avoidance. Dogs 
were first placed in a two-chambered cage and a brief electric current (US) passed 
through the floor every 10 s. The US could be delayed by 30 s if the animal moved, or 
shuttled, to the other side. This contingency shaped a baseline rate of free-operant 
avoidance, e.g. 0.5 shuttles/5 s. Next, avoidance was blocked while one tone (CS1) was 
explicitly paired with either a US or a second tone (CS2). A final test phase represented 
the tones but this time avoidance was possible. CS1 acted like warning signal and 
unsurprisingly increased the rate of avoidance relative to baseline. Importantly, 
presentations of CS2 effectively signaled safety; avoidance decreased during CS2 
presentations relative to the baseline; this stimulus is known as a conditioned inhibitor. A 
follow-up study employed a slightly different procedure whereby one tone (CS1) was 
always paired with the US while another (CS2) was always unpaired with the US. CS2 
still reduced the rate of avoidance during a final test; this stimulus is termed a 
discriminative inhibitor and is the most familiar safety signal to feature in research (e.g. 
Haddad et al., 2015; Lau et al., 2010). In essence, safety signals are synonymous with 
inhibitors that attenuate fear responding such as avoidance (Rescorla & LoLordo, 1965; 
Grossen & Bolles, 1968), fear-potentiated startle (Grillon & Ameil, 2001), US 
expectancy (Lau et al., 2011) and freezing behavior (Hammond, 1968; Ito, Pan, Yang, 
Thakur, & Morozov, 2009). 
 Safety signals can evidently emerge on the basis of direct experience. It is unclear, 
however, whether other pathways facilitate inhibitory learning. For example, Bennett, 
Vervoort, Boddez, Hermans and Baeyen (2015a) demonstrated the acquisition of safety 
signals through verbal instruction. One non-word was associated with a US and a second 
non-word was associated with an omitted US. This was done through experience (i.e. 
contingent US presentations) or through verbal information (i.e. non-words were paired 
with threatening/safety information). Ultimately, the directly experienced inhibitors and 
verbally instructed inhibitors evoked equally diminished US expectancy. Bennett, Struyf, 
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Hermans and Baeyens (2015b) also suggested, albeit cautiously, that safety cues can be 
inferred as soon as warning signals are discriminated. Participants derived that certain 
non-words were relationally opposed to an aversively conditioned stimulus (CS+). These 
opposite stimuli then evoked diminished US expectancy and behavioral avoidance. That 
is, a neutral stimulus may have acted as safety signal due to its conceptual relation to a 
threat-relevant stimulus. This is finding is quite unique and could reflect the emergence 
of novel safety beliefs in aftermath of threatening episodes. For instance, a person who 
suffered a traumatic car accident while on a drive might then derive safety from the 
opposite scenario, i.e. inside in their home (Charlton & Thompson, 1996; Perkonigg, 
Kessler, Storz, & Wittchen, 2000; Rachman, 1984). However, we must exercise caution 
with these observations. Our study of inferred safety signals has been of secondary 
concern. The current study therefore directly investigated this issue. It was examined 
whether a neutral stimulus can act as an inhibitor due to its derived opposition with a 
threat-relevant stimuli; this will be referred to as a derived inhibitor. 
 In order to study inhibition, this current study inspected the slope of a 
generalization gradient. This represents a decrement in fear responding as stimuli 
become increasingly dissimilar from an aversively conditioned stimulus along a salient 
physical domain. For instance, Lissek and colleagues (2008) paired a large circle with a 
US (CS+) and a small circle with no US (CS-). Afterwards, an assortment of differently 
sized circles was presented (generalization stimuli; GS) and those similar to the CS+ 
evoked heightened fear relative to the CS-. This behavioral output can be graphically 
represented as a curvilinear gradient. A steep gradient arguably implies that one extreme 
is inhibitory and signals the absence of danger. A comparably flatter gradient might 
indicate that one extreme is neutral and not associated with an absent threat. The rationale 
here is that inhibitors circumscribe fear and in doing so reduce generalization. As such, 
and in the absence of any reliable sources of safety, fear can become unrestricted and 
overgeneralized (also, see Woody & Rachman, 1994). Stated otherwise, an ambiguous 
generalization stimulus is likely to elicit fear when it resembles a warning signal. But the 
threat-value of this ambiguous stimulus will be dampened if it also resembles a safety 
signal.  
Chapter 6 
 122 
 A number of observations support the assumption that inhibitors interfere with 
fear generalization. First, unpublished research from our lab demonstrates that inhibitory 
learning can indeed change the shape of gradients. Flat gradients have been observed 
following non-discriminative fear conditioning (i.e. CS+ learning only) and steep 
gradients have been observed following discriminative fear conditioning (i.e. CS+ & CS- 
learning). Second, Ito and colleague (2009) demonstrated that inhibitory learning restricts 
generalization. Juvenile mice initially learned that a tone predicted the US in an 
acquisition context (CS+). Afterwards, a similar tone (GS) in a new context elicited as 
much fear as the CS+ suggesting a high degree generalization. However, fear 
generalization was weakened when the GS was initially paired with the absence of the 
US in the original context. Finally, Rescorla and LoLordo (1964) directly indicated that 
inhibition could transfer to ambiguous stimuli and attenuate the expression of fear. A 
single tone (CS-) was explicitly paired with an omitted US, which then dampened the rate 
of on-going avoidance. In a critical test, novel tones that were somewhat similar to the 
original inhibitor also reduced avoidance.  
 The current study investigated whether a previously neutral stimulus could inhibit 
the generalization of fear by virtue of its conceptual opposition to an aversively 
conditioned stimulus. Participants first completed a brief matching to sample (MTS) task 
and were taught that (i) one stimulus (CS1) was the same as a sample stimulus and (ii) a 
second stimulus (CS2) was the opposite of that sample. It could therefore be derived that 
CS1 and CS2 were relationally opposite (the opposite-group). Second, CS1 alone was 
explicitly paired with a US. Finally, the generalization of fear to stimuli that varied in 
similarity to CS1 and CS2 was examined. The dependent measures were US expectancy, 
self-reported fear and avoidance. If the opposite stimulus (CS2) signaled safety, then fear 
should be concentrated to the portion of the generalization gradient most similar to CS1. 
Therefore, it was predicted that this group would produce a steep generalization gradient 
relative to a control group. The control group was unlikely to promote any derived 
stimulus relations; a (pseudo)-recognition task was completed instead of a MTS task. 
Given the lack of either direct or derived inhibitor learning, fear was unlikely to be 
restricted to any specific portion of the generalization gradient. As such, this group was 
predicted to demonstrate a relatively flat generalization gradient. A third control group 
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was also included. These participants completed a variant MTS task wherein CS1 and 
CS2 were not derived ‘opposites’ but were merely ‘different’ from one another (the 
different-group). This manipulation allowed us to examine the necessity of opposition 
relations in derived inhibition. It could be the case that stimuli can act like safety signals 
once they are categorized as ‘different’ from a conditioned stimulus.  
Method 
Participants 
 Seventy-seven undergraduate students from the University of Leuven (68 female) 
were recruited using an online experimental management system (M age = 19.15 years, 
SD = 1.80). Individuals with a blood phobia and auditory sensitiveness were advised not 
to volunteer. Informed consent was acquired and the ethical committee of the Faculty of 
Psychology and Educational Science approved the study. Course credit (1/hr) or money 
(€8/hr) was provided as compensation. Participants were randomly assigned into the 
opposite-group (N = 25), the different-group (N = 28) and the control group (N = 24).  
Apparatus 
 Experiments were conducted in sound attenuated cubicles on Dell PCs with 17” 
monitors (blue background; 1024x768 pixels) and programmed using Affect 4 (Spruyt, 
Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010). A pre-training exercise 
familiarized participants with the MTS task and same-opposite relations. Sets of familiar 
objects were used; 4 boxes (small to large), 4 lines (narrow to broad), 4 discs (crescent to 
full circle), 4 sets of dots (few to many) and 4 stars (few to many points) (200x150 
pixels) (see Bennett et al., 2015b). 
 A brief MTS task established derived stimulus relations. Sample stimuli were non-
words; LUR and MAB (X or Y; black Arial font, 200 x 150 pixels). Relational cues were 
Flemish for ‘same’ (hetzelfde als) and ‘opposite’ (tegengestelde) (black Arial font size, 
150 x 100 pixels). Comparison stimuli were 6 grey shapes (250 x 180 pixels). Two were 
an oval and a trapezoid (CS1 & CS2) (see Figure 14). The other comparison stimuli were 
a hexagon, diamond, star and triangle (N1, N2, N3 & N4). Stimuli were arranged into six 
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Figure 14. Stimuli used in this study. For just over half of the participants, the extreme 
left stimulus was the fear conditioned stimulus (CS1; N = 43). For the remaining 
participants, the extreme right stimulus was the fear conditioned stimulus (CS1; N = 34).  
 
counterbalanced orders. CS1 was an oval and CS2 was a trapezoid in counterbalances 1, 
3 and 5 (N = 43). The CS1 was a trapezoid and CS2 was an oval in counterbalances 2, 4 
and 6 (N = 34). Counterbalances did not influence the dependent variables.  
 Six GSs were used (GS1, GS2, GS3, GS4, GS5, & GS6) (see Figure 14). These 
varied in similarity between CS1 and CS2 and were designed in ‘Vectorian Giotto’ 
animation software. CS1 and CS2 were entered as diametric points and a continuum of 
stimuli that varied across 6 steps were produced. The US was a combination of an 
aversive image (unpleasant IAPS image) and a sound (female scream) (see Bennett et al., 
2015a, 2015b). 
Procedure 
 Pre-training exercise 
 Participants were greeted in the lab where informed consent was signed. 
Participants were instructed that their first task was to practice some basic relational 
responses. The opposite-group and different-group were informed that an incomplete 
‘sentence’ would appear on top of the screen and they could complete this by selecting an 
item from the bottom. On each trial, an object appeared in the upper-left screen, e.g. 
[small box]. A relational cue then appeared 1 s later in the upper-middle screen, e.g. 
‘same’ or ‘opposite’. Next, a question mark appeared in the upper-right of the screen, e.g. 
[?]. Four comparison stimuli appeared 1 s later at the bottom of the screen, e.g. 4 boxes of 
different sizes. Clicking a comparison caused it to replace the question mark and 
automatically removed all other comparisons. A same trial, e.g. [small box]-same-[?], 
required the selection of the identical comparison, i.e. [small box]. An opposite trial, e.g. 
[small box]-opposite-[?], required the selection of the most perceptually dissimilar 
comparison, i.e. [large box]. The words “Correct” or “Wrong” then appeared above the 
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completed sentence for 3 s, followed by a 3 s inter-trial interval (ITI). A scoreboard was 
placed in the upper-right corner and in the beginning read, “Your score is 0/12” (white 
Arial font, size 18 against a black background). Correct responses increased the score by 
1 and incorrect responses reset the score to 0. Trials were presented randomly until the 
scoreboard reached 12/12. ‘Same’ and ‘opposite’ trials were evenly presented with no 
more than two consecutive trials of the same type. Trials were separated by a 2 s ITI 
 The control-group was informed that they would first complete a basic 
recognition test. Instructions stated that a collection of items would appear onscreen. 
Their task was to indicate whether this was already seen. It was stipulated that collections 
would be novel at first but they might repeat across time. The standard pre-training trials 
were presented with some modifications- the relational cue, scoreboard and corrective 
feedback were all omitted. On each trial, an object appeared in the upper-left screen, e.g. 
[small box]. An empty box appeared 2 s later in the upper-right screen, which was 
followed 1 s latter by 4 comparison stimuli at the center of the screen, e.g. 4 boxes of 
different sizes. Participants then indicated whether this collection of stimuli was 
previously seen, by pressing the C-key (for ‘Yes’) or the V-key (for ‘No’). To ensure that 
the control-group had equal exposure to stimuli as the opposite-group and different-group, 
a yoked control was introduced. The amount of trials completed by an odd numbered 
control-group participant was matched to the amount completed by the preceding 
opposite-group participant. The amount of trials completed by an even numbered control-
group participant was matched to the amount completed by the preceding different-group 
participant. 
 MTS task and between-groups manipulation 
The opposite-group and different-group were informed that the next task was to learn 
how shapes and non-words were related. On each trial, the sample stimulus appeared in 
the upper-left of the screen, e.g. [X]. A relational cue appeared 1 s later in the upper-
middle, e.g. same. A question mark then appeared 1 s later in the upper- right of the 
screen, e.g. [?]. Three comparison stimuli then appeared at the bottom of the screen, e.g. 
[CS1, N1, N2]. A comparison stimulus replaced the question mark when it was selected 
and all other comparisons were removed. Corrective feedback (i.e. ‘correct’ or wrong’) 
appeared above the completed sentence for 3 s followed by a 3 s ITI. A ‘scoreboard was 
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shown in the upper-right hand corner that initially read “your score is 0/32”. A correct 
response increased the score by 1 and an incorrect response reset the score to 0. Trials 
appeared in a quasi-random order (no more than two consecutive trials of the same sort) 
until the scoreboard reached 32/32.  
 There were 4 trial types. Two were same trials, i.e. [X]-same-[CS1, N1, N2] and 
[Y]-same-[CS1, N1, N2]. Two were opposite trials, i.e. [X]-opposite-[CS2, N3, N4] and 
[Y]-opposite-[CS2, N3, N4] (see Table 1). The correct responses on the same trials were 
constant; CS1 was always the same as X; N1 was always the same as Y. The correct 
responses on the opposite trials depended on the group (see Table 1). For the opposite-
group, CS2 was the opposite of X. This group could derive that CS1 and CS2 were in 
derived opposition to one another2. For the different-group, CS2 was the opposite of Y. 
This group could not specifically derive an opposition relation between CS1 and CS2; 
these two stimuli simply belonged to different categories.  
 The control-group continued their (pseudo)-recognition task. Instructions stated 
their task was to continue to indicate whether they had seen a set of items before by 
pressing the C-key (for ‘Yes’) or the V-key (for ‘No’). The 4 training trials were 
presented without the relational cue, the scoreboard or feedback. A yoked control was 
still in place. That is, the amount of trials completed by an odd numbered control-group 
participant was determined by the amount completed by the preceding opposite-group 
participant. Similarly, the amount of trials completed by an even numbered control-group 
participant was determined by the amount by the preceding different-group participant. 
                                                
2N3 was the always opposite of Y in the opposite-group while N3 was always the 
opposite of X in the different-group. This is indicated in Table 1. 
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 A brief test was also administered to determine the derived relation between CS1 
and CS2. This took place over a single trial. Here, CS1 and CS2 appeared side by side on 
the middle of the screen. After 1 s, 4 terms appeared at the bottom of the screen, ‘same’, 
‘opposite’, ‘different’, & ‘unsure’. Instructions then appeared asking participants to select 
the term that best described the relation between CS1 and CS2. The opposite-group and 
different-group completed this test immediately after the training phase. The control-
group completed this test at the very end of the experimental study.  
  Fear acquisition 
 Baseline fear of CS1 was first self-reported. The question “How afraid are you of 
this shape” appeared on the top of the screen with CS1 beneath. Answer were provided 
by clicking on an 11-point Likert scale, where 0 = not at all and 10 = absolutely.  
 A set of instructions then stated that (i) shapes could be followed by a US and (ii) 
an 11-point Likert scale could be used to indicate expectancy of the US, where 0 = not 
likely, 5 = unsure and 10 = definitely likely. On each trial, CS1 appeared center-screen 
and after 0.50 s the Likert scale appeared at the bottom. Clicking on the scale removed it 
from the screen and CS1 terminated exactly 0.50 s later. On 9 occasions, a 3 s US 
coincided with the termination of CS1. On 3 occasions, a 3 s blank screen coincided with 
the termination of CS1. These trials appeared randomly and were separated by a 4-6 ITI. 
By using a non-discriminative fear conditioning procedure, the only possible source of 
inhibition was the derived opposition stimulus relation.  
 Next, participants self-reported (i) their fear of the US, (ii) their perceived 
unpleasantness of the US and (iii) their fear of CS1. The first question read, “How afraid 
of the images and sounds are you?”. The second question read, “How unpleasant were the 
images and sounds?”. The third question read, “How fearful are you of this shape?” with 
CS1 beneath. Questions appeared on the top of the screen and answer were provided 
using an 11-point Likert scale, where 0 = not at all and 10 = absolutely.  
 Generalization of US expectancy  
  Instructions stated that shapes could be followed by the US and the task was to 
indicate expectancy. A stimulus appeared center-screen and after 0.5 s the Likert-scale 
appeared. Clicking on the scale removed it from screen and the stimulus terminated 0.5 s 
later. Eight stimuli were presented in a random order: CS1, CS2, GS1, GS2, GS3, GS4, 
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GS5 and GS6. The termination of CS1 coincided with the onset of a US. All other stimuli 
were presented in extinction; their termination as followed by a 3 s blank screen. A 4-6 s 
ITI separated trials.  
  Generalization of self-reported fear 
 The question “How fearful are you of this shape?” appeared on the top of the 
screen with CS1, GC2 or GSs beneath. Stimuli were presented randomly and answers 
were provided by clicking on an 11-point Likert scale, where 0 = not at all and 10 = 
absolutely.  
  Generalization of avoidance 
 Instructions stated that the spacebar could be used to avoid the US; it was 
stipulated that a cue reading “spacebar available” would appear on top of the screen to 
signal this possibility. A small number of reacquisition trials were first administered; CS1 
was paired with a US on 4 occasions. After this short block, the avoidance was made 
available. Eight stimuli were presented in a random order: CS1, CS2, GS1, GS2, GS3, 
GS4, GS5 and GS6. A stimulus appeared at the beginning of each trial and this was 
followed 0.5 s later by the avoidance cue. An avoidance response removed the avoidance 
cue but the stimulus remained onscreen for a full 4 s. If an avoidance response was made 
in the presence of CS1, then the US was omitted. If an avoidance response was not made 
in the presence of CS1, then the US was presented. All other stimuli were presented in 
extinction. Trials appeared randomly and were separated by a 4-6 s ITI. 
Outcome measures 
 The number of pre-training and training MTS trials was counted. ANOVAs were 
calculated to ensure that the groups had equal exposure to these trials. With respect to the 
opposite-group and the different-group, accuracy scores were also calculated by 
expressing the number of correct trials as a percentage of the overall number of trials. A 
t-test was then calculated to ensure these groups performed equally. Lastly, a brief test 
examined whether participants derived the appropriate relations between the conditioned 
stimulus (CS1) and the target stimulus (CS2). We checked whether our between-groups 
manipulation was effective. It was examined whether (i) participants in the opposite-
group related these stimuli as ‘opposites’ and (ii) participants in the different-group 
related these stimuli as ‘different’ or ‘unsure’.  
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 In respect to fear learning, fear ratings were reported for CS1 immediately before 
Pavlovian fear conditioning (B) and again after Pavlovian fear conditioning (A). We 
examined whether these ratings increased across time. Also, a difference score was 
calculated (d = A-B) and a one-way ANOVA was used to check for any between-groups 
difference in fear learning. Lastly, we investigated whether US expectancy in the 
presence of CS1 increased across the 12 fear acquisition trials. A rANOVA was 
calculated to examine the effect of trial on US expectancy ratings.  
 A rANOVA examined the influence of generalization stimulus (CS1, CS2, GS1, 
GS2, GS3, GS4, GS5, & GS6) on US expectancy. Group was also included as the 
between-subjects factor (opposite-group, different-group, & control-group). It was 
predicted that the generalization of US expectancy would differ between these groups; 
the opposite-group would display a steep generalization gradient while the control-group 
would display a flat gradient. As such, a significant two-way interaction between 
stimulus and group was expected. A similar rANOVA examined the effect of stimulus 
and group on the generalization of self-reported fear.  
 Due to a programming error, an avoidance response to the CS+ failed to omit the 
US during the first 18 experimental sessions. These data were not used to analyze 
generalized avoidance. This left a sample of 59 participants (opposite-group, N = 19; 
difference group; N = 22; control group, N = 19). The number of avoidance responses 
each participant emitted was counted (see Lommen et al., 2010). A one-way ANOVA 
tested for group differences. It was predicted that the opposite-group would show less 
generalized avoidance responses than the two other groups.  
 Where Mauchly’s test revealed that sphericity could not be assumed, the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction is reported. The alpha was set at 0.05 and effect sizes are 
reported using the partial ETA squared (ƞP²). Bonferroni corrections were used during 
planned comparisons.  
Results 
Pre-training & MTS-task 
 A mean of 15.52 pre-training trials was completed (SE = 0.54) and a one-way 
ANOVA indicated that the 3 groups completed an equal amount of trials, F < 1, p = .91. 
A high accuracy of responding was observed in the opposite-group (M = 93.21%, SE = 
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1.42) and different-group (M = 95.12%, SE = 1.20). There was no difference in 
performance, t = 0.93, p = .36, df = 50.  
 A mean of 47.55 MTS training trials was completed (SE = 1.61). A one-way 
ANOVA indicated that the 3 groups completed an equal amount, F(2, 74) = 1.12, p = .31. 
Therefore, exposure to CS1 and CS2 did not different across the groups. A high accuracy 
of responding was also observed in the opposite-group (M = 88.93%, SE = 1.04) and 
different-group (M = 84.82%, SE = 1.10). However, training proved to be easier for those 
in the opposite-group, t = 2.69, p = .01, df = 51. That is, 96.00% of the opposite-group 
achieved an accuracy score above 84.00% but this was true only for 53.57% of the 
different-group.  
 With respect to the test for derived relations, 84% of the opposite-group described 
CS1 and CS2 as ‘opposites’. In the different-group, 67.90% of described these stimuli as 
‘different’ and 10.70% stated they were ‘unsure’. This suggests that the different trials 
training (between-group manipulation) were generally effective in establishing the 
intended derived relations (see Table 1). Of note, the control-group was tested at the end 
of the study: 79.20% described these stimuli as ‘opposites’ and the remaining 20.80% 
related them as ‘different’. It may be that participants related these stimuli as opposites 
post-hoc because one reliably predicted the US while the other reliably predicted an 
absent US 
 Acquisition of fear 
 The US elicited moderately high self-reported fear (M = 5.94, SE = 0.27) and a 
one-way ANOVA did not suggest any between-groups difference, F < 1, p = .40. The US 
also prompted high unpleasantness ratings (M = 7.90, SE = 0.21) and, again, a one-way 
ANOVA did not indicate any between-group difference, F (2, 74) = 1.63, p = .20. Fear 
ratings to CS1 significantly increased after conditioning, t = 11.54, p < .001, df = 74, d = 
3.87 (see Figure 15a). As such, CS1 was reliably associated with a US and elicited fear. 
A one-way ANOVA demonstrated that the increase in self-reported fear did not differ 
across the groups, F < 1, p = .65.  
 A 12 (trial) x 3 (group) rANOVA revealed a main effect of trial on US expectancy, 
F(6, 408) = 23.60, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.24. Planned comparisons clearly demonstrated that 
US expectancy increased form the first trial to the last trial, t = 11.31, There was no main 
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Figure 15. This shows the results of fear acquisition. (A) The mean fear ratings in 
response CS1 from pre- to post- acquisition. (B) Trial-by-trial US expectancy ratings 
during acquisition. Error bars indicated standard error. *** p < .001. 
 
effect of group of US expectancy, F < 1, p = .94, and there was no interaction between 
group and trial, F < 1, p = .55. Therefore, fear was clearly acquired by in groups.  
Generalization of US Expectancy 
 An 8 (stimulus) x 3 (group) rANOVA indicated a main effect of stimulus on US 
expectancy, F(6, 438) = 55.82, p < .001, ƞP² = 0. 43. A clear generalization gradient was 
observed that was steep at first and flat towards the middle (see Figure 16a). This was 
verified by planned comparisons. CS1 prompted higher US expectancy than all other 
stimuli, all t’s > 10.43, p’s < .001, df = 76. Next, GS1 prompted higher US expectancy 
than the remaining stimuli, t’s > 3.41, p’s < .001, df = 76. From G2 onwards, stimuli 
generally elicited the same US expectancy ratings, although G6 prompted lower US 
expectancy than G3 (t = -3.20, p = .002, df = 76) and CS2 (t = -4 .11, p < .001, df = 76).  
 Contrary to our predictions, the generalization gradients for the opposite-group, 
different-group and control-group were indistinguishable. There was no main effect of 
group, F(2, 74) = 1.62, p = .21. Also, the critical main interaction between group and 
stimulus was not significant, F(6, 438) = 1.10, p = .39. There is no evidence to suggest 
that the derived relation between CS1 and CS2 influenced the generalization of US 
expectancy.  
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Figure 16. These figures indicate the (A) US expectancy generalization gradients and (B) 
the fear rating generalization gradients for the three groups. Error bars indicate standard 
error. 
 
Generalization of self-reported fear 
 An 8 (stimulus) x 3 (group) rANOVA revealed a main effect of stimulus on fear 
ratings. A clear generalization gradient was observed. Like before, this was steep at first 
and flat towards the end (see Figure 16b). Planned comparisons indicated that CS1 
prompted significantly higher fear ratings than all other stimuli, all t’s > 9.92, p’s < .001, 
df = 76. G2 prompted significantly higher fear ratings than all other stimuli, t’s >3.85, p’s 
< .001, df = 76, with the exception of its neighboring G3, t = 2.78, p = .007, df = 76 
(Bonferroni’s corrected α = .002). From G3 onwards, stimuli generally prompted similar 
fear ratings: although fear ratings to G3 were significantly higher than G5, t = 4.21, p 
< .001, df = 76, and G6, t = 4.21, p < .001, df = 76.  
 In contrast with our predictions, the generalization gradients for the three groups 
were similar. There was no main effect of group, F(2, 74) = 2.22, p = .12, and there was 
no two-way interaction between group and stimulus, F < 1, p = .74. There is, therefore, 
no evidence that the derived relation between CS1 and CS2 influenced the generalization 
of self-reported fear.  
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Figure 17. The mean number of avoided stimuli during the generalization test. Error bars 
indicate standard error. 
 
Generalization of Avoidance  
 The mean number of avoidance responses for each group was low (see Figure 17). 
A one-way ANOVA failed to indicate any between-groups difference, F < 1, p = .68. 
Contrary to our predictions, there was no indication that the opposite-group avoided 
fewer generalization stimuli than the two control groups.  
Post-hoc analysis 
 It could have been that the predicted effect was only evident in those participants 
that derived the appropriate stimulus relations. We re-examined these data but only 
included members of the (a) opposite-group who stated that CS1 and CS2 were opposites 
(N = 21), (b) different-group who stated that CS1 and CS2 were different or that they 
were unsure of the relation (N = 22) and (iii) control-group in general (N = 24). However 
the main findings did not change. As before, there was clear fear acquisition across the 
three groups. A 12 (trial) x 3 (group) rANOVA indicated a main effect of trial on US 
expectancy, F(11, 704) = 21.40, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.25, and planned comparisons indicated 
a significant rise in US expectancy from the first to last trial, t = 11.12, p < .001, df = 66. 
Also, the groups did not differ in with respect to fear learning, F < 1, p = .97.  
 Regarding the generalization of US expectancy, an 8 (stimulus) x 3 (group) 
rANOVA indicated a main effect of stimulus, F(6, 367) = 47.37, p < .001, ƞP² = .43. 
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There was a clear decrement in US expectancy as stimuli became increasingly dissimilar 
from CS1. However, the generalization gradients did not differ between the groups; the 
important two-way interaction between stimulus and group was not significant, F(12, 
367) = 1.41, p = .16. 
 Similarly, an 8 (stimulus) x 3 (group) rANOVA indicated a main effect of 
stimulus on self-reported fear, F(14, 192) = 67.17, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.51. A clear 
decrement in fear ratings was seen as stimuli became increasingly dissimilar from CS1. 
This was similar, however, for all three groups; the interaction between stimulus and 
group was not significant, F < 1, p = .93. Lastly, the amount of generalized avoidance 
responses for each was generally low (M = 1.41, SE = 0.17). Again, a one-way ANOVA 
indicated that all participants produced a similar amount of avoidance responses, F < 1, p 
= .87. 
Discussion 
 This study examined whether a neutral stimulus could signal safety due to its 
derived opposition with a threat-relevant stimulus. A unique method to test for derived 
inhibition was adopted; the slope of a generalization gradient was inspected. Participants 
were presented with a collection of stimuli that varied in similarity between two diametric 
points (CS1 & CS2) and one of these extremes was associated with an aversive US. A 
between-groups design manipulated the derived relation between these two stimuli. One 
group was trained such that CS1 and CS2 were derived opposites. Another group was 
trained such that the two extremes were simply different. A control group was unlikely to 
have derived any specific relation. If these stimuli extremes were in derived opposition, 
then fear should have been concentrated to the portion of the gradient that most 
resembled the conditioned stimulus. That is, derived inhibition would restrict fear 
generalization and produce a steep generalization gradient. If the two extremes were not 
in derived opposition, then we predicted that fear would be evenly spread across the 
generalization gradient. That is, fear would be unrestricted and the generalization gradient 
would be flat because of the absence of safety. The critical test for this hypothesis was a 
two-way interaction between stimulus and group. However, this effect never reached 
statistical significance for any dependent measure. Clear decrements in US expectancy 
and self-reported fear were observed as stimuli became increasingly similar from the 
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conditioned stimulus. But this was identical for all groups. As such, there was no 
evidence to support the presence of derived inhibition. 
 A second analysis was conducted. Participants who derived the appropriate 
stimulus relations were exclusively included. That is, all members of the opposite-group 
related CS1 and CS2 as ‘opposites’ while the members of the different-group related 
these stimuli as ‘different’ or ‘uncertain’. Nevertheless, the principle findings were 
unchanged. Generalization gradients across the groups were still indistinguishable from 
one another. Overall, there was no evidence to suggest the emergence of derived 
inhibition. It cannot be cannot concluded that stimuli signal safety when they are in 
derived opposition with other threat-relevant stimuli. 
 It is premature to resolutely accept the null hypothesis. A procedural limitation 
could be deduced from analyzing the control-group’s response pattern. These participants 
were expected to provide a flat generalization gradient wherein fear widely generalized 
across stimuli. Fear was, to the contrary, concentrated to one region. The first four GSs 
elicited heightened US expectancy and self-reported fear that gradually decreased from 
CS1 onwards. The latter four GSs elicited identically low US expectancy and fear ratings. 
It could be that stimuli were a priori placed in two distinct categories- 4 types of ovals 
and 4 types of trapezoids. During acquisition one of these sub-categories was associated 
with the US. This is problematic. First, this pre-experimental bias was likely to influence 
the generalization gradients for all groups independent of the between-groups 
manipulation. The possibility of observing derived inhibition could have, therefore, been 
neutralized. Second, it is possible that the opposite-group did in fact derived inhibition 
but this could not be verified without an appropriate control condition. 
 To employ inadequate stimuli constitutes a rather fundamental oversight. 
Perceptual generalization research often, if not always, uses stimuli that share just one 
salient feature, i.e. different types of ovals or trapezoids but not both. A circle, for 
example, is commonly paired with a US and different sized circles are then tested for the 
capacity to evoke fear (e.g. Sturyf, Ibericom, & Verliet, 2015; Lenaert et al., 2012; Lissek 
et al., 2007, 2012). Why then were the typical GSs abandoned in this experiment? It 
might have been difficult to derive an opposition relation between two circles that were 
similar in all but size. Stated otherwise, the perceptual similarity between two circles 
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might interfere with the derivation of a conceptual opposition. Future research could 
acknowledge this possible risk and simply employ the standard GSs. Perhaps this 
perceived risk is mute given that derived stimulus relations are argued to be arbitrarily 
applicable and insensitive to perceptual details (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). 
A second option is to use different stimuli. For example, Lenaert and colleagues 
demonstrated the generalization of US expectancy across a series of female faces 
(Lenaert et al., 2012). Perhaps it would be easier for participants to derive an opposition 
between two different types faces in comparison to two different types of circles. These 
alternatives pose clear empirical questions that future research could easily address.  
 It is plausible that the GSs formed two distinct categories (e.g. ovals), one of 
which was associated with the US. The other group (i.e. trapezoids) never featured in an 
inhibitory learning episode. If the stimuli in this other category were inert, then one 
would expect that they would prompt US expectancy ratings around 5 (‘uncertain’). 
However, US expectancy prompted by these stimuli edged towards 0 (‘no US’). Ratings 
specifically fell within a range of 2–3 on an 11-point Likert scale. This points to a second 
procedural limitation. Unwanted inhibitory learning may have taken place irrespective of 
our manipulation. During the generalization test, 8 stimuli were presented and only one 
was explicitly paired with the US. Participants could have abstracted a rule to describe 
this contingency- ‘only one stimulus is threat-relevant and that all others are safe’. Steps 
could be taken to prevent this from reoccurring in future. For instance, we could use two 
CS+ as opposed to one (e.g. Lommen, Engelhard, & van den Hout, 2010). Another 
simple step would be to reduce the number of GS presentations. The threat-value of 
stimuli would therefore be more ambiguous. 
 There are two standardized test for inhibition. The first is to examine whether a 
stimulus reduces fear that is typically observed in response to a conditioned stimulus; this 
is referred to as a summation test (e.g. Hammond, 1967). Here, one stimulus is directly 
associated with an aversive US such that it evokes heightened fear- a conditioned excitor. 
Another stimulus is not paired with the US a (putative) conditioned inhibitor. In a crucial 
test, both stimuli are presented together as a compound. If the latter stimulus is truly 
inhibitory, then it should attenuate fear responding to the conditioned excitor relative to a 
control. A second possibility is to examine whether it difficult to train an inhibitor to 
Deriving safety from threat 
 137 
signal threat; this is known as a retardation of acquisition test (e.g. Hammond, 1968; 
Rescorla, 1969). One stimulus is associated with a US while another is associated with its 
omission. In a test phase, the potential inhibitor is then explicitly paired with the US. If 
the stimulus actively signals the absence of the US, then a greater number of US pairings 
will be required for it to elicit fear relative to a novel stimulus. These protocols together 
represent the gold-standard tests for inhibition. This begs the question as to why the 
current study used an alternative approach. This decision was firstly motivated by 
practical reasons. The majority of summation and retardation of acquisition tests have 
been conducted using rodent models. There is a paucity of experimental studies detailing 
how these procedures ought to be arranged for adult human participants (cf. Grillion & 
Ameli, 2001). We capitalize on other experimental protocols that were more familiar to 
human fear conditioning research, i.e. perceptual generalization. 
  Secondly, this current approach allows an investigation of the learning 
mechanisms underlying stimulus generalization. A traditional associative account holds 
that a neutral stimulus will partially excite the memory of a US and elicit some fear when 
they feature elements of an originally conditioned stimulus (e.g. Rescorla, 1976). This 
elemental perspective would predict that each group in the current study to yield the exact 
same generalization gradient, irrespective of the derived relation between the extremes 
(CS1 and CS2). This is because generalization gradients are a direct function of the 
perceptual features of stimuli; the more similar a stimulus is to the conditioned stimulus, 
the more likely it is to evoke fear. However, recent evidence calls the robustness of this 
traditional view into question. Mere physical similarity is not always necessary for 
stimulus generalization. An abstract, conceptual connection between stimuli is also 
sufficient (e.g. Bennett et al., 2015a, 2015b). Given these observations, we predict that 
the generalization gradient is a function of the (derived) relation between the diametric 
points irrespective of their physical features. That is, the opposite-group and the control-
group might evince complete distinct generalization gradients to the exact same physical 
stimuli. If verified, this finding could suggest that generalization is based on the 
semantic-like statements that contain information on how different stimuli are related, or 
‘propositions’ (Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Indeed, a recent study also 
suggests that generalization gradients are not always a function of the physical features of 
Chapter 6 
 138 
stimuli, per se, but rather certain propositional beliefs (Boddez, Bennett, van Esch, & 
Beckers, 2015). In this study, propositional statements communicated through verbal 
instruction determined the slope of a generalization gradient. When instructed, “the more 
(or less) an image looks like the image that was followed by a shock, the higher (or 
lower) the changes that this image will be followed by an electric shock”, participants 
produced a typical generalization gradient; US expectancy ratings decreased as stimuli 
became increasingly dissimilar from the CS+. When instructed, “the more (or less) an 
image looks like the image that was followed by a shock, the lower (or higher) the 
changes that this image will be followed by an electric shock”, participants produced an 
atypical generalization gradient; US expectancy ratings increased as stimuli became 
increasingly dissimilar from the CS+.  
 We must note, however, that the current findings still support the mainstream 
associative approach. Regardless of how participants verbally categorized the stimuli, 
generalization gradients were always steep. It therefore appears that generalization was 
indeed a function of stimuli’s physical parameters. But as discussed, there were 
considerable procedural limitations. It will be quite interesting to reassess these findings 
when this study is replicated under more ideal conditions.  
 In summary, safety is a dynamic issue within anxiety disorder research as well as 
behavioral and cognitive therapy. On the one hand, an absence of safety might ignite new 
fears and fuel on-going anxiety. Those who pertain to this account would argue that 
successful therapy required a judicious use of safety cues (e.g. Rachman et al., 2008). On 
the other hand, the presence of safety cues can motivate debilitating coping strategies, 
which can hinder therapeutic progress. Proponents of this account world argue that 
therapeutic benefits could be maximized by eradicating safety signals and safety 
behaviors (e.g. Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek, & Vervliet 2014). This debate will 
likely continue but both sides can benefit from a sophisticated understanding of safety 
learning. This study represents the first attempt to examine whether safety signals can be 
spontaneously derived once threat-relevant cues are established. Specifically, we 
examined whether a neutral stimulus could signal safety due to its derived opposition 
with a threat-relevant stimulus. There is no evidence to support the possibility of derived 
inhibition. Yet we cannot rule out the possibility that certain procedural issues hampered 
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this study. A number of steps have, therefore, been laid out that could improve the quality 
of this investigation. 
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Abstract 
Cognitive defusion techniques reduce the maladaptive control conceptual relations exert 
over emotional responding. This clinical tool is thought to involve a disruption in the 
‘transfer of stimulus functions’; category exemplars may be less likely to evoke 
generalized fear when presented in novel contexts. The current study tested this 
possibility. Stimulus equivalence categories were first established (A1=B1=C1 & 
A2=B2=C2). B1 (or B2) was then presented in an acquisition context and avoidance (or 
approach) was reinforced through the cancellation of an aversive US (or presentation of 
an appetitive US). During a final test phase, participants did not avoid C1 (or approach 
C2) in a novel context but did in the acquisition context; the transfer of avoidance was 
sensitive to context changes. As a secondary aim, these experiments examined the 
learning histories that promote this effect. Using a between-groups design, participants 
differed with respect to how many additional responses to the conditions stimuli could be 
made in additional contexts. Irrespective of this manipulation, however, novel contexts 
always disrupted the transfer of avoidance (and approach). 
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 Individuals are equipped with an arsenal of concepts that are used to arrange 
events into coherent categories (Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002). Despite its 
obvious advantages, this cognitive faculty is likely to contribute to overgeneralized fear. 
The representation of an entire category (e.g. all men) can be emotionally altered after a 
single exemplar is associated with a threatening event (i.e. a brutal assault), such that 
innocuous exemplars (e.g. an old acquaintance) control fear and avoidance (see Browne 
& Finklehor, 1986; Dunsmoor & Murphy, 2015). Behavior and cognitive therapies often 
combat the maladaptive control that concepts can exert over emotion. A key strategy in 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is to foster an awareness of how 
conceptual relations are generated as an on-going activity that structures our worlds. This 
is known as cognitive defusion (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Luoma & Hayes, 
2009) and it assumes that conceptual relations are less likely to affect emotional 
responding when experienced in a novel (metacognitive) context (Masuda, Hayes, 
Sackett, & Twohig, 2004). The current study focused its attention to this relatively recent 
addition to therapy. In particular, the learning processes that underlie this technique were 
explored. 
 Cognitive defusion can been described as a procedure, as an outcome and as a 
process. At a procedural level, cognitive defusion refers to a collection of therapeutic 
exercises; twenty-six are formally documented (Luoma & Hayes, 2009; Tyndal, Roche, 
Baxter, & Waldeck, 2015). These techniques guide individuals to experience the process 
of generating conceptual relations, rather than experience the literal content of cognitions 
(Blackledge, 2015). In the context of PTSD, for example, cognitive defusion techniques 
might target a distressing thought like “Men are dangerous and I will be attacked again”. 
A person could be encouraged to instead say, “I am having a thought that men are 
dangerous” to underscore that this thought is a symbolic appraisal and not a reality 
(Pilecki & McKay, 2012). An alternative is the ‘milk, milk, milk exercise’ in which a 
client repeats the target thought over-and-over. They are then guided to notice how the 
subjective meaning of the words fades across these repetitions (Masuda et al., 2004). In 
general, cognitive defusion techniques manipulate the way (distressing) conceptual 
relations are experienced and this dampens their literal-value. At the level of outcome, 
cognitive defusion is characterized by a pattern of clinically relevant results (see Bach & 
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Hayes, 2002; Gillanders et al., 2014). The believability and averseness of target concepts 
must diminish, at least temporarily (e.g. Masuda et al., 2004). The willingness to openly 
experience, and not avoid, target concepts must increase (e.g. Hooper & McHugh, 2014). 
Lastly, a flexible behavioral repertoire ought to emerge, in which a target concept can 
prompt a range of different responses (e.g. Murrell & Wilson, 2004).  
 As a process, cognitive defusion is putatively rooted in the learning mechanisms 
described in Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; 
Dymond & Roche, 2013). Three elements are crucial. First, conceptual relations are 
understood with respect to derived relational responding; the ability to spontaneously 
respond to one stimulus in terms of its relation to another stimulus (e.g. Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2005). In a Matching-to-Sample (MTS) task, for example, a person might learn that 
two dissimilar items are mutually equivalent to a common item, e.g. A→X & A→Y. A 
network of derived stimulus relations might then emerge through reversing the previously 
learned relations (X→A & Y→A; e.g. derived symmetry) as well as a combining the 
previously learned relations (Y←X & Y→X; e.g. derived equivalence). As such, 
physically distinct stimuli can become functionally substitutable with one another; this is 
referred to as a stimulus equivalence category (i.e. A=X=Y). Second, the impact of 
conceptual relations on emotion is linked to the transfer of stimulus function (Hayes et al., 
2001).3 This is the process wherein the response elicited to stimulus can change in 
accordance to its derived stimulus relations. If, for example, a stimulus is directly 
associated with an aversive outcome (e.g. X+), then other equivalent stimuli (i.e. Y) 
might evoke heightened fear and avoidance responding (Augustson & Dougher, 1997; 
Bennett et al., 2015). Third, the aim of cognitive defusion is to attenuate the impact of 
conceptual relations on emotional responding. A stimulus (e.g. Y) might fail to elicit fear 
and avoidance behavior, for example, despite the fact it is still in derived equivalence 
with an aversively conditioned stimulus (i.e. X+). Cognitive defusion is therefore thought 
to involve a (partial) disruption in the transfer of stimulus function (Blackledge, 2007; 
Hayes et al. 2011; Masuda, Twohig, Stormo, & Feinstien, 2010).  
                                                
3 The ‘transfer of stimulus function’ or ‘transformation of stimulus function’ might 
otherwise be referred to as category-level generalization (e.g. Bennett, Vervoort, Boddez, 
Baeyens, & Hermans, 2015; Vervoort, Vervliet, Bennett, & Baeyens, 2014).  
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 The question remains as to how the transfer of stimulus function is interrupted. 
Indeed, this is akin to asking- how can the conceptual meaning of an item be distorted? 
Insight might be derived from real-world observations. The meaning of a given stimulus 
is not just determined by its relational connection to other events, but also by the context 
in which it is experienced (Wulfert & Hayes, 1998). As an example, imagine anxiously 
waiting to meet your surgeon in a hospital ward, when a fellow patient says, “Don’t 
worry! Dr. Sheppard is very nice.” Your fear upon seeing the actual doctor will differ 
depending on context in which these words were situated; whether they were uttered in a 
sincere or sarcastic tone. Contextual information seemingly gates the transfer of stimulus 
function; indeed, RFT refers to this as contextual control over transfer of stimulus 
function (Hayes et al., 2001). In line with this perspective, Blackledge and colleagues 
formulated a process-level definition of cognitive defusion. They contend that cognitive 
defusion involves a temporary disruption in the transfer of stimulus function due to the 
introduction of new contexts, which do not typically afford transfer (see Blackledge, 
2007, 2015; Blackledge & Drake, 2013).  
 The learning mechanisms that supposedly drive cognitive defusion have not been 
subject to intense scrutiny. There is a paucity of empirical evidence to indicate that 
context-based manipulations actually disrupt the transfer of fear-related behaviors to 
stimuli (Dymond & Roche, 2009; Dymond, Roche, & Bennett, 2013). Therefore, the 
current study explores the validity of this process-level definition of cognitive defusion. 
Such fundamental research is important and necessary. Elucidating the mechanisms-of-
change in cognitive defusion might contribute to a coherent framework that allows us to 
amplify and optimize therapeutic gains. 
Experiment 1 
 The aim of this study was to examine whether situating stimuli in novel contexts 
disrupts the transfer of fear-relevant behaviors. A MTS task first established two stimulus 
equivalence categories. Second, a member of one category was explicitly paired with an 
aversive outcome (USneg) and conditioned to control avoidance (i.e. CSneg). A member 
of the other category was explicitly associated with an appetitive outcome (USpos) and 
conditioned to control approach (i.e. CSpos). Crucially, these CS-US associations were 
acquired against a specific background, the acquisition context. A critical test phase then 
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investigated whether the introduction of a novel context disrupted the transfer of fear-
related behaviors. Equivalent stimuli were presented in either the acquisition context or a 
previously unseen (defusion) context. It was predicted that avoidance would transfer to 
equivalent stimuli in the acquisition context but not the novel context (hypothesis 1a) and 
approach would transfer to equivalent stimuli in the acquisition context but not the novel 
context (hypothesis 1b). That is, a novel context was expected to disrupt the transfer of 
fear-related behaviors. 
 As a secondary aim, we examined conditions that might boost the disruptive 
influence of novel contexts. Cognitive defusion techniques are thought to widen the 
possible responses to difficult concepts such that no one response will dominate in a 
novel context (see Blackledge, 2007). Consider, for example, the ‘milk, milk, milk 
exercise’: a difficult thought is repeated over-and-over and all the while individuals take 
note of new ways of responding to these words. For instance, one could treat the words 
conceptually as literal truths, auditory as sounds or even proprioceptively as mouth 
movements. Future encounters with these words might consequential elicit other 
responses and not necessary be treated as literal truths. From this perspective, it is crucial 
that cognitive defusion exercises expand the repertoire of responses that can be made to 
conceptual events. We empirically examined this possibility by manipulating the ways 
participants could respond to the CSs. After conditioning, additional responses were 
reinforced in additional contexts. In a multiple contexts (MC) condition, two new contexts 
were encountered while in a limited contexts (LC) condition there was only one. Also in 
the multiple responses (MR) condition two additional operant response sets were acquired 
while in a limited responses (LR) condition there was only one. It was predicted that a 
novel context was more likely to disrupt the transfer of fear-related behaviors when 
participants learned to emit multiple responses (across multiple contexts) relative to 
limited responses (across limited contexts) (hypothesis 2). 
Method 
Participants 
 Seventy-one undergraduate students (55 females) were recruited (Mage = 21 years, 
SD = 1.41). Individuals suffering from blood phobia and/or hearing sensitivities were 
advised not to volunteer. The Faculty of Psychology’s ethical committee approved the 
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study. All participants signed informed consent and were compensated with course 
credits (1 credit/hour) or money (€8/hour). Four groups were devised based on a 2 
(additional-contexts) x 2 (additional-responses) factorial design. This provided a (i) 
multiple contexts and multiple responses group (MC-MR group; N = 18), (ii) multiple 
contexts and limited responses group (MC-LR group; N = 18), (iii) limited contexts and 
multiple responses group (LC-MR group; N = 18) and (iv) limited contexts and limited 
responses group (LC-LR group; N = 17).  
Apparatus, stimuli and setting  
 The experiment was programmed using Affect 4 and ran on a Dell desktop PC 
with a 17” monitor with a grey background (1024x768 pixels; 191.191.191) inside sound 
attenuated cubicles. Instructions were presented onscreen in a black font (size 28, Arial). 
Eight novel shapes were used during the MTS task (160 x 160 pixels; black font on white 
background) (e.g. Augustson & Dougher, 1997). The contexts were different background 
colors. These were red (255.128.128), blue (0.128.255), yellow (255.255.128) and green 
(128.255.128). One was the acquisition context (ACQ context) wherein an aversive 
unconditioned stimulus (USneg) or an appetitive unconditioned stimulus (USpos) 
followed conditioned stimuli (CSs). The USneg comprised of co-occurring images and 
sound (e.g. Bennett et al., 2015). One of 12 body mutilation images from the 
International Affective Picture System was shown for 3 s, 1024x768 pixels (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001). An aversive sound of a female scream was modified using 
Audacity 1.2.6, and played via headphones for 2 s at 90dB. The USpos was of a 3 s 
message that read “very good! +10 points! You now have (x) points”. Two backgrounds 
were training contexts (TRN1 & TRN2 contexts). In TRN1, written feedback followed 
CSs; this read either “correct” (green font) or “wrong” (red font) (size 72, Arial bold). In 
TRN2, cartoon faces followed CSs; this was a smiling face or a frowning face (195x195 
pixels). One background was a previously unseen defusion context (DEF context). The 
stimuli and background colors were arranged into 4 counterbalances. Lastly, pairs of key 
presses were used. One was the approach-avoidance pair; pressing the spacebar omitted 
the USneg and pressing the return key delivered the USpos. The additional operant 
responses were the T-P pair (i.e. pressing either ‘T’ or ‘P’ keys) and a W-X pair (i.e. 
pressing either ‘W’ or ‘X’ keys).  
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Procedure 
 MTS Task 
 Participants were greeted in the lab where informed consent was provided. 
Instructions stated that the task was to learn how shapes were related. First, MTS training 
trials were completed. A sample stimulus appeared at the top of the screen, e.g. [A1] or 
[A2]. Three comparison stimuli then appeared, 500 ms later, in a line on the bottom of the 
screen, e.g. [B1, B2, B3] or [C1, C2, C3]. The positions were randomized from left to 
right. Participants observed the sample and then selected a comparison by pressing the 1-
key (for the left comparison), 2-key (for the middle comparison) and 3-key (for the right 
comparison). There were 4 training trials: [A1] → [B1, B2, B3], [A2] → [B1, B2, B3], 
[A1] → [C1, C2, C3] and [A2] → [C1, C2, C3] with the correct choice in italics. 
Corrective feedback was provided after each response; “correct” (or “wrong”) appeared 
for 2 s. Trials were presented quasi-randomly with no more than two consecutive trials of 
the same type. The inter-trial interval (ITI) was 2 s. This continued until 16 consecutively 
correct responses were made. Next, MTS test trials examined the emergence of derived 
equivalence relations. A previous comparison stimulus was presented on the top of the 
screen, e.g. [B1] or [C1], and other comparison stimuli appeared 500 ms later at the 
bottom, e.g. [C1, C2, C3] or [B1, B2, B3]. No corrective feedback was provided. There 
were 4 test trials: [B1] → [C1, C2, C3], [B2] → [C1, C2, C3], [C1] → [B1, B2, B3] and 
[C2] → [B1, B2, B3], with the correct selection in italics. Trials appeared, quasi-
randomly, 4 times each in a block of 16 trials. Passing this test suggested B1 and B2 were 
conceptually equivalent to C1 and C2 (equivalent stimuli).  
 Acquisition of avoidance and approach 
 Instructions stated that the task was to learn the appropriate response for different 
shapes. Participants were also informed that the background color could be relevant. CSs 
were first associated with USs in the ACQ context. The USneg was directly paired with 
B1 (CSneg). On 5 occasions, CSneg appeared for 5 s and was followed by a 3 s USneg. 
On 1 occasion, CSneg was followed by a 3 s blank screen. The USpos was directly paired 
with B2 (CSpos). On 5 occasions, CSpos appeared for 5 s and was followed by a 3 s 
USpos. On 1 occasion, CSpos was followed by a 3 s blank screen. After the 12 
acquisition trials, instructions stated that points could be gained by pressing the return-
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key while images and sounds could be avoided by pressing the spacebar. CSs appeared 
for 5 s during which time a response could be made. On some trials, CSneg was 
presented. If an avoidance response was emitted, then a 3 s blank screen followed this 
stimulus. If an approach response (or non-response) was made, then a 3 s USneg 
followed this stimulus. CSpos was presented on other trials. If an approach response was 
made, then USpos followed this stimulus. If an avoidance response (or a non-response) 
was made, then a 3 s message reading “Poor performance. You gained 0 points. Your 
score is now (x)” appeared. Trials continued until 12 avoidance responses were made. 
Trials appeared quasi-randomly with no more than two consecutive of the same sort and 
were separated by a 2-4 s ITI. 
 Between-groups manipulation 
 MC-MR group. First, a block of TRN1 trials and a block of TRN2 trials were 
presented. Prior to the TRN1 block, instructions stated that participants had to learn when 
to press ‘T’ and ‘P’. On each TRN1 trial, a CS was presented against the TRN1 
background. The CS terminated once a key press was emitted and written feedback 
(“correct” or “wrong”) appeared for 2 s. Pressing ‘T’ in the presence of CSneg was 
reinforced and ‘P’ in the presence of CSpos was reinforced. Prior to the TRN2 block, 
instructions stated that participants had to learn when to press ‘W’ and ‘X’. On each 
TRN2 trial, a CS was presented against the TRN2 background. The CS terminated once a 
key press was emitted and a cartoon face (smile or frown) appeared for 2 s. Pressing ‘W’ 
in the presence of CSneg was reinforced and ‘X’ in the presence of the CSpos was 
reinforced. Blocks continued until 6 consecutively correct responses were made. A 2-4 s 
ITI separated trials, which appeared quasi-randomly (no more than two consecutive of the 
same trials). The sequence of the TRN1 and TRN2 blocks was randomized.  
 Second, a mixed block was completed. Instructions stated that, at times, 
participants could use the ‘T’/‘P’ keys or ‘X’/‘W’ keys or avoidance/approach keys. 
There were 6 trial types. These were identical to the previous blocks. CSneg was 
presented in the (i) ACQ context where avoidance was reinforced through an omitted 
USneg, (ii) TRN1 context where pressing ‘T’ was reinforced using written feedback and 
(iii) TRN2 context where pressing ‘W’ was reinforced using cartoon faces. CSpos was 
presented in the (iv) ACQ context where approach was reinforced through the 
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presentation of USpos, (v) TRN1 context where pressing ‘P’ was reinforced using written 
feedback and (vi) TRN2 context were pressing ‘X’ was reinforced using cartoon faces. 
Trials appeared quasi-randomly and continued until 36 consecutively correct responses 
were made. The ratio of ACQ to TRN1 to TRN2 trials was 1:1:1. 
 MC-LR group. A block of TRN1 trials and a block of TRN2 trials were first 
presented. Prior to both blocks, instruction stated that participants had to learn when to 
press ‘T’ and ‘P’. The TRN1 block was identical to the previous group. CSs were 
presented against the TRN1 background; pressing ‘T’ in the presence of CSneg and ‘P’ in 
the presence of CSpos was reinforced. The TRN2 block was similar to that of the 
previous group except the T-P pair replaced the W-X pair. Pressing ‘T’ in the presence of 
CSneg and ‘P’ in the presence of CSpos was reinforced. Second, a mixed block was 
presented. This block was similar to the previous group. There were 6 trial types. CSneg 
was presented in the (i) ACQ context where avoidance was reinforced, (ii) TRN1 context 
where pressing ‘T’ was reinforced and (iii) TRN2 context where pressing ‘T’ was 
reinforced. CSpos was presented in the (iv) ACQ context where approach was reinforced, 
(v) TRN1 context where pressing ‘P’ was reinforced and (vi) TRN2 context where 
pressing ‘P’ was reinforced. The ratio of ACQ to TRN1 to TRN2 trials was 1:1:1.  
 LC-MR group. First, two blocks of TRN1 trials were presented. Prior to one 
TRN1 block, instruction stated that participants had to learn when to press the ‘T’ and ‘P’. 
This was identical to the previous groups- pressing ‘T’ in the presence of CSneg and ‘P’ 
in the presence of CSpos was reinforced. In the second TRN1 block, the W-X pair 
replaced the T-P pair. Prior to this block, instruction stated that participants had to learn 
when to press the ‘W’ and ‘X’. Pressing ‘W’ in the presence of CSneg was reinforced and 
‘X’ in the presence of CSpos was reinforced. Second, a mixed block was presented. 
Instructions stated that, at times, participants could press ‘T’/‘P’ or ‘X’/‘W’ or 
avoidance/approach. This mixed block had 4 trial types. CSneg was presented in the (i) 
ACQ context where avoidance was reinforced and (ii) TRN1 context where pressing ‘T’ 
or ‘W’ was reinforced. CSpos was presented in the (iii) ACQ context where approach 
was reinforced and (iv) TRN1 context where pressing ‘P’ or ‘X’ was reinforced. The ratio 
of ACQ to TRN1 trials was 1:2.  
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 LC-LR group. First, two blocks of TRN1 trials were presented. Pressing ‘T’ in 
the presence of CSneg and ‘P’ in the presence of CSpos was reinforced. Completing this 
block twice ensured that all participants had equal experience with CSs. A mixed block 
was then presented. This was similar to the previous group. There were 4 trial types. 
CSneg was presented in the (i) ACQ context where avoidance was reinforced and (ii) 
TRN1 context where pressing ‘T’ was reinforced. CSpos was presented in the (iii) ACQ 
context where approach was reinforced and (iv) TRN1 context where pressing ‘P’ was 
reinforced. The ratio of ACQ to TRN1 trials was 1:2.  
 Transfer test 
 Participants were instructed to make whichever response they felt were 
appropriate. It was also stated that feedback and/or USs might appear. Equivalent stimuli 
were tested for their ability to control avoidance and approach. This was conducted 
within two generalization contexts, namely the DEF context and the ACQ context. First, 
a DEF block consisted of 4 presentations of C1 and C2. On each trial, an equivalent 
stimulus appeared against the DEF context. The stimulus terminated after a response was 
made (or automatically after 4 s). All key presses were available and trials were presented 
in extinction; the USneg, USpos, feedback or faces never appeared. Second, an ACQ 
block consisted of 4 presentations of C1 and C2. On each trial an equivalent stimulus 
appeared against the ACQ context and terminated once a response was made (or 
automatically after 4 s). All trials were presented quasi-randomly with a 2-4 s ITI. 
 Data analysis  
 The numbers of MTS training and test trials were calculated, as were accuracy 
scores. ANOVAs tested for between-group differences. With respect to acquisition, the 
number of CS+ and CS- presentations were counted. The number of avoidance and 
approach responses were then calculated and expressed as a percentage. rANOVAs were 
used to examine the effect of stimulus (CS+ & CS-) on the proportion of avoidance and 
approach. The additional-contexts and additional-responses conditions were also included 
as between-group factors. Next, the number of trials completed during the TRN1 block 
and TRN1/TRN2 block were counted and accuracy scores calculated. The number of 
trials completed during the mixed block was also counted and an accuracy score 
calculated. ANOVAs again tested for any between-group differences.  
Chapter 7 
 156
 During the generalization test, C1 (equivalent to CSneg) was expected to elicit 
heightened avoidance relative to C2 (not equivalent to CSneg). A unit of transferred 
avoidance was calculated by subtracting the number of avoided C2 presentations from 
that of C1; a positive integer indicates the selective transfer of avoidance. Similarly, C2 
(equivalent to CSpos) was expected to elicit heightened approach relative to C1 (not 
equivalent to CSpos). A unit of transferred approach was calculated by subtracting the 
number of approached C1 presentations from that of C2; a positive integer indicates the 
selective transfer of approach. rANOVAs examined the effect of generalization context 
(DEF & ACQ) on transferred avoidance and approach. Additional-contexts and 
additional-responses conditions were included as between-group factors. It was possible 
for other responses to appear in the ACQ and DEF contexts, e.g. T, P, X, or W key 
presses. These were counted and rANOVAs were to examine whether stimulus and/or 
generalization context had any influence. While not a principle prediction, it is 
conceivable that other responses would be more frequent in the DEF relative to the ACQ 
context. Additional-contexts and additional-responses conditions were again included as 
between-group factors. Lastly, the time required to respond in the DEF and ACQ context 
was also calculated. rANOVA was used to examine whether stimuli and/or context had 
any influence. If the introduction of a novel context disrupted the conceptual ‘meaning’ 
of a stimulus, then it is possible that participants required longer when responding to in 
the DEF context. Where Mauchly’s test revealed that sphericity could not be assumed, 
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is reported. The alpha-level was set at .05 and effect 
sizes were calculated using the partial ETA squared (ηp2). Bonferroni corrections were 
used as the rejection criteria when pairwise comparisons were calculated.  
Results 
MTS task 
 A mean of 75.80 training trials (SE = 6.38) was completed with high accuracy (M 
= 86.39%, SE = 1.07). A two-way ANOVA did not indicate an effect of additional-
contexts, F <1, p = .53, or additional-responses, F < 1, p = .61, on training accuracy. Also, 
there was no interaction between these conditions, F < 1, p = .75. This suggests that 
training progressed equally across the groups. Importantly, the test trials were completed 
with a high degree of accuracy (M = 93.84%, SE = 1.68). There were no between-group  
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Figure 18. The principle findings of acquisition are presented. CS+ clearly controlled the 
production of avoidance while CS- controlled the production of approach. Error bars 
indicate standard error. *** p < .001. 
 
differences in test accuracy; a two-way ANOVA did not indicate an effect of additional-
contexts, F < 1, p = .92, or additional-responses, F(1, 67) = 3.16, p = .08. Again, there 
was no significant interaction between these conditions, F(1, 67) = 2.13, p = .15. This 
suggests that stimulus equivalence categories were reliably established with no a priori 
group differences.  
Acquisition of avoidance and approach 
 A mean of 9.99 CSneg trials (SE = 1.52) was completed. There were no between-
group differences in number of CSneg encountered; two-way ANOVA indicated no 
effect of additional-contexts, F(1, 67) = 1.57, p = .22, or additional-responses, F < 1, p 
= .33. And there was no interaction, F(1, 67) = 1.20, p = .16. A mean number of 10.07 
CSpos trials (SE = 1.50) were also completed. Again, two-way ANOVA indicated no 
main effect of additional-contexts, F(1, 67) = 1.27, p = .26, additional-response contexts, 
F < 1, p = .33, or interaction, F(1, 67) = 1.87, p = .18.  
 A 2 (stimulus) x 2 (additional-contexts) x 2(additional-responses) rANOVA 
revealed a main effect of stimulus on avoidance, F(1, 67) = 1596.00, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.96. 
The proportion of avoided CSneg trials was significantly higher than the proportion of 
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avoided CSpos trials, t(71) = 40.80, p < .001 (see Figure 18). There was no effect of 
additional-contexts, F < 1, p = .67, or additional-responses, F < 1, p = .30. There was also 
no significant two-way interaction between these conditions, F(1, 67) = 2.89, p = .10. 
Therefore, CSneg reliably controlled the production of avoidance. A 2 (stimulus) x 2 
(additional-contexts) x 2 (additional-responses) rANOVA indicated a main effect of 
stimulus on approach, F(1, 67) = 997.92, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.94. The proportion of 
approached CSpos trials was significantly higher than the proportion of avoided CSneg 
trials, t(71) = 31.84, p < .001 (see Figure 18). There was no effect of additional-contexts, 
F(1, 67) = 2.09, p = .15, or additional-responses, F(1, 67) = 4.49, p = .09. There was a 
significant interaction between the additional-responses and additional contexts condition, 
F(1, 67) = 4.49, p = .04, ƞP² = 0.06. The proportion of approached B2 stimuli was 
slightly lower in the LC-LR group relative to the other groups. However, this difference 
was no longer significant after Bonferoni’s correction. Overall, CSpos reliably controlled 
the production of approach.  
Between-groups manipulation 
 A block of TRN1 trials and a block of TRN1/TRN2 trials were first completed. 
CSs were encountered over a mean of 29.17 trials (SE = 0.87). A two-way ANOVA 
failed to indicated any between-group differences; there was no effect of additional-
contexts, F < 1, p = .78, no effect of additional-responses, F < 1, p = .99, and no 
interaction, F < 1, p = .71. A high level of accuracy was observed (M = 95.41%, SE = 
0.43). Again, a two-way ANOVA failed to indicate any pre-manipulation differences in 
accuracy; there was no effect of additional-contexts, F< 1, p = .81, no effect of 
additional-responses, F(1, 76) = 2.5, p = .12, and no interaction, F < 1, p = .59. Groups 
apparently acquired the additional CS responses in the additional contexts with 
comparable ease. A mean of 56.94 (SE = 4.47) mixed block phase trials were completed. 
A two-way ANOVA indicated that the between-groups conditions had no impact on the 
number of trials; there was no effect of additional-contexts, F(1, 67) = 1.26, p = .27, no 
effect of additional-responses, F(1, 67) = 1.13, p = 2.9, and no interaction effect, F(1, 67)  
= 1.98,  p = .16. A high degree of accuracy was observed that did not differ between 
groups (M = 97.18%. SE = 0.59); there was no effect of additional-contexts, F < 1, p 
= .89, additional-responses, F(1, 67), p = .29, nor an interaction effect, F < 1, p = .72 .  
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Figure 19. This graph indicates how avoidance transferred during the generalization test. 
(A) There was significantly more transferred avoidance in the acquisition context relative 
to the defusion context. (B) It is clear that C1 drove this effect. There was more 
transferred avoidance to C1 in the acquisition context relative to the defusion context. 
Error bars indicate standard error. *** p < .001. 
 
This suggests that all groups had equal exposure to the CS and acquired the necessary 
operant response.  
Transfer of avoidance  
 A 2 (generalization context) x 2 (additional-contexts) x 2 (additional-responses) 
rANOVA indicated a main effect of the generalization context on avoidance responding, 
F(1, 67) = 130.71, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.66. There was significantly less avoidance in the 
DEF context than in the ACQ context, t(70) = 11.52, p < .001 (see Figure 19a). In 
accordance with the first hypothesis, a change in context disrupted the transfer of 
avoidance. Specifically, there were significantly fewer avoidance responses to C1 in the 
DEF context relative to the ACQ context, t(70) = 15.63 p < .001. In contrast, the number 
of avoidance responses to C2 was equally low in both the DEF context and ACQ context 
(after Bonferoni’s correction), t(70) = 2.24, p = .03 (see Figure 19b). Regarding the 
between-groups conditions, it proved unimportant whether participants encountered CSs 
in additional-contexts, F < 1, p = .72, or emitted additional-responses to the CSs, F < 1, p  
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Figure 20. This graph indicates how approach transferred during the generalization test. 
(A) There was significantly more transferred approach in the acquisition context relative 
to the defusion context. (B) It is clear that C2 drove this effect. There was more 
transferred approach to C2 in the acquisition context relative to the defusion context. 
Error bars indicate standard error. *** p < .001. 
 
= .48. Lastly, there was no two-way interaction between these conditions, F < 1, p = .87. 
Overall, there is no evidence to support the second hypothesis. A change context 
disrupted the transfer of avoidance equally across the groups.  
Transfer of approach  
 A 2 (generalization context) x 2 (additional-contexts) x 2 (additional-responses) 
rANOVA indicated a main effect of the generalization context on approach, F(1, 67) = 
117.82, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.64. There was significantly more generalized approach in the 
ACQ context than in the DEF context, t(70) = 11.09, p < .001 (see Figure 20a). In 
accordance with the second hypothesis, a change in context disrupted the transfer of 
approach. Fewer approach responses to C2 were emitted in the DEF context relative to 
the ACQ context, t(70) = 12.04, p < .001. In contrast, the number approach responses to 
C1 was equally low in the ACQ and DEF context, t < 1, p = .9 (see Figure 20b). 
Regarding the between-groups factors, there was no main effect of additional-contexts, F 
< 1, p = .33. Also, there was no effect of additional-contexts, F < 1, p = .97. Lastly, there 
was no two-way interaction between these conditions, F < 1, p = .45. This contravenes 
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the second hypothesis. A change in context disrupted the transfer of approach across all 
groups. 
Other-responses 
 A 2 (stimulus) x 2 (generalization context) x 2 (additional-context) x 2 
(additional-response) rANOVA did not indicate a main effect of stimulus, F < 1, p = .98. 
Importantly, a main effect of generalization context was observed, F(1, 67) = 157.01, p 
< .001, ηp2 = 0.70. Other-responses were more prevalent in the DEF context (M = 5.04, 
SE = 0 .31) than in the ACQ context (M = .28, SE = 0.16), t(70) = 12.35, p < .001. With 
respect to the between-group conditions, there was no main effect of additional-contexts, 
F < 1, p = .97, and no main effect of additional-responses on other responses, F < 1, p 
= .56. There was also no two-way interaction between these conditions, F(1, 69) = 1.36, p 
= .27. Encountering CSs in additional contexts with additional responses had no impact.  
Reaction times 
 A 2 (stimulus) x 2 (generalization context) x 2 (additional-context) x 2 
(additional-response) rANOVA did not indicate any main effect of stimulus, F < 1, p 
= .70. Therefore, reaction times for equivalent stimuli were similar. Importantly, the there 
was a main effect of context, F(1, 65) = 14.29, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.18. Reaction times were 
longer in the DEF context (M = 1444.55, SE = 64.53) relative to the ACQ context (M = 
1218.46, SE = 47.446), t(68) = 3.78, p < .001. This suggests that a context change 
interfered with the aversive meaning of equivalent stimuli4. In addition, the there was no 
effect of additional-contexts or additional-responses, F’s < 1, p’s > .71. Also, there was 
no interaction between these conditions, F < 1, p = .65. Regardless of group, a change in 
context increased the time needed to respond to the equivalent stimuli. 
Discussion 
 Innocuous events can elicit heightened distress, unwarranted fear and debilitating 
avoidance when they are conceptually similar to aversively conditioned stimuli. This can 
                                                
4 A second possibility is that the responses emitted in acquisition context (i.e. ‘T’, ‘P’, 
‘W’, & ‘X’) simply took longer than the responses emitted in the acquisition context (i.e. 
avoidance and approach). To test this possibility, the reaction times for each response 
were calculated from the final 12 trials of the mixed block. A rANOVA did not indicate 
any main effect of stimulus on reaction times, F(1, 57) = 2.76, p = .10. It is therefore 
unlikely that the change in response type drove the main effect of generalization-context 
on response times. 
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be understood through the activity of derived stimulus relations and the transfer of 
stimulus function (Hayes et al., 2001; Dymond & Roche, 2013). Cognitive defusion 
techniques are often used to combat the maladaptive impact that conceptual relations 
have on emotional responding. This putatively involves a pause in the transfer of stimulus 
function due to the introduction of new contexts (Blackledge, 2007, 2015). The current 
study examined this possibility. A pair of CSs was differentially reinforced to control 
avoidance and approach behavior in a specific acquisition context. Results demonstrate 
that behaviors selectively generalized to equivalent stimuli in the acquisition context but 
not a novel context. Interestingly, non-fear related behaviors to the CSs were instead 
observed in the novel context. This indicates that participants were not absolutely reliant 
on the approach-avoidance pair but could flexibly respond to the equivalent stimuli. 
Furthermore, participants required significantly more time to respond to equivalent 
stimuli in the novel context. These findings generally suggest that the transfer of fear-
related behaviors can indeed be disrupted through context-based manipulations.  
 It has been suggested that cognitive defusion techniques widen the possible 
responses to aversive stimuli across different contexts such that no one response will 
dominate in a novel context (Blackledge, 2007; Wilson, & Murrell, 2004). In this sense, a 
critical feature of cognitive defusion is the broadening of one’s behavioral repertoire. 
This rationale was specifically tested. Using a between-groups design, participants 
differed in how narrowly, or broadly, they could respond to CSs. However, this 
manipulation had no observable impact. Irrespective of how individuals were trained to 
CSs, a novel context still disrupted generalization. This could cast doubt over a common 
explanation as to why cognitive defusion techniques work.  
 A number of caveats must be highlighted. First, certain procedural artifacts may 
have overshadowed the between-groups manipulation. The CSs were more often threat-
irrelevant than threat-relevant in the mixed block. That is, for every one encounter with 
the CSneg in a threat-relevant context (ACQ) there were two encounters with the CSneg 
in a threat-irrelevant context (TRN1 and/or TRN2). It is possible that participants 
abstracted a rule such as “more often then not, [CSneg] is not threatening”. In addition, 
the instructions used may have influenced responding in the DEF context. It was 
explicitly stated that changes in the background were relevant. This could have prompted 
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participants to exclusively associate the acquisition context with the USs. In this case, a 
novel context might have indirectly signaled the absence of USs. Second, it is possible 
that learning additional responses in different contexts had some fundamental impact on 
the transfer of stimulus function. However, this cannot be determined due to the absence 
of a control group that never encountered the CSs in any additional contexts or learned 
any additional operant responses. A follow up experiment was conducted to address these 
issues. 
Experiment 2 
 A modified version of Experiment 1 was conducted. Some changes increased the 
likelihood that the novel context was ambiguous and not a priori associated with omitted 
USs. First, the instruction stating that ‘changes in contexts could be relevant’ was 
excluded. Second, the mixed block was re-arranged such that the CSs were equally 
experienced in threat-relevant and threat-irrelevant contexts. Other changes allowed us to 
isolate any basic effect of the between-group manipulation. A new control-group was 
introduced that never encountered CSs in additional-contexts nor learned any additional-
responses to the CSs.  Finally, just two experimental groups were employed, based on a 
single condition (repertoire). Participants in the broad group encountered the CSs in two 
new contexts (i.e. TRN1 & TRN2) and learned two additional operant response sets (i.e. 
T-P pair & W-X pair). Participants in the narrow group encountered the CSs in one new 
context (i.e. TRN1) and learned one additional response set (i.e. T-P pair).  
 It was again predicted that avoidance (and approach) would transfer to equivalent 
stimuli in the acquisition context but not in the novel context. This would suggest that a 
context-based manipulation could indeed disrupt the transfer of stimulus function. 
Regarding the between-group factors, it was predicted that the defusion context would 
disrupt the transfer of fear-related behaviors in the broad-repertoire group and narrow-
repertoire group but not in the control group. This would suggest that the between-group 
manipulation indeed had some fundamental impact. Finally, if the expanded repertoire 
were specifically important, then transfer would be more disrupted in the broad-repertoire 
group relative to the narrow group.  
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Method 
Participants 
 Seventy-nine undergraduate students (66 females) were recruited MS (Mage = 
20.17 years, SD = 4.94). All participants signed informed consent and compensated with 
course credit or money (8euro/hour). There were three groups, (i) the broad group (N = 
27), (ii) the narrow group; N = 26, and (iii) a control group (N = 26).  
Procedure 
 MTS task and acquisition 
 These phases were identical to Experiment 1. First, a MTS task established 
stimulus equivalence categories (A1=B1=C1 & A2=B2=C2). Second (and within the 
ACQ context), the USneg followed B1 (CSneg) on 5 (out of 6) trials. Also, the USpos 
followed B2 (CSpos) on 5 (out of 6) trials. Avoidance in the presence of B1 (i.e. CSneg) 
was then reinforced while approach in the presence of B2 (i.e. CSpos) was reinforced.  
 Between-groups manipulation. 
 Broad group. Participants acquired multiple responses across multiple contexts 
(generally identical to MC-MR group in experiment 1). First, a TRN1 block and a TRN2 
block were presented. CSs appeared against the TRN1 background; pressing ‘T’ in the 
presence of CSneg and ‘P’ in the presence of CSpos were reinforced. CSs also appeared 
in the TRN2 background; pressing ‘W’ in the presence of CSneg and ‘X’ in the presence 
of CSpos were reinforced. The blocks finished once 6 consecutively correct responses 
were made. Second, a mixed block was presented with 6 trial types. CSneg was presented 
in the (i) ACQ context, (ii) TRN1 context and (iii) TRN2 context. CSpos was presented 
in the (iv) ACQ context, (v) TRN1 context and (vi) TRN2 context. Trials appeared quasi-
randomly until 24 consecutively correct responses were made. Critically, the ratio of 
ACQ to TRN1 to TRN2 trials was 2:1:1. The CSs appeared equally in threat-relevant and 
threat-irrelevant contexts.  
 Narrow. These participants acquired limited responses across limited contexts; 
identical to the LC-LR group in experiment 1. First, two TRN1 blocks were presented. 
Pressing ‘T’ in the presence of CSneg and ‘P’ in the presence of CSpos were reinforced 
during these trials. And the blocks finished once 6 consecutively correct responses were 
made. A mixed block was then presented wherein CSs appeared in the ACQ and TRN1 
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contexts. Trials continued until 24 consecutively correct trials were made. The ratio of 
ratio of ACQ to TRN1 trials was 1:1. The control group did not complete any extra 
training but moved straight to the transfer test 
 Transfer test 
 This was identical to experiment 1. First, a DEF block was completed with 4 
presentations of each equivalent stimulus. Second, an ACQ block of trials was completed 
with 4 presentations of each equivalent stimulus. A stimulus appeared against the specific 
context and terminated once a response was made (or automatically after 4 s). 
Results 
MTS task 
 A mean of 74.83 MTS training trials (SE = 4.59) was completed with high 
accuracy (M = 88.23%, SE = 0.76). There was no effect of group on accuracy, F <1, p 
= .25. Test trials were also completed with a high accuracy (M = 92.48%, SE = 1.60) and 
no effect of group, F < 1, p = .59.  
Acquisition of avoidance and approach 
 A mean of 14.35 CSneg trials (SE = 3.94) was completed and there were no 
between groups differences, F < 1, p = .35. A mean of 14.35 CSpos trials (SE = 3.97) was 
completed with no effect of group, F < 1, p = .34. The CSs were equally encountered in 
the ACQ context during the initial conditioning phase. A 2 (stimulus) x 3 (group) 
rANOVA indicated a main effect of stimulus on avoidance, F(1, 76) = 790.04, p < .001, 
ƞP² = 0.91. Avoidance during CSneg trials was significantly higher than that during 
CSpos trials, t(78) = 27.87, p < .001 (see Figure 21). There was also no main effect of 
group, F (2, 76) = 2.93, p = .06, and no significant interaction effect, F(2, 76) = 1.62, p 
= .21. A 2 (stimulus) x 3 (group) rANOVA indicated a main effect of stimulus on 
approach, F(1, 76) = 989.87, p < .001, ƞP² = 0.92. Significantly, more approach responses 
were emitted in the presence of CSpos than CSneg trials, t(78) = 31.39, p < .001 (see 
Figure 21). There was no main effect of group, F (2, 76) = 2.93, p = .06, and no 
significant interaction effect, F(2, 76) = 2.48, p = .09. 
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Figure 21. The findings of acquisition are presented. CS+ controlled the production of 
avoidance while CS- controlled the production of approach. Error bars indicate standard 
error. *** p < .001. 
 
 Between-groups manipulation 
 Additional responses to the CSs were first trained over a block of TRN1 trials and 
TRN2 (or TRN1) trials. The CSs were encountered over a mean of 13.87 trials (SE = 
0.37). A one-way ANOVA did not indicate a main effect of group on the number of trials, 
F < 1, p = .60. Responding was moderately accurate (M = 76.10%, SE = 1.00) and there 
were no group differences, F < 1, p = .59. A mean of 34.66 (SE = 3.10) mixed block 
phase trials was completed. One-way ANOVA indicated no impact of group on trial 
number, F < 1, p = .63. A high degree of accuracy was observed (M = 85.57%, SE = 
1.23), with no group effect, F < 1, p = .77. This suggests that all groups had equal 
exposure to the CS in different contexts and acquired the additional operant responses.  
Transfer of avoidance  
 A 2 (generalization context) x 3 (group) rANOVA indicated a main effect of the 
generalization context on avoidance, F(1, 76) = 7.70, p = .007, ηp2 = 0.09. There was 
less transferred avoidance in the DEF context than in the ACQ context, t(78) = 2.64, p 
= .01 (see Figure 22a). This mirrors the findings of experiment 1 and supports the first 
hypothesis; a context change disrupted the transfer of avoidance. Specifically, there were  
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Figure 22. This graph indicates how avoidance transferred during the generalization test. 
(A) There was significantly more transferred avoidance in the acquisition context relative 
to the defusion context. (B) It is clear that C1 drove this effect. (C) The control group did 
not show any disrupted transfer. Error bars indicate standard error. ** p < .01 *** p 
< .001. 
 
fewer avoidance responses to C1 in the DEF context relative to the ACQ context, t(78) = 
3.39 p = .001 (see Figure 22b). The overall number of avoidance responses to C2 was low 
in the DEF and ACQ context, t(78) = 0.58, p = .56. Also, there was also a significant 
effect of group, F(2, 76) = 121.96, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.6. The control-group showed 
significantly more transferred avoidance in the DEF context relative to the MC-MR 
group, t(51) = 5.59, p < .001, and the LC-LR group, t(50) = 4.65, p < .001 (see Figure 
22c). This supports the second hypothesis; context change likely disrupted avoidance 
generalization because of the between-groups manipulation. However, planned 
comparisons failed to indicate any difference between the two experimental conditions. 
The broad and narrow groups produced similar amounts of transferred avoidance in the 
DEF context, t(51) < 1, p = .79. Contrary to the third hypothesis, there is no added benefit 
of experiencing the CSs in additional contexts and with additional responses. 
Transfer of approach  
 A 2 (generalization context) x 3 (groups) rANOVA indicated a main effect of the 
generalization context on approach, F(1, 76) = 4.65, p = .03, ηp2 = 0.06. There was 
significantly less approach in the DEF context than in the ACQ context, t(78) = 2.14, p 
= .04 (see Figure 23a). There were significantly fewer approach responses to the C2 in 
the DEF context relative to the ACQ context, t(78) = 3.21, p = .002 (see Figure 23b); a  
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Figure 23. This graph indicates how approach transferred during the generalization test. 
(A) There was significantly more transferred approach in the acquisition context relative 
to the defusion context. (B) It is clear that C2 drove this effect. (C) The control group did 
not show any disrupted transfer. Error bars indicate standard error. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
*** p < .001. 
 
context change disrupted the transfer of approach. A significant main effect of group was 
also observed, F(2, 76) = 129.70, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.63. The control-group demonstrated 
significantly more generalized approach in the DEF context relative to the broad group, 
t(51) = 5.19, p < .001, and the narrow group, t(50) = 4.10, p < .001. A context change 
likely disrupted approach because of the between-groups manipulation. While this 
corroborates the second hypothesis, there is no evidence of the third hypothesis. The 
broad and narrow groups behaved similarly in the DEF context, t(51) < 1, p = .76 (see 
Figure 23c).  
Other-responses 
 A 2 (stimulus) x 2 (generalization context) x 3 (group) rANOVA did not indicate 
a main effect of stimulus, F(1, 76) < 1, p = .90. Interestingly, there was a main effect of 
context, F(1, 71) = 6.01, p = .017, ηp2 = 0.07. Significantly more other responses were 
emitted in the DEF context (M = 1.94, SE = .32) than the ACQ context (M = 0.99, SE = 
2.9), t(78) = 2.43, p < .017. A main effect was also observed, F(2, 76) = 13.00, p < .001, 
ηp2 = 0.26. The control-group (who never acquired additional CSs responses) obviously 
emitted fewer other responses than the broad group (M = 3.96, SE = .89), t(51) = 4.39, p 
< .001, and the narrow group (M = 4.76, SE = .82), t(51) = 5.78, p < .001. On the other 
hand, the broad group and the narrow group did not differ, t < 1, p = .51. 
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Reaction times 
 A 2 (stimulus) x 2 (generalization context) x 3 (group) rANOVA did not indicate 
a main effect of stimulus, F(1, 71) = 1.39, p = .24. Importantly, there was an effect of 
context, F(1, 71) = 37.40, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.35. Reaction times were longer in the DEF 
context (M = 1366.77, SE = 56.55) relative to the ACQ context (M = 1058.63, SE = 
44.12), t(75) = 5.54, p < .001. A main effect of group was also observed, F(2, 71) = 3.55, 
p = .04, ηp2 = 0.09., The control-group (M = 1075.57, SE = 59.32) required less time to 
responded to stimuli than the broad group (M = 1304.69, SE = 75,43), t(50) = 2.47, p 
= .02, and the narrow group (M = 1258.83, SE = 78.37), t(47) = .120, p = .05 (not 
significant after Bonferoni’s correction). Also, there was no significant difference 
between responding in the broad group and the narrow group, t = 0.42, p = .68. 
Discussion 
 The central finding of Experiment 1 was replicated. Stimuli that were in derived 
equivalence with an aversively (or appetitively) conditioned stimulus evoked heightened 
avoidance (or approach) in the original context of acquisition but not in a novel context. 
Other evidence further demonstrates the utility of context-based manipulations. First, 
alternative operant responses were more likely to be emitted in the presence of equivalent 
stimuli in the novel context relative to the acquisition context. Second, the time required 
when responding to equivalent stimuli was significantly extended in the novel context. It 
seems that equivalent stimuli were ambiguous when presented in a novel context and not 
immediately treated as if they were threat-relevant. These findings collectively 
demonstrate that introducing novel contexts can interrupt the problematic transfer of fear-
related behaviors to innocuous stimuli. This is important to the extent that cognitive 
defusion is rooted in such context-based manipulations. 
 The current study also attempted to ascertain why a change in contexts interfered 
with the transfer of stimulus function. The inclusion of a control group was critical in this 
respect; no additional operant responses to conditioned stimuli were reinforced in any 
other contexts. Equivalent stimuli evoked indistinguishably high avoidance and approach 
in the novel context as well as the acquisition context. That is, the context change did not 
affect the transfer of fear-related behaviors in the control group. It is therefore likely that 
some aspect of the between-groups manipulation drove the main effect of generalization 
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context. It is unclear however why this was the case. Experiment 2 failed to isolate the 
specific features of the manipulation that were required. Cognitive defusion supposedly 
broadens the number of possible responses that can be made to problematic conceptual 
events; individuals acquire new ways of responding to target concepts such that no one 
response (e.g. treating them as literal truths) will dominate in an ambiguous or novel 
situation (see Blackledge, 2007; Dymond & Roche, 2009; Dymond, Roche, & Bennett, 
2013). We found no evidence of this potential mechanism. Participants were trained to 
emit multiple operant responses to the conditioned stimuli across multiple contexts (broad 
group) or a limited number of operant responses to the conditioned stimuli across a 
limited number of contexts (narrow group). Yet irrespective of this manipulation, a 
change in context always and equally disrupted the transfer of fear-related behaviors  
General Discussion 
 Cognitive defusion is a central and effective component of ACT. Evidence clearly 
points to its usefulness in alleviating psychological distress and functional impairments in 
anxiety (Arch, Wolitztky-Taylor, Eifert, & Craske, 2012), chronic pain and pain-related 
fear (Wetherell et al., 2011; Wicksell, Dahl, Magnusson, & Olsson, 2005), depression 
(Zettle, Rains, & Hayes, 2011) and stress (Brinkborg, Michanek, Hesser, & Berglund, 
2011) (also, see Blackledge & Drake, 2013; Hayes, 2004). Clinical analogue studies 
similarly show that cognitive defusion reduces the emotional impact and believability of 
negative self-referential thoughts (Masuda et al., 2004, 2009, 2010; Pilecki & McKay, 
2012) as well as (experimentally educed) avoidance behaviors (Luciano et al., 2014). 
There is, however, a stark difference in asking if cognitive defusion works and how it 
works. Scientific efforts have heavily focused on the former pursuit. Queries as to the 
psychological inner workings of this clinical construct have all the while been dealt with 
post-hoc supposition. It is generally assumed that these exercises involve a temporary 
disruption in the transfer of problematic functions by the introduction of novel contexts 
(Blackledge, 2007, 2015; Blackledge & Barnes-Holmes, 2009). A self-referential thought 
like “I’m a bad person”, for example, is less likely to translate into emotional responding 
when it is said in a different way: over-and-over again in a ‘milk, milk, milk exercise” or 
prefixed with the phrase “I’m having the thought that …” . The current study represents 
the first empirical verification of this process with respect to fear-relevant behaviors; the 
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transfer of avoidance (and approach) responding was indeed reduced by the introduction 
of novel contexts. It seems that the base assumption of cognitive defusion is valid. 
Overall, this is arguably a useful, albeit simple, step towards better understanding what 
cognitive defusion is on a fundamental learning psychology level.  
 It is important to note, previous research demonstrated that context-based 
manipulations affect the transfer of stimulus function. Wulfert and Hayes (1988) used a 
MTS task to establish two three-member stimulus equivalence categories 
(A1=B1=C1=D1 & A2=B2=C2=D2; against a green background). Second, two stimuli 
were shown and participants were trained to select one then the other. Choosing B1 
before B2 was reinforced in the presence of a high-pitched tone while choosing B2 before 
B1 was reinforced in the presence of a low-pitched tone. In a final test phase, participants 
(N = 4) were shown other category exemplars5. The derived response to these exemplars 
markedly differed depending on which tone was sounded. In the presence of high tone 
participants spontaneously choose C1 then C2. In the presence of the low tone however 
participants spontaneously choose C2 then C1. This finding suggested that the transfer of 
stimulus function is indeed sensitive to context-based manipulations. The current study 
complements this original work by examining context manipulations in a considerably 
larger sample, across multiple experiments and using emotionally relevant behavioral 
responses. In addition, an abundance of literature on ACT and cognitive defusion has 
emerged since the original Wulfert and Hayes study. In light of this new clinical 
information, there are potential benefits in revisiting and reimagining these earlier works 
like we have done. Such fundamental research into the transfer of stimulus function 
might provide a useful framework to explore the learning processes in new clinical tools 
like cognitive defusion.  
 Attempts to explain why contexts disrupt the transfer of fear related behaviors fell 
short. Cognitive defusion exercises supposedly broaden the repertoire of responding such 
                                                
5  Using an additional within-subject condition, different backgrounds established 
alternative stimulus equivalence categories (A1=B1=C2=C2 and A2=B2=C1=D1; against 
a red background color). This context also featured during the final test phase; the 
background ultimately moderated the impact of tones on derived sequential responding. 
When a red background was used and a high tone was played, C2 was selected first and 
C1 second. When a red background was used and a low tone was played, C1 was selected 
first and C2 second. 
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that no one response will dominate in an ambiguous situation. However, we found no 
evidence of this process. An alternative and fruitful approach might be to treat cognitive 
defusion as a variant of exposure. First, there is a procedural similarity between the two 
(Arch & Craske, 2008). Exposure involves the repeated presentation of specific objects 
until fear and the urge to avoid diminish (Hermans, Craske, Mineka, & Lovibond, 2006). 
In contrast, cognitive defusion involves the repetition of distressing words, which are 
symbolic of a core fear, until their emotional impact diminishes. It therefore appears that 
both techniques reduce problematic responses through repeated presentations; however, 
defusion is unique in that the affective control of words is extinguished and this might 
generalize to their actual referents (e.g. Roche, Kanter, Brown, Dymond, & Fogarty, 
2010; Vervoort et al., 2014). Second, adopting this perspective might reveal mechanisms-
of-change. If cognitive defusion is indeed a type of exposure, then it could be analogous 
to (a sort of) inhibitory learning. This is the acquisition of new stimulus associations (e.g. 
CS→ no US) that compete with previously learned excitatory associations (e.g. CS → 
US) (Bouton, 1993; Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek, & Vervliet, 2014). With respect 
to cognitive defusion exercises, a category exemplar (e.g. certain word) is directly 
associated with new, non-aversive outcomes such that the conceptual connection to an 
aversively conditioned stimulus (e.g. specific referents) is inhibited. Third, this approach 
might explain why context-based manipulations disrupt transfer in novel contexts. 
Excitatory associations can be activated (and fear can return) once stimuli are presented 
in contexts other than the one in which inhibition was acquired (Neumann, 2006; Thomas, 
Larson, & Ayres, 2003). However, this risk is reduced when inhibitory associations are 
installed across multiple contexts. For example, Vansteenwegen and colleagues (2007) 
repeatedly showed phobic students videos of a spider in one location or three different 
locations; fear generally reduced across extinction trials. There was a significant ‘return 
of fear’ when the spider was then presented in a new context but this was dampened in 
the multiple locations group. Evidence therefore suggests that inhibitory learning across 
multiple context extinction can interfere the re-activation of excitatory associations in 
novel contexts (Bouton, 1993; Craske al., 2014). A similar effect may have been 
replicated in the current studies. Conditioned stimuli were presented in extinction within 
one or two additional contexts. As a result, the equivalent stimulus’ conceptual 
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connection to the conditioned stimulus was likely to be inhibited in a novel context. In 
essence, this might suggest that the mechanism-of-change in defusion is not repertoire 
building per se, but rather experiencing stimuli in extinction across multiple contexts. 
This alternative is obviously and admittedly not a complete analysis. It is raised here as a 
possible alternative account that may offer an interesting avenue of inquiry. With further 
consideration and testing, this approach might reveal unique insights into the operation of 
cognitive defusion. 
 In conclusion, these laboratory studies show that it is indeed possible to 
manipulate the transfer of fear related behaviors between conceptually related stimuli. 
This was accomplished through the introduction of novel contexts. Overall, this 
investigation represents a helpful step for other researchers who are interested in the 
mechanisms-of-change in clinical techniques like cognitive defusion. In future, it will be 
important to investigate this effect using other proxies of fear, e.g. US expectancy ratings, 
self-reported fear and psychophysiological measurements. A critical limitation of the 
current study is indeed the absence of any direct measurement of fear. It cannot be 
objectively stated that the transfer of fear was itself reduced; instead, fear-related 
avoidance and approach behaviors were disturbed. Furthermore, it will be interesting to 
examine ecological validity of this study. It could make for an interesting study to isolate 
specific context-manipulations that would attenuate the transfer of fear between real-
world feared objects and their categorically related partners.  
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 The goal of this dissertation was to better understand category-level fear 
generalization. This describes the elicitation of fear by a neutral stimulus by virtue of its 
participation in a conceptual relation with an aversively conditioned stimulus. Some final 
thoughts are now offered. First, a summary of the principle findings is provided. Second, 
the relevance of these experimental studies to (i) psychopathology and (ii) concept 
learning is discussed. Finally, a few closing comments are offered.  
 
Summary 
Section 1: Similarity is not so simple. 
 Overgeneralization involves a transfer of fear to innocuous stimuli by virtue of 
their similarity to other threat-relevant stimuli. This similarity can be perceptually based 
when stimuli reside along a single physical continuum (Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, & 
Eelen, 2004). This similarity might also be arbitrary when physically dissimilar stimuli 
share a more conceptual relation (Dunsmoor & Murphy, 2015). These forms of 
generalization are rarely studied together; indeed, the impressive volume of perceptual 
generalization research often dampens the input of ‘non-perceptual’ generalization 
research. This discordance is problematic. Researchers might play to a false dichotomy 
wherein fear generalization is regarded as either perceptual or non-perceptual (e.g. 
Garcia-Marques & Ferreria, 2011). In the future, this artificial divide could disrupt the 
external validity of generalization research. The events that feature in conditioning 
episodes feature both perceptual features and conceptual information, not just one or the 
other. Chapter 2 therefore examined whether the perceptual and conceptual features of 
stimuli concurrently facilitate fear generalization. A laboratory procedure established two 
artificial categories of physically distinct stimuli and a member of one category was then 
associated with an aversive US. The generalization of fear to (i) other category members 
and (ii) perceptual variants of these members was examined. As predicted, both 
conceptual and perceptual similarity facilitated the transfer of fear and avoidance. These 
findings highlight how a complexity of conceptual and perceptual stimulus relations can 
intensify the expansion of fear responding. In real-life, this combination of perceptual and 
conceptual generalization might create a nexus of events that elicit intense fear and 
debilitating avoidance.  
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 Dougher, Augustson and colleagues originally demonstrated the transfer of fear 
responses through stimulus equivalence categories (Augustson & Dougher, 1997; 
Dougher, Augustson, Markham, Greenway, & Wulfert, 1994). This basic effect has been 
replicated a number of times and it is often asserted that the findings relate to human 
anxiety, in general (Dymond, & Roche, 2009). However, anxiety is a broad construct and 
the topography of feared events widely varies (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). The majority of 
category-level generalization research arguably mirrors the emergence of feared objects 
in specific phobia. In these studies, distinct objects prompt heightened fear and avoidance 
when in derived equivalence with other aversively conditioned objects (Augustson & 
Dougher, 1997; Vervoort, Vervliet, Bennett, & Baeyens, 2014). Other studies may reflect 
instances in which individuals struggle with aversive and unwanted verbal events, such as 
sexual or violent thoughts in obsessive-compulsive disorder (McGinn & Saunderson, 
1994). For example, Dymond and colleagues have indicated that neutral words can elicit 
avoidance behavior due to a derived equivalence with an aversively conditioned stimulus 
(Dymond, Schlund, Roche, Whelan, Richards, & Davies, 2011).  
 The current dissertation extended the scope of inquiry by considering the fear of 
proprioceptive events. Chronic pain patients, for example, often report a (pain-related) 
fear of movements that never featured in painful episodes. In Chapter 3, an artificial 
stimulus equivalence category was established in which non-words and joystick arm 
movements were equivalent. Non-words were then associated with a pain-US. During a 
final generalization test, joystick arm movements from within the same stimulus 
equivalence category were observed to elicit pain-related fear. This finding might 
highlight a novel pathway for the emergence of pain-related fear in the absence of a 
painful episode. Chapter 3 consequentially stands to the trans-diagnostic potential of 
category-level generalization. Further research may also be beneficial. For instance, it is 
not yet known whether category-level generalization exacerbates the fear of interceptive 
states. These states are highly relevant and feature in numerous anxiety and health-related 
disorders. It includes issues like dizziness in panic disorder (Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow, 
2001), respiratory sensations in asthma-related anxiety (Jansssens, Verleden, De Peuter, 
Petersen, & Van den Bergh, 2011), and visceral sensations in irritable bowl syndrome 
(Labus et al., 2004). 
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 As a secondary objective, Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the impact of different 
learning pathways on fear generalization. In addition to direct experience, fear can also be 
acquired by hearing or reading about the threat-value of a stimulus (Rachman, 1978). 
Despite the importance of instructed fear in real-life anxiety (e.g. Muris & Fields, 2010), 
there were no studies examining whether this pathway could excite perceptual and/or 
category-level fear generalization. Chapter 2 addressed this lacuna. An instructed fear-
conditioning paradigm was used in which non-words were paired with threatening 
information, e.g. “MAU is dangerous”. The generalization of fear to other stimuli was 
still observed despite the fact that no CS-US pairings were encountered.  
 Chapter 3 then compared the activity of two learning pathways. Using a 
between-groups design, non-words were associated with a pain-US through direct 
experience or through verbal information. Both pathways excited the category-level 
generalization of pain-related fear to joystick arm movements. In addition, direct 
experience with CS-US presentations resulted in stronger acquisition and generalization 
effects. Participants who experienced the CS-US pairings rated (i) the aversively 
conditioned stimulus as more unpleasant and (ii) conceptually similar movements as 
more fear-relevant and unpleasant. This may be valuable information when considering 
the etiology of anxious suffering. Perhaps the risk of overgeneralization increases once 
patients directly experience an aversive outcome. 
 It is important to note, however, that the study of learning pathways in fear 
generalization was secondary in this dissertation. Future research should prioritize this 
issue. An experimental study could re-examine whether learning pathways indeed 
differentially affect acquisition and generalization. It could be important to consider 
whether more specific threat information would lead to stronger acquisition effects, e.g. 
participants could be told that “MAU will be followed by an electric stimulus” as 
opposed to “MAU is bad” (e.g. Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, Brass, & Kalisch, 2014). 
Lastly, such an experimental study could test whether learning pathways are differentially 
sensitive to extinction learning. It could be that fears acquired through direct experience 
are more difficult to extinguish then fears acquired through verbal instructions (Bennett, 
Stuyf, Scheveneels, & Baeyens, 2015a). 
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Section 2: Conceptual opposition hampers fear generalization, at least. 
 Our focus expanded across Chapters 4 and 5. Consideration was given to complex 
conceptual relations that exceed fundamental notions of similarity. An influential study 
by Dymond and colleagues previously suggested that conceptual relations dynamically 
influence fear generalization (Dymond, Roche, Forsyth, Whelan, & Rhoden, 2008). 
Behavioral avoidance specifically generalized to stimuli that were in derived equivalence, 
but in derived opposition, with an aversively conditioned stimulus. While somewhat 
intuitive, this study provided an important observation. A conceptual relation between 
stimuli alone is not sufficient for fear generalization; rather, the qualitative nature of the 
relation is decisive. However, their technique was limited. Opposite stimuli were not only 
in derived opposition with an aversively conditioned stimulus, but also in derived 
equivalence with a conditioned inhibitor. This latter equivalence relation may 
alternatively explain why the opposite stimuli did not elicit heightened avoidance. 
Chapter 4 therefore replicated this experiment and controlled for this confounding factor. 
In our procedure, a novel stimulus acted as a conditioned inhibitor during Pavlovian 
conditioning, and not the opposite stimulus. As a result, the opposite stimulus was only in 
derived opposition with an aversively conditioned stimulus. The main findings of Chapter 
4 were still consistent with those of Dymond and colleagues. Stimuli that were in derived 
equivalence (but not derived opposition) with an aversively conditioned stimulus elicited 
heightened avoidance and US expectancy as well as more negative self-reported stimulus 
valence. In summary, Chapter 4 reaffirmed that conceptual relations can differentially 
impact fear generalization. 
 The experimental study reported in Chapter 4 was guilty of some limitations. 
Therefore, we decided to replicate this study and amend these procedural issues. 
Participant dropout was high in Chapter 4. Around 30% of participants failed to derive 
the necessary stimulus relations and were excluded from the subsequent statistical 
analysis. The relational MTS task was therefore simplified in Chapter 5. First, 
participants were explicitly informed that their task was to learn relation between non-
words and shapes. It was also stipulated that the important relations were ‘sameness’ and 
‘opposition’. Second, familiar Flemish words for ‘same’ (hetzelfde als) and ‘opposite’ 
(tegengestelde) were used when training the baseline stimulus relations, e.g. [Δ] hetzelfde 
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als [S1] & [Δ] tegengestelde [O1]. This contrasted with the study reported in Chapter 4 
wherein novel cues prompt relational responses, e.g. one wingdings character was trained 
to prompt ‘same’ and ‘opposite’ relational responses. Finally, participants were given 
continuous feedback using a scoreboard. This incremented by one (or reset to zero) when 
a correct (or incorrect) response was made. At the conclusion of this experimental study, 
participants completed a brief test for derived stimulus relations. A substantially reduced 
failure rate was observed; just 7% of participants did not derive the necessary stimulus 
relations. This finding is likely to be useful for future category-level generalization 
research (see Dymond & Whelan, 2010). 
 In general, Chapter 5 simplified the opening training trials of a relational MTS 
task and this enhanced the accuracy of the derived stimulus relation. This suggests that 
derived stimulus relations pivot on adequately acquired (baseline) stimulus-stimulus 
relations, a finding reflected in other stimulus equivalence researchers. For instance, 
Eikeseth, Rosales-Ruiz, Duarte and Baer (1997) established a set of baseline stimulus-
stimulus relations, e.g. A1(2)!B1(2) and B1(2)!C1(2), and then examined the 
emergence of derived (symmetrical transitive) relations, i.e. C1(2)!A1(2). During a final 
test, findings revealed that 48% of participants adequately recalled the baseline relations 
and only 50% derived the appropriate stimulus relations. A subsequent replication, by 
Smeets and colleagues, saw 100% of participants adequately recall the baseline relations 
and 77% of participants now derived (symmetrical transitive) stimulus relations (Smeets, 
Dymond, & Roche, 2000). Therefore, enhancing the acquisition of baseline relations may 
be one way to achieve more accurate derived relational responding.  
 The use of retrospective US expectancy ratings during the study reported in 
Chapter 4 was another drawback. This measurement relies on memory and was likely 
insensitive to subtle differences between stimuli during the generalization test. For 
instance (in Chapter 4), the equivalent stimulus prompted moderate US expectancy 
ratings that did not differ from the within-subject control stimulus. This could simply 
suggest that participants were unsure whether the equivalent stimulus actually predicted a 
US. But the story could be more complex. Participants may have originally expected the 
US to follow the equivalent stimulus; afterwards, some participants avoided while others 
did not. Avoiders failed to experience this stimulus in extinction and could not correct 
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their threat beliefs. Conversely, non-avoiders experienced this stimulus in extinction and 
could therefore correct the original threat beliefs. As a result, the former group would 
report high US expectancy ratings for the equivalent stimulus while the latter group 
would report low US expectancy. The mean retrospective US expectancy for the entire 
group would thus be moderate or middling. Chapter 5 employed trial-by-trial (online) US 
expectancy ratings instead. Results indicated that the aversively conditioned stimulus and 
its conceptual equivalent initially evoked indistinguishable US expectancy ratings. As the 
generalization test then progressed, expectancy ratings for the equivalent stimulus (but 
not the conditioned stimulus) declined. In addition, the differential impact of avoidance 
behavior on trial-by-trial US expectancy ratings was clearly documented. Two thirds of 
participants avoided the equivalent stimulus. These avoiders attributed the absence of the 
US to the avoidance response and, therefore, US expectancy ratings for this stimulus 
remained high. One third of participants did not avoid the equivalent stimulus. Non-
avoiders learned that the US never coincided with the termination of the equivalent 
stimulus and, therefore, US expectancy ratings for this stimulus diminished. Overall, 
considerably more information was obtained using this more sensitive dependent variable.  
 As well as resolving certain procedural limitations, Chapter 5 sought to isolate 
conditions that promote the category-level fear generalization. First, it was examined 
whether an earlier opportunity to designate the derived stimulus relations would enhance 
generalization (designate condition). Participants completed either a test for derived 
stimulus relations or no test. It was reasoned that completing the test would explicate the 
derived relations and, therefore, render them more likely to influence generalization. 
Second, we examined the importance of how the derived relations were designated 
(format condition). Participants completed a computer-based test for derived stimulus 
relations or a written-assessment. The computer-based assessment was more structured 
and involved on-screen prompts and visual feedback; we thought this to be a more 
explicit format. Crossing these factors generated four experimental groups; test-computer 
group, no test-computer group, test-written group and no test-written group. In contrast to 
our predictions, generalization effects did not differ between groups. No effects of the 
designation and format conditions were observed nor was there a significant interaction 
effect. This finding suggests that the explicit rehearsal of relations is not immediately 
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important; rather, fear is likely to transfer between stimuli once a clear conceptual 
connection could potentially be derived. For instance, recent research by Dunsmoor and 
Murphy (2014) similarly suggest that the clarity, or precision, of a conceptual connection 
mediates generalization and not necessarily the degree to which a relation is rehearsed. In 
these experimental studies, stronger generalization effects were observed when the 
aversively conditioned stimuli are clearly typical category exemplars (e.g. a sparrow or 
humming bird) as opposed to atypical exemplars (e.g. an emu or penguin).  
 Chapter 5 lastly investigated whether certain traits impact on category-level 
generalization. Particular attention was paid to the possible contribution of cognitive 
fusion. This is a central feature of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) that 
describes the propensity to abstract, and inflexibly adhere to, verbal rules or relations 
about environmental events (see Hayes, Stosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Individual differences 
in cognitive fusion were assessed using a recently developed 13-item questionnaire 
(CFQ; Gillanders et al., 2014). It was reasoned that individuals who reported more 
cognitive fusion would (i) be more likely to derive the relational connections between 
stimuli and (ii) more be more likely to generalize in accordance with these relations. 
Therefore, we predicted that higher self-reported cognitive fusion would be associated 
with more generalization to the equivalent stimulus and less generalization to the 
opposite stimulus. This was not the case; performance on the CFQ had no association 
with generalized fear. Again, it seems as though our attempts to isolate limiting, or 
facilitating, conditions for category-level generalization fell short. Nevertheless, this 
finding is potentially informative. Cognitive fusion is supposedly rooted in learning 
processes such as derived relational responding. If this is true then the self-report measure 
of cognitive fusion and the behavioral measure derived relational responding ought to co-
vary. This null finding might cast doubt over the validity of the CFQ as a measure of 
cognitive fusion. Indeed, many of the CFQ items do not specifically address an 
individual’s capacity to abstract verbal rules and relations but rather the emotional 
struggle that comes from these verbal rules, e.g. “my thoughts cause me distress or 
emotional pain” or “I get so caught up in my thoughts I’m unable to do the things I most 
want to do”.  
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 The findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5 clearly demonstrate that derived 
opposite relations hamper generalization. The question remains as to whether stimuli in 
derived opposition with an aversively conditioned stimulus exhibit any exclusive 
properties. We postulated that opposite stimuli could act as safety cues that actively 
signal the absence of threat. Therefore, Chapter 6 investigated whether a neutral 
stimulus could inhibit fear because of its derived opposition to an aversively conditioned 
stimulus; this was referred to as derived inhibition. Such a mechanism might represent 
the spontaneous emergence of safety signals in the aftermath of a threatening episode. A 
person who suffered a traumatic car accident, for example, might quickly interpret the 
near-opposite scenario to be a source of safety, i.e. being inside in their home (Charlton 
& Thompson, 1996). Participants were trained such that two stimuli (CS1 & CS2) were 
opposites and one was then associated with an aversive US (CS1+). In order to study 
inhibition, we inspected the generalization gradient. We probed for fear in response 
(generalization) stimuli that varied in physical similarity between CS1 and CS2. It was 
expected that CS2 would inhibit fear and restrict responding to stimuli that more closely 
resembled CS1+. This could be graphically represented as a steep generalization gradient. 
This was in comparison to two control groups who were (i) trained such that CS1 and 
CS2 were merely different or (ii) never given the opportunity to derive any specific 
relation. These groups were expected to produce comparatively flatter generalization 
gradients. The results did not reveal any between-group differences. Irrespective of the 
stimulus relations, US expectancy and fear ratings decreased as the generalization stimuli 
became increasingly dissimilar from the conditioned stimulus. In summary, this chapter 
did not report any evidence of derived inhibition.  
 The use of inadequate stimuli could account for the null findings in Chapter 6. 
The extreme ends of the generalization gradient were an oval and a trapezoid. Therefore, 
stimuli could be already arranged into distinct categories- 4 types of ovals and 4 types of 
trapezoids, and only one of these categories was associated with an aversive outcome. 
This pre-experimental bias could have easily influenced the generalization gradients for 
all groups, overshadowing our between-groups manipulation. Therefore, Chapter 6 
concluded with some directions for future research. In order to study generalization 
gradients, stimuli should only differ along a single salient dimension. For instance, 
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perceptual generalization researchers typically make extensive use of concentric circles 
(see Lissek et al., 2010).  
 Although Chapter 6 found no evidence of derived inhibition, the effect is still 
plausible. Previous research demonstrated that the reinforcing-value of neutral stimuli 
shifts in accordance with derived opposite relations (Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2004; 
experiment 2, 3 and 4). In these experimental studies, a neutral stimulus was first paired 
with an unpleasant outcome, i.e. the loss of points (CSneg). Second, a relational MTS 
task was introduced (e.g. Chapter 4 & 5); participants were trained such that (i) a one 
neutral stimulus (GSneg) was in derived equivalence with the conditioned punisher and 
(ii) another neutral stimulus (GSpos) was in derived opposition the conditioned punisher. 
A final test examined whether these neutral stimuli could differentially shape responding 
in a ‘simultaneous discrimination’ task. Two items were presented and the participants 
were instructed to select one. The GSneg (equivalent to the conditioned punisher) always 
followed one item while the GSpos (opposite to the conditioned punisher) always 
followed the other. Results indicated a preference for selecting the latter item. That is, the 
frequency of selecting an item increased when it was followed by the presentation of a 
derived opposite stimulus (GSpos). It therefore appears that stimuli in derived opposition 
with a conditioned punisher did more then just become non-aversive. Indeed, the function 
of these stimuli altered (or transformed) and they acted as an appetitive reinforcer (also, 
see Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000). This evidence certainly bodes well for any future attempt 
to isolate derived inhibition.  
Section 3: Category-level fear generalization can be influenced. 
 The majority of experimental studies reported in this dissertation explored the 
conditions that promote category-level fear generalization. The question posed towards 
the conclusion of this research project was as to whether this phenomenon could be 
attenuated. As a starting point, we turned to a clinical application that is inspired from 
derived relational responding research, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; 
Hayes et al., 1999).  
 ACT is a relatively recent addition to the family of behavioral and cognitive 
therapies. Here, clients learn to safely experience psychologically distressing events 
while adopting flexible behavioral strategies in the service of valued goals. ACT posits 
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that human psychopathology results from an over-abstraction, and inflexible adherence to, 
conceptual rules or relations about our environment and our selves. The finding reported 
of Chapter 2-5, for example, indicate that objectively innocuous can elicit fear and 
avoidance by virtue of an abstract, conceptual similarity to a conditioned stimulus. ACT 
employs a number of protocols that purportedly reduce the (problematic) impact of 
conceptual relations on emotional responding. These are collectively known as cognitive 
defusion techniques. Here, an individual is guided to experience the process of generating 
conceptual relations, rather than experience the literal content of cognitions. An anxious 
patient might be encouraged, for example, to prefix difficult thoughts with a stipulation, 
e.g. “I’m having the thought that… [I’m going to panic]”. It is assumed that conceptual 
relations are less likely to affect emotional responding when experienced in such novel 
contexts (Blackledge, 2007). Chapter 7 empirically examined this possibility. That is, we 
investigated whether context-based manipulations disrupt category-level fear 
generalization. Stimulus equivalence categories were first established in which novel 
shapes participated in derived equivalence relations. Within a specific acquisition context, 
(i) a member of one equivalence category was paired with an aversive outcome (USneg) 
and conditioned to control avoidance (i.e. CSneg) while (ii) a member of the other 
category was associated with an appetitive outcome (USpos) and conditioned to control 
approach (i.e. CSpos). A final generalization test examined whether equivalent stimuli 
would evoke heightened fear-related behaviors in a previously unseen (defusion) context 
as well as the original acquisition context. The results demonstrated that avoidance and 
approach behaviors selectively generalized to equivalent stimuli in the acquisition context, 
but not in the defusion context. This finding suggests that the transfer of fear-related 
behaviors can indeed be disrupted through context-based manipulations.  
 The two experimental studies reported in Chapter 7 also investigated the 
conditions that allowed contexts-based manipulations to disrupt generalization. Findings 
revealed that it is not sufficient to simply present equivalent stimuli in a novel context. In 
fact, a novel context only disrupted generalization when alternative operant responses to 
conditioned stimuli were reinforced across different contexts (Chapter 7, experiment 2). It 
may be necessary to broaden ways in which individuals can respond to problematic 
conceptual events; new ways of responding to category exemplars are needed such that 
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no one response will dominate in an ambiguous situation (see Blackledge, 2007; Dymond, 
Roche, & Bennett, 2013). But there was a caveat. There was no added benefit in 
increasing the number of operant response options and/or the number of possible contexts. 
That is, the ‘broadness’ of new learning did not seem important, per se. In conclusion, we 
tentatively suggest that disrupting category-level generalization involves the acquisition 
of new associations and relations surrounding a conditioned stimulus. This new learning 
may then compete with the conditioned stimulus’ connection to other category 
exemplars- thus reducing the likelihood of category-level generalization. However, if the 
category exemplars are encountered in the original acquisition context, then it is the 
association with the conditioned stimulus and the US that are excited. Cognitive defusion 
techniques are, in this way, framed as a sort of extinction learning. 
 Nevertheless, this explanation is far from complete. We consider these final 
experimental studies to be the bedrock for future and more extensive research. It will be 
important to continue investigating the conditions that allow context-based manipulations 
to disrupt fear generalization. Such information might ultimately contribute to a coherent 
framework that informs clinical applications like cognitive defusion procedures. In 
addition, it will be interesting to examine ecological validity of these experimental studies. 
An experimental study could replicate this protocol but replace de novo stimulus 
equivalence categories with real-world feared objects and their categorically related 
partners. From there, it could be directly determined whether context-based 
manipulations can disrupt conceptual meaning of problematic events (e.g. Masuda, Hayes, 
Sackett, & Twohig, 2004). 
 
Derived relational responding and psychopathology 
 The goal of this dissertation was to better understand category-level fear 
generalization. We supposed that derived relational responding underlies this clinical 
phenomenon. This is no small assumption; rather, it is the crux of much of our research. 
As such, it would be remiss of me to not elaborate on the strength of this claim. I will 
now discuss the connection between derived relational responding, as studied in the 
laboratory, and real-world cases of category-level fear generalization in human anxiety. 
This analysis, firstly, affords an important opportunity to gauge the clinical relevance of 
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the current research (i.e. where are we now?). Gaps in the evidence might, secondly, 
reveal themselves thus establishing necessary steps for the future (i.e. where do we go?). 
Where are we now? 
 Vervliet and Raes (2013) laid out systematic criteria that help estimate the 
external relevance of experimental psychopathology research. These guidelines provide a 
useful structure for the current discussion. First, face validity captures the 
phenomenological similarity between an experimental model (e.g. derived relational 
responding studies) and the psychological phenomenon of interest (i.e. category-level 
fear generalization). Second, predictive validity indicates the degree to which an 
experimental model predicts performance of the real-world phenomenon. Third, 
diagnostic validity is when performance in an experimental model relates to 
abnormalities in the real-world phenomenon. A final criterion is construct validity. This 
entails a theoretical framework that coherently accounts for the relationship between the 
experimental model and the psychological phenomenon.  
 Category-level fear generalization features across several anxiety disorders. In the 
case of OCD, a catalog of items that are physically dissimilar (e.g. washing powder, 
ammonia, cleaning gels, aerosols) but conceptually alike (i.e. corrosive household agents) 
trigger heightened fear and repetitive coping behaviors (McGinn & Sanderson, 1999). In 
the context of specific phobia, a person with a fear of blood-injections might also dread 
conceptually (or symbolically) related events like white coats or the scent of a hospital 
(Dunsmoor, Martin, & LaBar, 2012). Yule and colleagues also provided an example of 
category-level fear generalization in PTSD. After experiencing a traumatic ferry accident 
(i.e. the rapid sinking of the ‘Jupiter’ in October 1988), adolescent survivors reported a 
heightened fear of conceptually similar situations; other modes of transportation became 
a source of psychological distress (Yule, Bolton, Udwin, Boyle, O’Ryan, & Nurrish, 
2000; Yule, Udwin, & Murdoch, 1990). These instances could be summarized in stating, 
the fear response to an event can be in relation to another (physically dissimilar) threat-
relevant event that is not immediately present. This closely resembles our experimental 
protocols; derived relational responding involves reacting to one stimulus in terms of its 
relation to another physically dissimilar stimulus, which is not shown on-screen. If one 
member of a stimulus equivalence category is associated with an aversive outcome, then 
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participants respond to other members as if they were previously associated with that 
outcome (e.g. Bennett, Vervoort, Boddez, Hermans & Baeyens, 2015b; Dymond et al., 
2011). Additionally, if one member of an opposite-set is associated with an aversive 
outcome, then participants respond to other members as if they were negatively correlated 
with that outcome (Bennett, Hermans, Dymond, Vervoort, & Baeyens, 2015c; Dymond et 
al., 2008; also, see Chapter 5 & 6).  
 These observations highlight a degree of similarity between derived relational 
responding, as shaped in the laboratory, and real-world instances of category-level fear 
generalization. In essence, there is sound face validity and this suggests our experimental 
studies are fundamentally promising. But it must be noted that face validity is the weakest 
criterion proposed by Vervliet and Raes (2013). Indeed, just that two events appear 
similar does not mean they are the same.  
 The type of derived relational responding research reported in this dissertation 
predominantly features proof-of-principle, laboratory studies. The majority of 
experiments report on the transfer of specific fear responses (e.g. avoidance, conditioned 
suppression, extinction, pain-related fear, US expectancy & conditioned arousal) in 
accordance with different types of derived stimulus relations (e.g. atypical-typical 
exemplars, equivalence relations & opposite relations) (Augustson & Dougher, 1997; 
Allcoat, Greville, Newton, & Dymond, 2015; Bennett et al., 2015b, 2015c; Boyle, Roche, 
Dymond, & Hermans, 2015; Dunsmoor, Martin, & LaBar, 2012; Dunsmoor & Murphy, 
2014; Dymond et al., 2011; Vervoort et al., 2014). A limited number of attempts have 
been made to extend beyond these basic (but informative) designs. For instance, only a 
few studies have attempted to isolate when (or the conditions under which) derived 
stimulus relations influence fear responding (Dunsmoor & Murphy, 2015; also Chapters 
5 & 7). Also, the present literature almost exclusively describes derived relational 
responding in non-anxious student populations. Just one experimental study recently 
demonstrated that an elevated fear of spiders is affiliated with a heightened transfer of 
fear through stimulus equivalence categories (Dymond, Schlund, Roche, & Whelan, 
2014; also, see Leslie, Tierney, & Robinson, 1993).  
 In general, efforts to advance derived relational responding research beyond the 
laboratory have been slow. Two critical pieces of information are resultantly absent from 
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our knowledge base. First, it is unclear whether derived relational responding manifests 
differently in anxious individuals who report excessive category-level fear generalization. 
Second, it is unclear this whether this learning mechanism becomes dysfunctional and 
(in)-directly contributes to overgeneralized fear and anxious suffering. So while much has 
been achieved, considerably more translational research is required.  
Where do we go? 
 Effort should be spent in elucidating the clinical relevance of derived relational 
responding. Only then will the functional knowledge gathered in this dissertation 
(regarding how and when this learning mechanism affects fear) be useful in predicting 
and influencing category-level fear generalization. 
 A fruitful next step is to conduct cross-sectional research studies that recruit 
(sub)-clinical samples (e.g. Dymond et al., 2014). This could act as a simple litmus test, 
indicating whether abnormalities in derived relational responding correlate with category-
level fear generalization and anxious suffering. One possibility is that derived stimulus 
relations rigidly regulate fear responding, over and above direct experience, in those 
struggling with anxiety (Blackledge, 2007; Hayes et al., 1999). For instance, aspects of an 
environment that are conceptually similar (or opposite) to threat-relevant events might be 
inflexible treated as such even in the absence of actual evidence. A second possibility is 
that derived stimulus relations cease to gate the spreading of fear. Fear might generalize 
between two stimuli simply because they are related in any given way (Hasson & 
Glucksberg, 2006; Herbert, Deutsch, Sutterlin, Kubler, & Pauli, 2011). A person 
struggling with a distressing event, for example, might seek solace in the presence of its 
conceptual opposite. The opposite event could later elicit fear by virtue of its basic 
association with the problematic event. Or alternatively, the story could be more dynamic. 
Perhaps the conceptual features of feared objects/situations are only germane in some 
anxiety disorders (e.g. OCD or generalized anxiety disorder) and not others (e.g. Panic 
Disorder). In general, a collection of cross-sectional studies is needed to examine the 
ubiquity of (abnormal) derived relational responding and category-level fear 
generalization (e.g. Lissek et al, 2015). Such cross-sectional studies will substantially 
contribute to the diagnostic validity of this brand of derived relational responding 
research.  
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 It is still unknown whether (abnormal) derived relational responding plays a 
causal role in the emergence of category-level fear generalization. Longitudinal research 
will be highly beneficial in filling this lacuna. For instance, a study could investigate 
whether the transfer of fear through derived stimulus relations predicts later reports of 
category-level fear generalization as well as other anxious symptoms (e.g. Lenaert, 
Boddez, Griffith, Vervliet, Schruers, & Hermans 2014). Longitudinal intervention studies 
could also be useful. For instance, a study could examine the impact of structured 
exercises that strengthening derived relational responding (e.g. Cassidy, Roche, & Hayes, 
2011; Colbert, Roche, & Cassidy, 2015; Hayes, Stewart, O’Conner, & Roche, 2015) on 
future reports of category-level fear generalization and anxiety. This information would 
augment the diagnostic validity of derived relational responding research. In addition, 
these studies would be instrumental in developing a theoretical account of the connection 
between derived relational responding and category-level fear generalization (i.e. 
construct validity). 
 Studies have identified certain conditions in which derived stimulus relations do 
not influence fear responding. The qualitative nature of a stimulus relation has, for 
example, been shown to gate the transfer of fear, e.g. derived opposition hampers fear 
generalization while similarity does not (Bennett et al., 2015c; Dymond et al., 2007). 
Also, novel context can disrupt the transfer of fear-related behaviors in certain situations 
(Chapter 7). Efforts to isolate such limiting conditions should obviously continue. In 
addition, clinical analog studies should be conducted as a follow-up step. These 
experiments should evaluate whether the same factors that moderate the transfer of fear to 
category exemplars in the lab also moderate real-world cases of category-level fear 
generalization. One analog study could, for example, examine whether the conditions 
associated with reduced fear transfer in Chapter 7 also influence the category-level fear 
generalization with familiar (threat-relevant) stimuli. Conversely, it could also be 
examined whether clinical techniques that reduce category-level generalization also affect 
performance in our experimental protocols. For instance, Luciano and colleagues argued 
that a cognitive defusion exercise reduced the transfer of avoidance (and approach) 
through a stimulus equivalence category (Luciano et al., 2014). This study first 
established two stimulus equivalence categories using a MTS task. Members of one 
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category were conditioned to control avoidance responding and members of the other 
category were conditioned to control approach responding. Before testing for the transfer 
of avoidance (and approach) to other category exemplars, participants completed either a 
15-20 minute distractor task or a 15-20 minute brief cognitive defusion exercise. Results 
indicated that those who completed the defusion exercises were less likely to transfer 
avoidance (and approach) to other members of the stimulus equivalence category6. In 
general, predictive validity can be earned by examining whether limiting conditions 
isolated in laboratory also influence real-world cases of category-level generalization 
(and vice versa). These efforts could lead to the development of evidence-based clinical 
techniques that are grounded in known learning mechanism (e.g. Craske, Treanor, 
Conway, Zbozinek, & Vervliet, 2014). 
 In summary, derived relational responding might underlie real-world instances of 
category-level fear generalization. Although we can boast promising fundamental 
research, this core assumption is far concrete. Progress requires concerted efforts to 
determine whether (i) derived relational responding manifest differently in anxious 
populations and whether (ii) these abnormalities contribute to fear overgeneralization on 
a category-level. 
Derived relational responding and concepts 
 The study of derived relational responding originated from the field of Behavior 
Analysis (e.g. Sidman, 1971; Hayes & Hayes, 1992). Accordingly, this learning 
mechanism is functionally defined in respect to a history of observable environmental 
events. For instance, derived relational responding could be defined as the emergence of 
accurate responding to previously untrained stimulus-stimulus relations following the 
reinforcement of responses to other stimulus-stimulus relations (Cooper, Heron, & 
Heward, 2007; Sidman, 1992). But the unique properties of derived relational responding 
                                                
6 This experiment had number of procedural drawbacks. For instance, the cognitive 
defusion exercise may have simply functioned as an instruction to not avoid. This is 
because the wording of the exercise stated that avoidance is problematic and is not 
always necessary. Also, the control group was introduced post-hoc. And finally, 
generalized avoidance may have actually been directly reinforced; the US followed 
equivalent stimuli in the absence of an avoidance response. Nevertheless, the principle 
behind the study is sound; interventions that affect category-level fear generalization in 
real-life (e.g. cognitive defusion) should also influence our experimental procedures.  
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allowed researchers to contribute to cognitive domains where Behavior Analysis was 
traditionally silent (e.g. De Houwer, 2011, 2014; Friman, Hayes, & Wilson, 1998; Horne 
& Lowe, 1988; Stewart, McElwee, & Ming, 2013). Indeed, this complex behavior 
arguably resembles human symbolic (or conceptual) processing. This is the ability for 
one item to spontaneously and arbitrarily represent a different item (Rotheram-Fuller & 
Kim, 2013). The current dissertation employed derived relational responding as a way to 
understand cognitive events like conceptual processing and categorization (e.g. Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2005). As a final discussion topic, I will outline the evidence suggesting 
that this (functional) learning mechanism relates to these (cognitive) constructs. Again, 
the systematic criteria described by Vervliet & Raes (2013) will be used to structure the 
discussion. 
 Face validity. ‘Category’ and ‘concept’ are typical defined in cognitive terms. A 
category is a collection of mentally represented items that cohere or belong together 
(Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002). A concept is the ‘knowledge’ that facilitates the 
categorization process. In this way, concepts afford structure to our world by allowing 
environmental events to be grouped. On a behavioral level, a similar activity observed 
when a participant emits a derived relational response. After learning a number of 
baseline stimulus-stimulus relations (AB & AC) participants are likely to accurately 
and coherently respond to (or group) stimuli with respect to these relations (BC & C
A). Therefore, derived relational responding seems to resemble a type of (relational) 
category formation. 
 Zentall and colleagues (2002) further posited that different forms of concepts 
bring about different forms of categories. Some of these are more complex than others. 
For instance, a concept might be perceptually based. Knowledge of formal attributes (e.g. 
‘triangles have three angle’) can allow similar objects to be grouped together (i.e. 
‘anything with three angles can be classed as a triangle’). Alternatively, higher-order 
concepts can be more complex (i.e. relational) and arbitrary (i.e. non-perceptual). The 
written word ‘SHAPE’ or sound “triangle”, for example, bare no physical similarity to 
three-angled-objects but individuals can still class these events together (e.g. Sidman, 
1971). These characteristics of arbitrary, relational categories are apparent in our 
behavioral protocols. Derived relational responding entails the emergence of complex 
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connections between physically distinct stimuli (e.g. auditory sounds, proprioceptive 
movements and physical objects; Chapter 2 & 3). Interestingly, the capacity to construct 
such arbitrary and relational categories may be a central feature of human verbal-
cognitive processes (Dymond, 2014; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001; Horne & 
Lowe, 1998; Sidman, 1971). If this is the case, then derived relational responding could 
specifically reflect verbal categories formation (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2005). 
 These observations afford face validity to the assumption that derived relational 
responding represents (verbal) categories. But as previously discussed, face validity is the 
weakest criterion for validity.  
 Predictive validity. There is evidence to suggest that performance on derived 
relational responding tasks (e.g. relational MTS task) relates to verbal-cognitive 
processes in general. A collection of cross-sectional studies, by O’Hora and colleagues, 
found correlations between derived relational responding and scores on the Wechsler 
Adults Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III). Participants who emitted accurate derived 
relational responding also demonstrated higher full-scale IQ and verbal-cognitive ability 
(O’Hora, Peláez & Barnes-Holmes, 2005; O’Hora, Peláez, Barnes-Holmes, Rae, 
Robinson & Chaudhary, 2010). In addition, evidence suggests that speed and acuity of 
derived relational responding is positively correlated with verbal intelligence (O’Toole & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2010). Recent interventions studies similarly highlight a link between 
derived relational responding and verbal-cognitive ability. Efforts to strengthen derived 
relational responding can predict enhancements in verbal IQ after 3-6 months (e.g. 
Cassidy et al., 2011; Colbert et al., 2015; Hayes et al., 2015; Roche et al., 2015). It is 
important to note, however, that this latter research is still in its infancy. 
 Other longitudinal studies tenuously suggest a link between derived relational 
responding and verbal-cognitive processes like concept learning and categorization. 
Using a single-case design, Lipkens, Hayes and Hayes (1993) tracked the emergence of 
derived relational responding in an infant, from 16 to 23 months. Derived stimulus 
relations were observed to become more complex across time: from derived symmetry to 
derived equivalence responding. Some have been noted that this timespan also 
corresponds with the development of early verbal-cognitive abilities, e.g. concept 
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learning and verbal category formation (Hayes et al., 2001). However, and to the best of 
my knowledge, this developmental correlation has not been directly measured.  
 In general, there is some evidence to suggest that the performance on derived 
relational responding tasks corresponds to verbal-cognitive processes. However, these 
studies have generally focused on language-in-general (e.g. verbal IQ scales). Few 
studies have systematically examined the specific link between performance on derived 
relational responding tasks and conceptual processing (cf. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2005). 
While the predictive validity is promising, it is far from certain.  
 Diagnostic validity. There are two seminal experimental studies that suggest that 
deficits in derived relational responding relate to abnormal verbal-cognitive processes. 
Devany, Hayes and Nelson (1986) first exposed three groups of young children to a MTS 
task wherein two comparison stimuli were mutually related to a common sample stimulus, 
e.g. A!B and A! C. The emergence of derived equivalence relations was then 
examined, i.e. B!C and C!B. One group consisted of normally developing 2 year olds. 
A second group consisted of developmentally delayed 2-4 year olds without deficits in 
verbal skills. A final group consisted of developmentally delayed 2-4 year olds with 
impaired verbal skills. Participants were also matched for mental age based on the 
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale. During testing, children with normal verbal capacities 
emitted derived equivalence relations, irrespective of their clinical diagnosis. Derived 
relational responding was however absent in the group of verbally impaired children.  
 Using a near-identical protocol, Barnes, McCullagh and Kennan (1990) recruited 
three groups of children that were not diagnosed with any form of developmental delay; 
instead, the children differed in verbal age. One group constituted a healthy control with a 
verbal age above two years. A second group consisted of profoundly deaf children who 
evinced a verbal age above two years. A final group consisted of profoundly deaf 
children whose verbal age was below two years. Again, results indicated that verbally 
impaired children were unable to emit derived equivalence responding.  
 Overall, it appears that an inability to engage in derived relational responding 
correlates with impairments in verbal-cognitive capacities. It therefore seems as though 
the diagnostic validity of our experimental protocols is well grounded. However, it must 
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be noted that these studies (once again) speak to verbal-cognitive abilities in a general 
sense and not specifically concept formation and categorization.   
 Construct Validity. Relational frame theory (RFT; Hayes et al., 2001; Dymond & 
Roche, 2013) is a contemporary behavior analytic theory of human verbal processes. This 
framework attempts to, not just explain the emergence of derived relational responding, 
but also elaborates on the connection between derived relational responding and verbal 
behavior.  
 Relational responding is considered to be an operant behavior that is selected and 
shaped by environmental events (e.g. Skinner, 1974). Relational responding is, at first, 
perceptually based and is even observable in non-human animals. For instance, Reese 
(1968) presented rhesus monkeys with multiple sets of light bulbs, one of which was 
always brighter than the others. The selection of the brighter light bulb was continuously 
reinforced. During a final test phase with novel sets of light bulbs were presented. The 
brighter bulb was consistently selected despite the absence of previous history of 
reinforcement. This demonstrates the shaping of a purely functional operant behavior; it 
is as though a relational concept of ‘brighter’ has been acquired and animals can now 
respond to (or group) stimuli within respect to this relation (Hayes et al., 2001; also, see 
Castro & Wasserman, 2011). Relational responding is thought to be more sophisticated in 
verbally-able humans. Contextual features that typically precede relational responses are 
discriminated across time. These cues can subsequently prompt (or control) the emission 
of relational responding, even in the case that the stimuli are physically distinct. Words 
like “same” or  “similar”, for example, might prompt individuals to relate two physically 
dissimilar stimuli as being interchangeable with one another. Relational responding can 
essentially become arbitrarily applicable (Hayes et al., 2001; Dymond & Roche, 2013).  
 Over time, arbitrary applicable relational responding is thought to become more 
intricate by virtue of feedback from a verbal community. There is, however, a paucity of 
direct developmental research to indicate that derived relational responding is operant-
based. This framework relies on numerous studies that collectively suggest derived 
relational responding has the properties of operant behavior. For instance, derived 
relational responses (i) can be brought under the control of contextual cues (e.g. Wulfert 
& Hayes, 1988), (ii) can be reinforced or even punished by virtue of their environmental 
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consequences (e.g. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2004; Cassidy et al., 
2011) and (iii) emerge and grow in complexity across ontogeny (Lipkens et al., 1993).  
 With respect to categorization and concept learning, relational frame theory 
appeals to derived stimulus relations to understand the abstraction of conceptual relations 
between environmental entities (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2005). This is the behavioral 
process whereby untrained relations emerge by reversing (e.g. symmetry relations) or 
combining (e.g. equivalence relations) previously learned relations. Second, the control 
that conceptual relations exert over behavioral and emotional responding is linked to the 
transfer (or transformation) of stimulus function. This is the behavioral process wherein 
the response elicited to a stimulus is in accordance with its derived stimulus relations. A 
neutral stimulus might, for example, evoke heightened fear due to its derived equivalence 
to a threat-relevant stimulus (Augustson & Dougher, 1997). 
In conclusion, I have attempted to elaborate on the links between a functionally 
defined learning mechanism (derived relational responding) and cognitive constructs like 
conceptual processing and verbal categories. The face validity is relatively clear; there 
indeed appears to be a connection between the two. Longitudinal and cross-sectional 
research studies also imply that derived relational responding captures some components 
of verbal-cognitive processing in general (predictive and diagnostic validity). There is 
however little direct evidence of a specific link with conceptual processing. Lastly, RFT 
provides an adequate theoretical framework with which to understand the connection 
between derived relational responding and conceptual processes (construct validity). 
Therefore, it can be assumed (for the moment) that derived relational responding, as 
studied in the laboratory, may represent or speak to the conceptual processing of 
environmental events.  
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Final thoughts 
  “Every individual is at once the beneficiary and the victim of the linguistic 
tradition into which he has been born—the beneficiary inasmuch as language gives 
access to the accumulated records of other people's experience, the victim in so far as it 
… bedevils his sense of reality, so that he is all too apt to take his concepts for data, his 
words for actual things”.  
 
 In penning these words Aldeus Huxley (1954) captures to perfection the boon and 
bane of conceptual (or symbolic) behavior. One the one hand, the ability to categorize 
environmental events together and respond to them interchangeably affords an economy 
of learning. It is indeed a highly adaptive capacity. On the other hand, conceptual 
relations between stimuli can become problematic when they inflexibly determine our 
emotional responding (Hayes et al., 1999). This is evident in cases of excessive category-
level fear generalization- a common feature of human anxiety (Hermans, Vervliet, & 
Baeyens, 2013).  
 The current dissertation hoped to explore this clinical phenomenon from a 
learning psychology perspective. A particular weight was therefore placed on the role of 
derived relational responding. Our experimental studies have clear implications for the 
current industry of overgeneralization research. It has been demonstrated that conceptual 
similarities between stimuli can interact with perceptual similarities thus creating a 
complex network of feared objects. We also suggest that this might be a trans-diagnostic 
process that features in other disorders that involve fear learning, e.g. chronic pain. 
Finally, we have identified certain factors that moderate the impact of conceptual 
relations on fear responding, e.g. the qualitative nature of relations and context-based 
manipulations. Most importantly, the current dissertation offers a reflection on our 
progress to-date. It is obvious that considerably more work is required before this 
fundamental research program can realize its full clinical potential. Only with further 
study can a sophisticated understanding of category-level fear generalization emerge. At 
this point, we may boast the knowledge and technology to predict, as well as control, fear 
overgeneralization.   
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Appendix 
 
An illustration of a basic 
 Matching-to-Sample Task 
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(1) This is an example of the stimuli typically used during the Matching-to-Sample task. 
Specifically, some non-words and novel shapes are presented. Stimuli are arranged into 
different counterbalanced orders and described in alphanumeric (e.g. A1, B1, C1, A2, B2, 
& C2).  
 
 
(2) The MTS task begins with a set of training trials; a set of stimulus-stimulus relations 
are directly reinforced. This example contains 4 types of training trials (one on each row) 
(I) A sample stimulus is presented on screen. (II) Comparison stimuli are presented at the 
bottom of the screen; there may be 2 or more comparison stimuli. (III) The participant 
selects one of the comparison stimuli. This is completed using a mouse click or a key-
press. (IV) During the training trials, corrective feedback follows each selection. 
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(3) Derived stimulus relations can involve a reversal of the previously trained stimulus-
stimulus relations. In a basic MTS task, this reversal is known as symmetry responding. A 
series of test trials is administered to probe for the emergence of derived symmetry 
responding. (I) A stimulus that acted as a comparison stimulus during the training trials is 
now presented as the sample stimulus. (II) Sample stimuli from the previous training 
trials are now presented as the comparison stimuli. (III) Participants must choose one of 
the comparison stimuli. There is no corrective feedback during test trials.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) Derived stimulus relations can involve a combination of the previously trained 
stimulus-stimulus relations. In the case of a basic MTS task, this combination is known as 
equivalence responding. A series of test trials is administered to probe for the emergence 
of derived symmetry responding. (I) A comparison stimulus from the training trials is 
now presented as the sample stimulus. (II) Other comparison stimuli from the training 
trials are presented on screen (still as comparison stimuli). (III) Participants must choose 
one of the comparison stimuli. There is no corrective feedback during test trials. 
  
 
 
 
 

